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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTORY 
In this dissertation, we are going to consider a part of the his-
tory of welfare economics. This we propose to do by a study of the 
history and developll2llt of tha concept of oonsumer•s surplus. We shall 
show that it has a very useful role to play as a measure of tt¥= gains 
from exchange in the theory of oonsumer demand and as a determi.nant of 
ideal out put. 
Welfare economics is first of all a study of the economic progress 
of society. Two kinds of analysis of progress are used by economists. 
The one, essentially static, compares, as it were, the social balance 
sheet at the end of one phase of development with that at the beginning. 
The other, llhich is dynamic, seeks to vork out the path of growth of the 
economy and to measure the trend of tba objective indices of progress. 
This dissertation represents an exercise in the first kind of analysis, 
for the analytical tool we examine is an equilibrium concept, or better, 
it is an 11ex post" measure of benefit. While qynamic analysis .may some 
dey" offer a more accurate means of determining the direction of society, 
we cannot devote attention to it in its present stage of development in 
this kind of a paper.1 We suggest that the renascence of interest in 
1 
However, cf. P. A. Samuelson, Foundations 2£ Economic Analysis 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1947); John R. Hicks, A Contri-
bution to the Theory of ~ Trade Cycle (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1950). 
welfare economics may lead to a sharpening of eynam.ic tools. 
Progress is an elusive concept and one vbich is ultimately subjec-
tive. To measure it, we nru.st set goals and determine the movement of 
society toward those goals. In Section Ill of this chapter, we shall 
look at those goals devised by economists from the early deys of clas-
::deism to the present. It should be noticed that we do not deal direct-
ly with the concept of progress in this paper but rather that we exaai.me 
the developm.en_t of one measure of subjective satisfaction from the con-
sumption of the results of physical prodl.ction. We look at the W'B'3"S in 
vd:lich it can be used as an indication of social gains and in this way 
we shall see whether it is perhaps possible to say something ~aningful 
about economic progress. It may be useful at some time to consider 
whether such a concept as progress does in fact exist, rut here we not 
only assume that it c:Des exist l::ut we also assume that so~ ~asure of 
it is available. 
Those economists whose works we are to consider are modest in 
their claims regarding the usefulness of the consumer's surplus as an 
indication of economic progress. It follows that our conclusions re-
garding their work and its significance will not be startling in 
character. We do believe that this review of their works will indicate 
the proper role of the concept and the reasons for its renascence in 
1 
recent years. These conclusions are, however, tentative and subject 
1 
It was thought until rather recently that con~r's surplus 
(Continued on following page) 
to revision in the light of additional evidence and more refined treat-
ment. 
II 
The method we have chosen to accomplish our purpose is basically 
illustrative. We shall seek to show what consumer's surplus is and ·how 
it can be used by examination of the relation between the various im-
portant surplus concepts, of the meaning of the consumer dEID.and theory 
in welfare terms, of the writings of tb:l developers of the concept of 
consumer's surplus, and of the possible role of consumer's surplus in 
recent theoretical issues. 
1 (Continued from previous :page) 
ought to be consigned to the scrap-heap of economics. (Cf. F. 
Machlup, "Professor Hicks' Statics," Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(Feb., 1940) Esp. p. 282.) It was said to involve the concept of 
measurable utility as well as the assumption of constant marginal 
utility of money. Its renascence has been the outgrowth of the use 
of ordina.l concepts in utility measure:nent and of the indifference 
curve technique for utility analysis. Since just before the war, 
consumer's surplus has been given very complete treatment in many 
articles appearing in economic journals in Great Britain; (the follow-
ing is a sample listing: M.F. Vi. Joseph, "The Excess Burden of Indi-
rect Taxation, 11 Review of Economic Studies (1939); J. R. Hicks, 11The 
Rehabilitation of Consumer 1 s Surplus, 11 Review of Economic Studies 
(1941); A. Henderson, 11Consumer 1s Surplus and the Compensating Varia-
tions," Review of Economic Studies (1942); J. R. Hicks, 11The Four Con-
sumer's Surpluses," Review of Economic Studies (1943) and more pres-
ently has begun to receive notice in American journals. (Cf. R. L. 
Bishop, 11 Consumer 1s Surplus and Cardinal Utility, 11 Quarterly Journal 
of Economics (1943); F. H. Knight, "Realism and Relevance in the 
Theory of Demand, 11 Journal of Political Economy (1944); R. E. Boulding, 
"The Concept of Economic Surplus," American Economic Review (1945); 
J. H. Morgan, "Measurement of Gain am Losses," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (1948). --
This will require a definition of surplus, a description of its 
nature, and an outline of the meaning and significance of consumer's 
surplus, rent, and surplus value--major surplus concepts. This we do 
in Chapter Two. Chapter Three is a technical treatment of tbe role of 
consumer's surplus in consumer demand theory. It is not exhaustive in 
any sense and seeks only to outline the connection between consumer's 
surplus and consumption theory vnich economists before Marshall saw, 
that which Marshall presented in his Principles of Ecooomics, and that 
which has grown up in fairly recent years, especially at ttra hands of 
John R. Hicks and Paul A. Samuelson. 
In Chapters Four, Fiv:e, and Six we enoounter the core of this 
dissertation, for there are presented in a series of studies the wel-
fare economic principles of seven economists as these principles in-
volved the development and use of the consumer's surplus. These men 
are selected for special treatment because their presentations have 
influenced greatly the present use of tre concept. Throughout these 
chapters, however, reference is made to the works of others vbose con-
tributions have tended to amend and clarify the issues involved in the 
use of consumer's surplus. We have in these three chapters adopted 
the procedure of considering the ideas of each man separately and let-
ting the concept of the consumer's surplus act as the unifying factor 
so that it .IIlB3' be seen how much alike are the thought patterns of Uese 
men, especially as they seek a measure of progress. Our purpose in 
this is to point up the welfare content of the cons~er's su;-plus. 
The reviving interest in measures of consumer satisfaction has 
4 
made it apparent that, in a number of fields of economic research, some 
attempt to correlate the results that could be obtained by the use of 
such a measure of ideal output with those obtained without its use 
might yield interesting conclusions. In Chapter Seven, then, we tum 
our attention to two general ranges of problems--those of tm ideal 
output under monopolistic competition--and carefully reconsider them 
in the light of the consumer's surplus. Though few new conclusions are 
drawn, forgotten or overlooked matters of sone importance are pointed 
up. 
In Chapter Eight, our final one, we turn to the criticisms that 
have been directed against the concept of a consumer's surplus to see 
whether 'these criticisms will affect the general conclusions of this 
paper. We do not seek to analyze these criticisms in the light of 
their accuracy so much as to analyze those phases of consumer's surplus 
theory at lilich the criticisms are aimed. Perhaps, in this way, we can 
come to see why they have not been fully effective as well as why con-
sumer's surplus should need rehabilitation. The chapter concludes with 
a setting out of four possible levels of welfare analysis in order to 
see what part consumer's surplus can play at each level. This methodo-
logical device helps us to consider certain of the issues involved in 
consumer's surplus theory in their turn and serves to summarize mat we 
have said about the utility of the concept. 
The reasoning involved in the oo nsumer' s surplus theory and con-
sidered in the following pages assumes that we can abstract from the 
intricate complex of independent and dependent variables which comprises 
5 
the masses of economically meaningful data a canparatively few simple 
relationships between tastes (and/or preferences), incomes, prices, 
and a given good (or set of goods). These relationships do not usually 
allow for the influence of factors which lie just at the periphery or 
beyond (e.g. other prices, other goods, etc.) for if they did, the 
analysis would be unduly complicated but the conclusions vould not be 
appreciably altered. 
This form of analysis requires that we use mathematical tools in 
our presentation, both because mathematics makes the presentation 
formally easier and because much of what has been written in recEnt 
years has been couched in mathematical terms. An especial feature of 
recent articles has been tre use of tb3 indifference curve technique. 
Because we recognize the complexity of this device and of the algebraic 
reasoning w:lich usually accompanies it, we will, whenever possible, 
translate the conclusions obtained with the use of these tools into 
either literary form or the more familiar demand and supply curves. 
As a final statement regarding what we propose to do, we may point 
out that this study does not seek to present a complete history of con-
sumer's surplus concepts. We attempt, rather, to build up a schema of 
thought tha~ will aid in understanding the reasons for the renascence 
of these once neglected ideas. Likewise, only that part of consumer 
demand theory is treated which relates directly to the present use of 
the consumer's surplus. Basic to our analysis is the relationship of 
consumer's surplus to the economics of welfare, but we do not try to 
give a complete history of welfare economics. This, then, is a stuqy 
6 
of the welfare connotations of consUIIEr demand theory as they involve 
the consu.ner 1s surplus. 
III 
Although it is true that welfare theory has s:>metimes been viewed 
as a specialized branch of economics, it is als:> true that this sort of 
reasoning has played a significant part in all economic wrl ting. Mer-
cantilism, for -example, involved explicit measures of the benefits ac-
cruing to the nation from the operation of a particular economic system 
as well as certain obvious goals (e.g. favorable balance of trade, etc.). 
Laissez faire, free trade, perfect competition, all measures of surplus, 
are phases of a type of welfare economics. 
Because an understanding of the relevancy of tba subject matter of 
this dissertation requires a view of society Ybich must be carefully 
set forth, let us now look into the maning of tba ideal principles of 
classical and neo-classical economics and at tba ways economists have 
recently come to regard them. We will find it possible to cb this with-
out resort to the mathematical form of analysis. 
Economists of the English classical tradition sought to set out 
ideal principles by which the real problems of the economy might be in-
1 
terpreted and understood and perchance be solved. Ideal in the sEllae 
1 
The following is in part based upon Chapters III and IV of 
(Continued on following page) 
7 
of individual freedom, these principles postulated that each individual 
understood his own self-interest and that if permitted to pursue that 
well-understood self-interest the individual "YDuld contribute to the 
good of all. They attempted to explain social behavior in terms of a 
rational, self-interested, acquisitive "economic man. 11 This individual-
ism was limited only by tm requirements of the social order. It was 
reasoned that the nature and worth of the individuals of a society men 
summated equalled the nature and mrth of the social whole. 
The nature of the individual was, however, linked very closely 
with a particular kind of society end social organization which gave 
meaning to the concept of individualism. It was not the completely un-
restrained individual who was the center and measure of this social 
whole, but rather that individual vilose character most closely conformed 
to the ideals established in the tradition of Anglo-saxon Puritan theol-
ogy. 
Within the limits of tm traditional pattern, however, there was 
ample room for the diversification of individual talents. (Random 
1 
(Continued from previous page) 
W. E. Moore, Industrial Relations and the Social Order (New York, The 
Macmillan Company, 1946). Moore closely follows the sociological ap-
proach to economics of Max Weber and his American disciple, Talcott 
Parsons. Cf. T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1937) Esp. Chapters II, TII, IV. 
8 
diversification was not justified, but that which existed within the 
degree and extent dictated by the occupational distribution in the 
society and the chance far useful work was.·) Each person was to be 
doing the wol'K for which he was best fitted and in which he might pro-
duce the most consonant with his abilities. This was some'Wh.at broader 
than simple individualism. It added to the concept of the "economic 
man" a duty to specialize. This emphasis on the specialization of 
talents provided the outstanding social characteristic of the society 
of ideal capitalism--the division of labor. 
Free labor and a free market were also characteristics of the 
ideal political economy. The eJCpression 11free labor" included not only 
wage labor, but the independent economic activities of all classes of 
individuals in the production and distribution of economic goods. This 
"individual initiative" emphasized the economic individual's role in the 
production of utilities, vilich were assumed to be ultimately measurable 
and capable of expression in tenns of money. The free laborer was ac-
quisitive, always seeking after a moving goal, with -wants that were in-
definitely extensible. He was technically efficient, capable of com-
paring the methods of production ·and of selecting that one Yilich best 
served to further his own-self-interest and increase his income. He 
was the owner of the means of production with power of alienation. In 
short, the free laborer was an acquisitive, technically efficient pro-
ducer of economic utilities (and therefore income) who owned the ~ans 
of production. 
The market in which goods and labor services were sold and bought 
9 
10 
was not positively regulated or manipulated by any agency or organiza-
tion, political or otherwise, but was rather "determined" by the impar-
tial operation of unregulated "supply and demand. 11 Such regulation as 
did occur was to keep the narket free. This simply meant that the in-
dividual consumers 11 came to the mrket 11 willing '00 buy at certain 
prices certain quantities of conmodities mich separate and discrete 
produce s were willing to sell at certain prices. None of the three 
elements of the mrket--price, supply, and demand-was assumed to be 
regulated fran outside the market. Not only did this free narket re-
quire that no external positive regulation occur, w t als:> that the 
market was not to be regulated through collaboration or conspiracy be-
tween buyers and sellers. Pure competition thus insured that the indi-
vidual's efficiency was impartially and impersonally weighed and pre-
sumably appropriately rewarded within the economic system itself. 
Each individual participant in the market had tm freedom to con-
tract for the sale of his goods and services to anyone he wished, that 
is, with that person with whom he could make the best bargain. The 
contractual relationship was voluntary, limited to specified rights and 
duties, explicit, and involved tre giving of consideration to all parties. 
This implied an equality of opportunity in the bargaining in the market 
place. 
Every fonn of property was conceived to be a possible article of 
conmerce and '00 be freely transferable. Land, labor, capitaJ.,.-all were 
subject to the same measuring stick of economic value as was every other 
economic good. Hence, tre mrket could not only be free but also active 
11 
and .fluid, .for it was essential to a .free market that the means of pro-
duction be available to all those \'tho could afford them. Thus, not only 
consumption goods were transferred on the mrket, but. through absentee 
ownership and paper symbols of ownership, the means of produ.ction were 
also subject to the counter-balancing pressures of supply and demand. 
There was assumed to be behind this .free mrket a legal .framework 
lilich was constant so that knowledge of its operation was alone sufficient 
in the rational calculation of means to tm end of the self-interest of 
the individual participant in the mrket. Justice was not purchasable; 
it was reasonably certain; it was impartial; it was not arbitrary. In 
summary the .free market of capitalism involved ideally free competition, 
impersonal judgment of efficiency, freedom of contract, equality of 
opportunity, commercialization and transferability of all property, as 
well as certainty and predictability in the operation of the law. 
All of the foregoing was expressed in the equation o.f supply and 
demand which determined the equilibrium price, the value vilich repre-
sented the true relation between economic forces. The refinements of 
the neo-classicist consisted in more careful definition of the meaning 
of the exchange equilibrium to meet the arguments of the Marxist that the 
equilibrium might not be consistent with economic justice.1 To the con-
1 
Some might contend that this is an overstatement, but cf. Roll, 
! HistoEY of Economic Thought, Revised Edition (New York, Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1942Jpp. 404-411. 
cept of the economic man, the free market and free labor were added 
the marginal tools of analysis with vbich it seemed possible to set 
out more exact conditions for the equilibrium. and to describe more 
accurately the ideal role of the JIBrket in society. 
It was now possible to state in technical fonn. the advantages of 
the perfectly competitive mrket.1 The first advantage was that it 
would not be possible by producing more of one commodity and less of 
another commodity to make any one consumer better off without making 
other consumers worse off. The equation between supply and demand was 
a maximum condition for equilibrium of economic welfare. This first 
advantage proceeded from the fact that each consumer was assumed to 
spend his money (income) on the different comnodities in such a way 
that the marginal utility of the money spent on each commodity was the 
same for all commodities which made up his consumption l:udget. It was 
12 
also assumed that each factor of pro<hction moved into that industry in 
which the value of its marginal product was the highest. 
The second advantage accruing to society from the operation of the 
perfectly competitive market was that it VDuld not be possible to in-
crease output beyond that detenn.ined by the supply-demand chiasma. 
Output was at a maximum in the sense that it vould only be possible 
1 
Cf. J. E. lleade and C. J. Hitch, An Introcilction to Economic 
Analysis and Policy (New York, Oxford University Press,l93S) pp. 
117-124. 
with the given amunt of factors of production to produce more of any 
one commodity by prochlcing less of soiiB other. Thus, all the factors 
of production 1110uld be employed in the most efficient combinations in 
the different industries, so that with full Employment, no increase in 
the total product was possible. 
A third advantage postulated that all the prochlcing units of the 
community 1110uld be of the most efficient size when the final inter-
action of supply and demand had set the long run conditions of equili-
brium. This implied that there vould have to be freedom of entry and 
exit in every industry and in the general economy. 
13 
It is not surprising that SODB economists should have coJIE to re-
gard these ideal principles and their marginal reinforcement as indica-
tive of a position of maximum satisfaction, and that s:>m should feel 
the equilibrium doctrine to be possessed of an almost theological 
flavor. Yet the most rigorous statement o.f the perfect oompetition 
market equilibrium is consistent wi. th the existence of som form of the 
surplus we have chosen to exam.irie. Marx worked within this frame1t0rk, 
accepted all its major tenents as they were held in his age, and yet 
derived a surplus doctrine l'lhich has been a political catalyst in 
modern capitalist states. For him, objective price--exchange value--
could and did exist apart from subjective price--use value--and the 
equilibrating action of the forces of demand and supply did not operate 
to keep use-value and exchange-value in equality in the capitalist 
economy. Obviously his interpretation of justice, of freedom of con-
tract, of equality of opportunity could not be orthodox, rut the 
reality these concepts sought to explain he found to exist and took 
full account of their action in his theoretical presentation. 
Though Marx's surplus value analysis depended on a rationale 
which is in some respects different from most of the classicists~ it 
is in fact possible to go farther than he did and accept every inter-
pretation of society as presented thus far and still find surplus to 
have a real meaning against the background of the exchange equilibrium. 
Marshall has pointed out that 
It is true that so long as the demand price is in 
excess of the supply price, exchanges can be effected 
at prices 'llhich give a surplus of satisfaction to l:::Juyer 
or to seller or to both. The marginal utility of mat 
he receives is greater than that of which he gives up, 
to at least one of the tw:> parties; while the other, if 
he does not gain by tie exchange, yet does not lose by 
•t 1 ~ . 
Short of the equilibrium price, every step in the process of exchange 
would increase the aggregate satisfaction of the JS.rties. When at 
last equilibrium had been reached, "there would be no room for any 
surplus. n2 The marginal utility af' vbat each receives is now ecpal 
to that vbich he gives up. Beyond the equilibrium amunt of pro due-
tion, the demand price must be less than the supply price and 11no 
terms can be arranged vtlich will be acceptable to the l:::Juyer, and will 
1 
A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, Sth Edition, (London, 
Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1930) p. 470. 
2 
.!:£.£· ill· 
1 
not involve a loss to the seller." 
15 
In a limited sense this equilibrium must be admitted to be a posi-
tion of maximum satisfaction to every p1rty and every individual in the 
economy. Up to the point of equilibrium every increase in production 
must bring an increase in aggregate satisfaction. Beyond the point of 
equilibrium production cannot be maintained 11 so long as buyers and 
sellers acted freely as individuals, each in his own interest, n2 but 
this assumes an equality of social position, of wealth, of intelligence 
which cannot be found to accord with any real society and with very few 
fancied utopias. It is obvious that if we were to divide society into 
only t"WO classes according as the individual members of society are 
habitually to be found on tlle consumption or production side af the mar-
ket, the doctrine o.f ma:x.imwn satisfactions involves an equal marginal 
utility for every unit of money (or income) as between all .!IEID.bers of 
each class, or, as Marshall put it, it YiOuld involve 11that the satis-
faction llhich is rated at a shilling by anyone of them, may be taken as 
equal to one that is rated at a shilling by any other. n3 
Marshall gives the following example. If in a society of pearl-
divers, all food were produced by a separate class of farmers l'ho were 
~rshall, 2£• cit., p. 471. 
2 
Loc. cit. 
3 Loc. cit. 
also international merchants in the pearl trade and the procncers of 
the food were on the average richer than the producers of the pearls, 
16 
it is obvious that total satisfaction might be increased if the pro-
duction of the food were extended beyond the equilibrium amount (and 
sold at a loss). The rich farmers at the equilibrium level of p due-
tion receive a surplus of satisfactions as compared with the pearl-
divers. 
From this sort of reasoning Marshall concluded that: 
There is on abstract grounds rather less prima facie 
cause than the earlier economists supposed, for the general 
doctr:ine of so-called "maximum satisfaction"; for the doc-
trine that the free pursuit by each individual of his own 
immediate interest, will lead producers to turn their ex-
penditure into such oourses as are most conducive to the 
general interests. • •• Even without taking into acoount of 
the evils arising from the unequal distribution of wealth, 
there is prima facie reason for believing that the aggregate 
satisfaction, so far fran beiog already a ma:ximum, could be 
much increased by collective action in promoting the pro-
duction and consumption of thiogs in regard to micb. the law 
of increasing returns acts with especial force.l 
So long, then, as we can postulate one point in a cartesian plane, 
at which point alone supply and demand will be satisfied, we have a 
point· of maximum satisfaction consistent with the existence of con-
sumer's surplus. The chiasma of supply and demand determine, as it 
we~, marginal conditions of maximum satisfaction.2 It is still pos-
~rshall, ££• cit., p. 502. 
2
cf. M. W. Reder, Studies in the Theory 2f Welfare Economics 
(New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1947); P. A. Samuelson, Foundations 
{Continued on following page) 
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sible by making some individuals worse off and others better off to 
increase total satisfactions. Thus, a redistribution or income through 
some means such as a subsidy to farmers to encourage them to produce 
more than the equilibrium amount of wheat and so to increase the sum 
of satisfactions of consumers by an amount greater than the general 
tax which must be levied to provide the subsidy, will involve .moyement 
away from the chiasma of supply and demand obtained under pure competi-
tion. The marginal conditions are not sufficient although they are 
necessary. 
If', next, we add a third dimension to our typical-price-quantity 
chart and measure along this new axis income, we shall find that the 
marginal conditions define a line at the intersection of supply and 
demand planes, no point along which is definable as on:~ of maximum 
satisfactions by tha .narginal conditions. There are necessary stabll-
ity conditions to insure that the position taken on this line is one of 
1 (Continued from previous page) 
of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948) Esp. 
Ch. 7, 8; H. R. Bowen, Toward Social Econoy (New York, Rinehart & 
Company, Inc., 1948); J. R. Hicks' "Foundations or Welfare Economics, II 
Economic Journal, Vol. XLIX, pp. 696ff; A. Bergson, "A Refornmlation 
of Certain Aspects or Welfare Economics, II Quarterly Journal 2!:. §.£2-
nomics, Vol. LII, pp. 310ff; N. Kaldor, ·~elfare Propositions in Eco-
nomies," Economic Journal, Vol. XLIX, pp. 549ff; 0. Lange, "The Foun-
dations of Welfare Economics," Econometrica, Vol. X, pp. 215ff; T. 
deSeitovsky,"A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics," Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. IX, pp. 77; Hl.a Myint, Theories of wetrare Eco-
nomies (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948) Ch. VII. -
18 
maximum satisfaction. These stability conditions involve that both 
the supplier and the demander have diminishing IIBrginal rates of sub-
stitution or what is the same thing that their consumption indifference 
curves be convex to the origin and that. their production indifference 
curves be concave to the origin. It will not be possible by shifting 
either the indifference curves or the production curves to find oome 
better position in terms of satisfaction. 
We do not yet know whether the point established by the stability 
conditions on the (contract) line is an ultimate maximum. To eliminate 
all possible surpluses, we shall have to insist upon total conditions, 
such that it ld.ll be impossible to increase satisfaction by prodlcing 
some new product (with existing resources) or by increasing production 
of some product already in production. Stated in consumption terms, 
the final conditions would hold that there must exist no necessary con-
sumer want unsatisfied (within the full potential or tha economy with 
techniques unchanged) at the point of nlaxi.mum satisfactions. 
We are now ready to examine wi. th care the history and development 
of the consumer's rurplus. Yie will see that this wrplm concept is a 
very convenient means of assessing th9 results of market equilibrium 
and of measuring the effects of changes in market organization. Though 
we do not contend that consumer's surplus is a necessary part of con-
sumer demand theory and of welfare economics, its usefulness will be-
come apparent as our presentation unfolds. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE CONSUMER'S SURPLUS 
AND 
OTHER SURPLUS CONCEPTS 
It is necessary before proceeding to a stud.y of the role ~ich 
consumer's surplus plays in economic analysis that we examine in oome 
detail the consumer and other surplus concepts. Section I of this 
chapter gives a definition of surplus, while Section II seeks to pre-
sent the nature of economic surplus concepts. Section III suggests 
that surpluses may be classified best by distinguishing between abso-
lute and relative concepts and argues that the consumer •s surplus is a 
relative concept.. Although more careful definitions of consumer's sur-
plus will be presented in Chapter Five, Section IV sets out the most 
commonly used measure in order to distinguish the ooncept clearly from 
rent and surplus value with which it is s:>metimes confused. Sections V 
and VI conclude the chapter with analyses of those phases of the con-
cepts of rent and surplus value vbich make them similar to consun:er•s 
surplus as well as of those phases ~ich clearly separate the concepts. 
I 
It is perhaps significant that much of the problem of surplus 
which it is the purpose of this dissertation to discuss consists in the 
definition among economists of the word. The Webster Collegiate 
Dictionary defines surplus to be "that vbich remains when use or need 
is satisfied" but this denotative phraseology rather overlooks the 
connotative force of the w:>rd. "Use" or "need" are cultural concepts 
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largely, however much it be insisted that below them lie the basic 
requirements of human life. The economist cannot concern himself at 
length with "use" or "need" but must accept cultural definitions 
that are current and apply them to the examination of the problem of 
surplus. More to the point than Webster's is the definition of sur-
plus given in the Dictiona~ £!Economics (1949)--"that which remains 
after immediate needs have been fulfilled." This adds a time element 
to "need. ttl 
Neither definition suggests the real nature of the problem as 
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seen by economists. To the Mercantilist, the Physiocrat, the Classicist, 
the Neo-Classicist, the Marxian, and the Keynesian, surplus implies ad-
vantageous position in the exchange process. Few go as far as Mar.x to 
insist that surplus in capitalism must arive in the exchange process,2 
but most economists imply that this is the case. It is incumbant upon 
the definer of surplus that in his definition he relate the concept to 
exchange. 
If some reference to need and to exchange be necessary components 
of a definition of surplus, it will follow that such a definition must 
state that surplus is relative to the position of the observer. \1hile 
much will be said in what follows concerning a distinction between 
1H. S. Sloan and A. J. Zurcher, ! Dictiona~ £! Economics, (New 
York, Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1949) P• 240. 
2see discussion of surplus value below in Section VI. 
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relative and absolute surpluses, there can in the final analysis exist 
no absolute surplus unless we regard all return as surplus. It will not 
be helpful to so theorize for the writer does not regard himself compe-
tent in the fields of physiology, psychology, or sociology to analyze 
with a~ degree of accuracy the basic organic "needs." Above these 
"needs," however they be defined, all that has come to be regarded as 
surplus is the result of comparison with societal standards. The com-
parison can only be understood against the cultural background of the 
society and from the view point of the definer. 
If need be culturally determined, if exchange be the process of 
ttcreation" of surplus, and if all surpluses be relative, then surplus 
may be defined, in any cultural context, as that income obtained in 
the process of exchange above that adjudged to be necessary, within 
that cultural context, to life. 
II 
The concept of surplus in economics concerns social income,l and 
the manner of its distribution. Income, the means be which the life 
of individuals in a society is sustained, results from the application 
lnsocial income" implies a measure in terms of satisfactions. 
These satisfactions objectified are the flow of goods and services 
produced during the income period. 
of human effort to the productive resources of the community.1 It may 
be measured in commodity units, money units or units of subjective 
satisfaction. Although it may be conceived as a rate per unit of time, 
it wi l l be best to regard it as an amount-the amount of commodities, 
money, or subjective satisfactions which accrue to individuals and the 
community during a given period of time.2 Every objective good of what-
ever kind or form which has significance for a society in the fulfill-
ment of individual or social desires and every subjective satisfaction 
of the psyche which results from the fulfillment of desires is a part 
of income. The component parts of income flow may be rights, privileges, 
services, pleasures; they may be received or receivable; they may be 
tangible or intangible, fungibles or nonfungibles. The society and its 
cultural context determine the definitional limits of "income." 
Income arises from the application of human effort to the productive 
resources of the area in which the society is found. While it is con-
ceivable that a society may subsist, with comparatively little effort, 
from free goods which require but little in their appropriation, modern 
l"The labor and capital of the country, acting upon its natural 
resources, produce annually a certain net aggregate of commodities, 
naterial and immaterial, including services of all kinds. This is the 
true net annual income or revenue of the country of the national 
dividend... A. Marshall, Principles of Economics (London, Macmillan, 
1930) P• 524, 8th Ed. 
2cf. L. u. Fraser, Economic Thought and Language (London, Adam & 
Charles Black, 1937) PP• 330,331. 
western society "earns" its income "by the sweat of its brow."l While 
the Physiocrats assigned to land and its uses a primary role in the 
production of income, the classical economists of the English tradition 
emphasized the role of labor regardless of the resource to which it was 
applied. Economists of the twentieth century have ceased the search 
for the relatively more productive resource2 and have sought instead 
to understand the distribution of the income as well as the most 
efficient methods of its production.3 
Although the classical economists tended to regard income as a 
fund, it will be useful to look upon it as a flow because a viewpoint 
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aids in the measure of "progress." The flow of income may be sufficient 
to maintain the growth of the society population-wise; it may be more 
than sufficient or it may be less than sufficient. It is necessary to 
insist that what is sufficient is a matter of societal definition, to 
lBoth this and the previous sentence imply a labor theory of 
value. In private conversation J. R. Hicks has admitted that, as a 
philosophical ultimate, labor, or if you will, human effort, does 
create objective value, though the society by setting the frame-work 
within which individual goals are envisioned is the ultimate arbiter 
of what has value. 
2m the sense of being productive of a surplus above basic organic 
needs. 
3rt was in fact Ricardo who changed the direction of economics by 
emphasizing distribution. Though Senior and Mill add subjective 
elements to cost analysis, it was not until the rise of marginalism 
that a complete shift to consumption demand and subjective use-value 
was accomplished. Cf. J. M. Clark, "Distribution," Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences, Vol. V: 167-173. 
a discussion of which the economist can add little.l Since society 
conceptually is dynamic, subject at the very least to changes in 
population, the concept of sufficiency of income is by nature also 
dynamic. The "progress" of a given society seems to depend upon the 
ability of that society to produce an income flow at least equal to 
the growth of population.2 The most progressive societies are those 
which have discovered means of increasing the now of income so that 
it grows at a rate faster than the level of population. When the 
society with its productive machinery finds itself capable of produc-
ing more than enough on the average to maintain the growth of the 
population, the amount over that necessary or sufficient may be re-
garded as a "sull>lus ."3 
Income which just maintains the rate of population growth may be 
regarded as the cost of production. Since we may assume that the one 
basic objective of society is preservation, the attainment of a level 
of production which yields the necessary sustenance of society is the 
elemental cost, an expenditure which cannot in the logic of society 
lBut cf. E. Whittaker, A History of Economic ~ (New York, 
Longmans Green, 1940), Ch. 27 - . 
2studies of the growth of population compose what has become 
a separate science from economics despite its classical origins. 
These comments can only begin to suggest what is a matter of 
elementary discuseion among populationists. 
3Marshall uses this elemental concept of surplus in beginning 
his discussion of distribution. Cf. Marshall, ~· cit. p. 504. 
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be foregone.l Income less the cost of production is surplus. 
It is characteristic of society that this surplus is not distributed 
equally among all the members of the society. This may result from the 
fact that among the members of the society actual yields are likely to 
differ individually due to the more or less favorable personal or 
natural conditions which control eventual results. The yields which 
accrue to the majority of the members of a community are likely to 
deter.mine the low limit of the "sufficient" levels of customary con-
sumption. The above average yields of the minority of individuals is 
a differential gain due to above average performance. Since the cus-
tomary consumption level is determined principally by the average yield, 
this differential gain takes on the character of a surplus which is not 
necessary to maintain prevailing conditions.2 ~ben once the society has 
become "a going concern," it is likely to develop means whereby the 
surplus accruing to an individual is passed on to his lineage so that 
each succeeding heir has an increased personal advantage. The societal 
complex at any given period of time vnll contain intricate rules for 
the distribution of this surplus. 
lcf. Marshall, 2£• ~., Mathematical Appendix, N. XIV, pp. 
846-852. 
2This treatment is based on suggestions in H. Apel, An Outline of 
a Dynamic Theory of Income (Boston University, Ph. D. Thesis, 1945) pp. 37, )8. -
In a modern exchange economy, it will be instructive to examine 
the distribution of the surplus after the exchange equilibrium. Those 
economists whose theories of the distribution of the surplus are to be 
analyzed postulated an equilibrium of the two parties to the act of 
exchange from which they studies the character of the surplus. fuile 
26 
it is possible to describe a genuine surplus "which designates a pro-
ductive differential and relates to average consumption insofar as this 
is determined by average yields from production,"1 Ricardo's rent, Marx's 
"surplus value," and Marshall's "consumer's surplus" distinguish between 
economically necessary or justified payments and income realized beyond 
this economically justified or relevant payment which results from 
natural, social, or acquired advantages in the process of exchange. 
On the one hand the surplus is conceived to exist apart from the 
process of exchange, on the other it is traced from the exchange 
process which "creates" the surplus. While both kinds of surpluses are 
referred to in the writings of Marshall, the analytical development of 
the exchange created surplus receives emphasis in what follows. 
III 
Say's fourfold division of economics into production, exchange, 
distribution, and consumption determines at least four ways of 
lLoc. cit. 
regarding economic phenomena. Assuming a customar,y level of consumption 
which results from the average productivity of society, surplus may be 
regarded as that amount of income produced above the customary in any 
period of time. This has been called by Professor Apel 11 genuine sur-
1 plus. n Assuming an equality between supply and demand, the gains ob-
tained in the act of exchange between two or more parties over the mini-
o-re 
mum bids of the sellers and the buyers. @!a· ·~one form of Marshall's 
consumer's and producer's surplus. 
If we assume that society has devised some process of distributing 
its income, whether through organized exchange in a system of markets, 
through a system of tithing, a dole, an automatic redistribution of 
family-held resources, or theft, we may then give attention to ~ether 
the recipients got a sufficient amount. Accordingly, that income which, 
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in the process of distribution provides more than the necessary "standard 
of living, u is in the amount above that necessary, a surplus. This may 
2 be regarded as a social surplus. From the viewpoint of consumption, 
that addition to a stock of goods which yields a diminished marginal 
unit of satisfaction is a surplus. This is Professor Patten's "positive 
1 Cf. H. Apel, op. cit. Esp. Ch. III. 
2This is the ultimate form of Prof. Lerner's "rent." Cf. A. P. 
Lerner, The Economics of Control (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1944) 
p. 234.- -
utility.nl 
If we regard production as related in some equilibrium sense to 
consumption, as is implied by Say's Law of Markets, 2 then exchange will 
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be regarded as the process of equilibration. As J. B. Clark has pointed 
out, a study of distribution is in reality an analysis of the operation 
of the economic system.3 Thus, if we look at exchange, we have the key 
to the working of the system and the beginning of its analysis. To the 
economists of the English classical tradition, distribution had seemed 
to depend upon the result of the exchange equilibrium, for the equilib-
rium prices of the factors of production were in turn their 11 rewards."4 
We have drawn up our definition of economic surplus with this classical 
concept in mind. All too frequently economists use surplus in a manner 
which does not indicate whether they are referring to the production, 
1see Chapter Five below. 
211 The classical school frequently introduced the assumption of 
Say's law. This law served to remove other contradictions from the 
classical system •••• The meaning of Say's law is that people spend 
all they receive, regardless of prices. Another way o£ saying the 
same thing is that people maintain their money stocks constant regard-
less of prices. 11 Don Patinkin, "The Indeterminacy of Absolute Prices in 
Classical Economic Theory," Econometrica, Vol. 17, p. 2. 
3cf. J. B. Clark, Essentials of Economic Theory (New York, 
Macmillan Co., 1907) Esp. Ch. v. --
~or as Wicksteed pointed out "the law of exchange value is 
itself the law of distribution of the general resources of society." 
P. H. Wicksteed, An Essay on the Coordination of the Laws of 
Distribution (London, Macm.ITlan and Company, Lt'd.;-!89U')p:-7. 
exchange, distribution or consumption side of value. Except where 
necessary to point possible confusion in interpretation, surplus will 
be regarded in what follows as an exchange phenomenon and will be 
analyzed against the background of the equation of supp~ and demand. 
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To interpret properly the results obtained from analyses of surplus, 
it is clearly necessary to understand whether the surplus is absolute or 
relative.1 Does it exist as a magnitude apart from the relation between 
two or more alternative situations? Or does it appear only when alter-
natives are compared. It is one of the purposes of this paper to show 
that the consumer's surplus is a relative surplus whose analytical 
existence is dependent upon a comparison between a defined and real 
situation and a defined and possible alternative situation within the 
whole complex of the economic s.ystem. It does not need to be assumed 
that we change the values of all variables or any significant proportion 
of them or that we affect their total relation to one another or that we 
increase or decrease the sum of their interaction. A relative surplus 
concept examines the relation between one exchange relationship in a 
given market at a given time with all other factors except those intrin-
sically involved impounded in a "ceteris paribus" assumption and a 
~y first concern with this question came out of a classroom 
discussion with Prof. J. R. Hicks. On that occasion he defined rel-
ative surplus as "the difference between what a factor is paid and what 
is needs to be paid to cover cost, 11 whereas an absolute surplus is "the 
difference between what a factor is paid and what it needs to be paid 
to keep it going • 11 It will be seen that his more precise definitions 
which are to be found in Hla Myint, Theories of Welfare Economics 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948) come out of these general 
statements. 
possible alternative exchange relationship. Economists have been slow 
to come to a full usage of this surplus concept because it has not been 
clearly understood that it is not a concrete and absolute magnitude. 
Part of this lack of understanding has proceeded from the failure 
to understand the classical view of the economic problem and the extent 
to which the English neo-classicists preserved parts of that view in 
their marginal utility economics. Two recent studies of the nature of 
classicism have pointed up the concern of the classicists with the 
problem of the absolute surplus, an excess of the results of production 
over the costs of production which could be used to advance society.1 
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Vfuile it should not have needed emphasizing that capitalism depended for 
the logic of its progress upon the ability of the society to i ncrease 
production results more than production costs so that the surplus might 
add to the means of production which in turn increased the results of 
production, there had grown up a general belief that in some way the 
classical economics was concerned with the connection between production 
1
cf. Hla Myint, "The Classical View of the Economic Problem, 11 
Economica (New Series) Vol. XII, pp. 119ff. 
E. Roll, History of Economic Thought, Rev. Edition (New York, 
Prentice-Hall, 1942) Esp. Ch. V, but see also M. Bowley, Nassau Senior 
and Classical Economics (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago, 1938) pp. 67=68. 
T. DeScitovsky, "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics," 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. IX, pp. 77ff. 
and demand or the 0 allocative problem."1 
There is a reasonable doubt as to the correctness of this belief. 
Ricardo, for example, examined the net revenue of society which he con-
ceived in physical terms.2 He and other classical political economists 
devoted considerable space to an examination of the means qy which this 
net revenue might be increased. It was this that led Adam Smith to 
begin his Wealth ~ Nations with a study of the division of labor-a 
most efficient device for improving the productivity of society--and to 
present in Book II a very carefully reasoned analysis of the role of 
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capital in increasing productivity. The labor theory value in the hands 
of the classicist was not a creed but rather a device to set up a measur-
ing rod of increasing prosperity, from whence it follows that "if we 
measure the quantity of labor simply qy working time; ••• (as) ••• the total 
quantity of labor employed in producing as increased, the national income 
increases in the same proportion.•a3 This theory of value with its 
lr. DeScitovsk.y, op. cit. says "All the welfare propositions of the 
classical economists :7. are ••• based on the principle that given the 
total quantity of utilized resources, they will be best distributed 
among different uses if their rates of substitution are everywhere and . 
for every person equal; for only in such a situation will each person's 
satisfaction be carried to that maximum beyond 'Which it cannot be in-
creased w.i thout diminishing someone else's •" We insist with Myint that 
this is a misinterpretation. 
2David Ricardo, Principles of Political Econo~ and Taxation, 
Gonner Edition (London, G. P. Bell and Sons, Ltd.,9ffi" Ch. XXVI. 
3J. M. Cassells, "Re-interpretation of Ricardo on Value," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XLIX, p. 521. 
- . 
humanist implications was bolstered by an assumption that satisfaction 
was directly proportional to consumption and that if production could 
increase the goods available for consumption, satisfaction would like-
wise increase in proportion.l 
Such a view of society could not be static. The surplus concept 
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developed by the classicist was then a measure of the dynamic of society. 
It was determined by taking the total product of society over a period of 
time and subtracting from that total product, the total amount of wages. 
Profits and rent remain as the surplus. While Ricardo did qualify his 
analysis by admitting that some wages might include an element of sur-
plus, and that some profits might include elements of cost, rent was 
always a true surplus because it contained no cost element.2 If the 
amount of this surplus remained the same while the number of men employed 
(perhaps better, the number of hours at which the number of men employed 
worked) decreased, this was taken to indicate progress. It was more 
likely that the ability to increase the surplus would lead to the employ-
ment of more not less labor for "capital (would) naturally flow, when 
trade is free, into those occupations wherein the least quantity of 
labor is required to be maintained at home; ••• to trades where profits 
are in proportion to the capital, and not in proportion to the quantity 
of labor employed. 113 We shall have occasion to examine a reversion to 
laicardo, op. cit., pp. 336-337. 
2 Loc. cit. 
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classicism in the writings of Simon Nelson Patten and John A. Hobson and 
there consider what can be said with the new technical language about the 
absolute surplus. 
The English neo-classicist, Alfred Marshall, pointed out that "our 
growing power over nature makes her yield an ever larger surplus above 
necessaries."l The Malthusian fear that productive ability could not keep 
pace with increasing population was rejected by him. This surplus "is 
not absorbed by an unlimited increase of the population, n2 he said. In 
fact, one of the major questions he sought to answer in Book VI was "what 
are the general causes which govern the distribution of this surplus among 
the people. 11 But a shift in approach had occurred since Smith had written. 
Beginning with Ricardo there had been increased emphasis on utility but 
Mill while seeming to restate the classical doctrines had in reality given 
them subjective interpretations. It was quite natural then that Marshall 
should regard the total product of society as 11 the sum total of satis-
factions") (or H) and the costs of production as the "sum total of dis-
satisi'actions11 (or V), and suggest that "there is constant tendency to 
make H-V a maximum for society as a whole." 
While Marshall thus sought a means of measuring welfare absolutely, 
1 A. Marshall, ~· cit., p. 496 
2Ibid. 
)Marshall, op • ..£!.:!:.•, p. 8.51 
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though he did not feel he had succeeded in this, marginal utility econo-
mists on the Continent were principally concerned with mat has been 
called the "scarcity problem," v.hich is essentially relative. Myint 
has shown that llhen we say that "economics is the study of the princi-
plea governing the allocation of scarce means among competing ends when 
the objective of the allocation is to maximize the attairmants of the 
ends, 111 we imply that the concern of economics is with a given quantity 
of resources and the maximization of consumer wants consistent with the 
best use of those resources. 2 It is not erroneous to say that the Eng-
lish neo-classicist saw the economic problem in essentially this way, 
but it must not be forgotten that he had not jettisoned the absolute 
surplus concept of the classicist. 
The relative surplus concept arose out of a recognition that no 
practical means existed for determining the value of H and V. If one 
turned from the absolute view of the surplus to find what a relative 
concept of surplus might mean, he YOuld find himself "concerned with 
the net changes in economic welfare due to given changes in particular 
sectors of the economic system, tre rest of tre system being assumed 
to be constant.n3 
lc. J. Stigler, The Theory of Price (New York, The Macmillan 
Company, 1946) P• 12. 
~yint, .2£• cit. 
3Hla Myint, Theories of Weliare Economics, P• 147. 
Besides the distinction between relative and absolute surplus 
concepts, a further classification device would set qualitative sur-
pluses apart from quantitative surpluses. The standard of reference 
for such a separation is the element of price. Thus a change in the 
form of a given commodity might involve no change in price but in the 
minds of some of its purchasers it may involve an increase in satis-
faction. It is possible, then, that quality changes might yield a sur-
plus which price data does not indicate. Obviously, quantitative sur-
pluses are those which are observable against price data. 
A recent articlel has sought to show that such a qualitative sur-
plus is rare. Postulating a law for total subjective economic satis-
faction or value as follows: 11A person's total economic satisfaction 
varies directly w:i. th the quantity and quail ty of the scarce goods which 
he acquires, and direct~ with the degree of appreciation which he has 
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for them; it varies inversely with the quantity and quality of the goods 
he desires, and inversely with the intensity of those desires,n2 Becker 
finds that for the vast majority of persons, individual economic desires 
exceed considerably the gratification received from acquiring goods or 
from those already acquired. A similar conclusion of Schumpetez-3 
~. P. Becker, "Psychological Production and Conservation, 11 
Quarterly Journal 2£ Economics, Vol. LXIII, pp. 577-583 (1949). 
2~. p. 578. 
3cf. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd 
Edition (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947) Esp. Chapters XI, XII, XIII. 
pointed up what has been called a law of increasing dissatisfaction 
which involves a relation between dynamic wants and productive ability 
to satisfy wants such that wants are created faster than they can be 
satisfied. This might imply that relative surplus concepts are, as 
Hobson and Patten allege, not as significant measures of progress as 
neo-classicists had supposed. 
This paper will not be concerned except tangentially with a qual-
i tative measure of surplus but will attempt to outline the development 
of the most important of the measures of relative surplus--consumer's 
surplus. It will be necessary first, however, to set out the relation 
between various concepts of surplus in economics. 
IV 
Since the whole of this paper is devoted to a developmental 
analysis of the consumer's surplus, it will be the purpose of this sec-
tion to outline generally the currently accepted doctrine. This will 
of necessity closely follow Alfred Marshall's presentation. In Chapter 
Five a more complete treatment is given of Marshall's argument and ita 
welfare significance.l 
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1
chapters Four, Five and Six examine the consumer's surplus against 
the bacltground of various systems of welfare analysis as proposed by 
economists from Dupuit to Hicks. As contrasted with this section in 
which an attempt is made to define the concept in a manner commonly ac-
cepted, these chapters outline the patterns of thought and seek to show 
that an understanding of the meaning of consumer's surplus requires an 
understanding of the reasons why each forger of this tool in economic 
analysis found it useful. 
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That Marshall actually gave three definitions of consumer's surplus 
will be shown in what follows. These three definitions do not coincide 
except under specialized assumptions. One of these definitions is the 
one commonly thought of and presented is most textbooks, and this one 
we should examine here. Marshall said that: 1 
••• the price which a person pays for a thing can never exceed, 
and seldom comes up to that which he would be willing to pay 
rather than go without it; so that the satisfaction which he 
gets from its purchase generally exceeds that which he gives 
up in paying away its price; and thus he derives from the pur-
chase a surplus of satisfaction. The excess of the price which 
he would be willing to pay rather than go without the thing, 
over that which he actually does pay, is the economic measure 
of this surplus satisfaction. It may be called consumer's 
surplus. 
Thus, Marshall stated the most controversial doctrine of neo-classical 
economics. 
This definition is subjective in charactEr and outlines a measure 
of benefit in utility terms. The benefit which an individual derives 
from his economic environment is here presented as a significant measure 
of the accomplishments of capitalism. It will be noticed that it is not 
a general measure, that is, it does not offer a technique by which we can 
determine the total benefit to be derived from a particular type of 
economic organization.2 In addition, as presented above, it is not an 
~. Marshall, ~· cit., p. 124. 
2 Except when we assume the whole economy to be in equilibrium. 
Cf. J. R. Hicks, "Foundations of Welfare Economics, 11 Economic Journal, 
Vol. XLIX, PP• 696ff. 
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absolute measure but rather a relative measure. It takes one person and 
examines the benefit he derives from a shift from an established and 
known position to a possible alternative position while all other factors 
are impounded in ceteris paribus. 
This·consumer's surplus is shown by Marshall to be conceivable in 
units of utility. If we conceive of an individual in the process of 
acquiring units of a commodity for which he gives up units of altern-
ative goods taken together,l we shall find that as the number of units 
of the commodity being consumed increase, the satisfaction from consump-
tion continues to increase but by a decreasing increment. The individual 
will find some marginal unit of the commodity to be just equal in sa tis-
faction to an amount of all other goods he must gi veup to obtain this 
unit. This "price" times the number of units he actually purchases is 
the 11 cost" of the total acquisition. But since each unit previous to 
the marginal one might have induced a higher "price," the excess of its 
"price" over the actual "price" is a surplus. Were one to sum all these 
differences between actual "price" and possible 11 price," he would have 
the total consumer's surplus which the individual obtains by being able 
to purchase the good at the actual "price." 
Actually, .Marshall presents his arguments in terms of money which 
Lrms involves the Marshallian ccncept of "money" which we examine 
in Chapter Three. 
I 
has caused him to be subject to a great deal of criticism.1 But the 
presentation in utility terms has occasioned no less criticism. The 
essence of this criticism is that pleasure or satisfaction or utility 
cannot be measured in determinable units.2 In addition, if it could be 
granted that such units of utility did exist in fact, it would not be 
possible to make a comparison between tha utility of one individual and 
that of another. What is more, it is contended, it is not logical to 
seek to add the consumer's surpluses obtained from various commodities. 
It has very generally been concluded that since consumer's surplus is 
inexact, immeasurable, and even incomprehensible, it is best to discard 
it. 
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It can be shown that Pigou who was very familiar with the arguments 
against the consumer's surplus3 sought to avoid its use in his Economics 
of elfare4 by the use of a more objective measure--the national dividend. 
His successful efforts to have economists concentrate on this measure of 
1 Cf. for example E. Cannan, "Total Utility and Consumer's Surplus," 
Economica, (Old Series), November, 1923, pp. 2lff. 
2For an outlining of criticism against consumer's surplus together 
with answers to these criticisms, Cf. H. Hotelling, 11The General Welfare 
in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 11 
Econometrica, Vol. 6, p. 246. 
3 A historian of economic thought insists that 11the whole field of 
'welfare economics,' of which Marshall's disciple and successor, is the 
founder, really rests on considerations of which the consumer's surplus 
doctrine is the spiritual father. 11 Roll, ££• cit., p. 440. 
4A. c. Pigou, Economics of Welfare (London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 
1920). 
the benefits of capitalism have caused us to forget the reasoning which 
lies behind this measure.l His maximization principle is that the aim 
of economic policy is to make as large as possible the real value of the 
social income. To arrive at such a real value, the quantities of the 
various commodities produced must be weighted by a given set of prices. 
That this procedure of itself involves some difficulties there is avail-
able abundant evidence. However, Hicks has shown that there are more 
fundamental objections to the Pigou measure. 2 First of all, it is re-
quired that a direct correlation be made between economic welfare and 
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social welfare in general. Secondly, we have to admit that it is possible 
to compare the satisfactions various people receive from their wealth. 
Lastly, and of most importance, is the fact that, strictly speaking, the 
quantity to be maximized is the sum of the consumers' surpluses which 
are derived from the commodities which compose the national dividend. 
Since Pigou finds this very awkward to handle, he substitutes for it the 
real value of the national dividend which is quite another thing. Is it 
unwise to suggest that Pigou has failed of his objective? 
Hobson examined very carefully the meaning of the consumer's surplus 
concept of Marshall and rejected it, not because it is unreal or immeasur-
able, but because he felt an absolute measure is more germane to the 
1But Cf. S. Kuznets, National Income: :! Summary of Findings (New 
York, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1§4bJ Esp. Part IV, 
"Problems of Interpretation." 
2Hicks, ~· ~., p. 697. 
issues of capitalism and its benefits.1 He, like Smith in whose metho-
dological footsteps he followed closely, was much more concerned with 
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the great finite movements of the whole complex and their significance 
than with the infinitely small movements from one defined position within 
the complex to another defined position. Insofar, however, as it was 
sought to measure such movements, he was an adherent of this measure of 
satisfaction. 
Patten, on the other side of the Atlantic, saw the consumer's sur-
plus in much the same manner in which Ricardo saw rent. 2 These surpluses 
were of a peculiar character in that their increase did not indicate the 
increase in total benefit except under specialized assumptions. Just as 
rent's increase was more likely to indicate an advantage accruing to the 
landowner out of proportion to his contribution to the national revenue, 
so consumer's surplus' increase indicated a benefit accruing to the con-
sumer which did not reflect his productive contribution to the progress 
of the whole economy. Both Patten and Hobson, likewise, attacked the 
unreal dichotomy between individual as consumer and as producer, and 
sought to show that any benefits which the individuals in society received 
were more likely to come to them in their capacity as producers than in 
their capacity as consumers. The producer had a right to expect these 
lcf. Chapter Five below. 
2cf. Chapter Five below. 
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benefits, the consumer only an advantageous institutional position. 
Prior to Marshall, Snd. th had indicated the existence of a consumer's 
surplus with his paradox of value.1 In fact, it can be contended that he 
stated the consumer's surplus doctrine in his Wealth of Nations.2 
Dupuit) is generally acknowledged to be the pioneer writer in this field, 
while Jenkin~ whose thesis and conclusions are so strikingly similar to 
Marshall,is often overlooked.5 Both these men, the Englishman and the 
Frenchman, first outlined the nature of a consumer's surplus and then in 
their application used the doctrine as a consumers' surplus. Likewise, 
both sought to measure benefits from social goods as well as the effects 
of taxation and only incidentally the benefits from more normal commodi-
ties and services. Thus, they indicated what they thought to be the 
1 Chapter Four below. 
2Note this passage~ 11 The importation of gold and silver is not the 
principal, much less the sole, benefit which a nation derives from its 
foreign trade. Between whatever places foreign trade is carried on, they 
all of them derive two distinct benefits from it. It carries out that 
surplus part of the produce of their land ani labor for which there is 
no demand among them, and brings back in return for it something else for 
which there is a demand. It gives value to their superfluities, by ex-
changing them for something else, which may satisfy a part of their wants, 
and increase their enjoyments. 11 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Cannan 
Edition (New York, Modern Library, 1937) p. 415. -
3A. J. E. J. Dupuit, 11De la mesure de l'utilita des travaux publics," 
Annales des Ponts et chaussees, 2me serie, Tome viii, pp. 332-75 (Paris, 
1844). ----
4sidney Colvin and J. A. Ewing, editors, Papers, Literary, Scient-
ific, Etc. By the ~ Fleeming Jenkin, Vol. II (London, Longmans, Green 
& Co.,WB~ . 
5of all the major histories of economic thought only Whittaker men-
tions Jenkin. Whittaker's treatment is however complete. Cf. E. 
fuittaker, op. ~., pp. 450-453. 
place where such a concept might best be used. 
Marshall, who gives but slight mention to his predecessors, 1 was 
not unlike them in his application of the consumer's surplus. Though 
his theoretical outlining of the concept is in individual tenn.s, his 
use of it is always in plural tenns. His most famed propositions which 
he sought to prove by the use of this measure of utility were stated in 
terms of the oons~rs' surplus. 2 It is perhaps best to conclude that 
Marshall intended the cbctri.ne to be used as an additive measure. 
It is possible to present this partial surplus oonception in a 
number of diagrammatical forms.3 The most general of these presenta-
tions is so familiar that it does not seem necessary to consider it 
here. It needs only to be repeated, as Hicks has insisted, that the 
diagrammatic form of the concept is a proposition which remains to be 
proved.4 It is unwise to associate the geometry with the essence of 
the idea and to conclude that if the geometry can be shown to be in 
error, that therefore the concept has no value. 
~rshall, ££• cit., n. to p. 101, n. to p. 476. 
~rshall, ££• cit ., Book V, Chapters XII, XIII, XIV. 
3cf. Chapter Five below. 
4 Cf. J. R. Hicks, Value ! Capital, 2d Edition (Oxford University 
Press, 1946) pp. 38-41. 
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The same sort of caution seems in order with regard to algebraic 
forms of the consumer's surplus. More than a sufficient amount of space 
has, we think, been wasted in an effort to show the errors in Marshall's 
algebra. While we do not feel ourselves of enough strength in algebra 
to argue the contended points, we shall insist that the conception exists 
apart from any algebraic formulation. 
Marshall used all three forms of presentation, literary, geometrical, 
and algebra. The differences between these presentations will be examined. 
It needs only to be stressed here that he might have been in error in 
each one of the presentations and yet have contributed a doctrine of 
great importance to economics. We shall disregard all methodological 
arguments as beside the point except insofar as they assist in clarify-
ing the meaning of the concept.l 
That this surplus concept can also be regarded as an absolute sur-
plus requires to be said. As a relative measure it depends upon a con-
cept of demand. It is because demand is conceived of as consisting of 
instantaneously comparable alternative positions, that any measurement 
of the surplus relatively can be thought of. Whether one uses indiffer-
ence curves and thus avoids all the implications of cardinal utility or 
the marginal utility demand curve, one is dealing With many alternatives 
in a market in a given moment of time. The price which is determined in 
lrhey are considered for their significance to the criticisms of 
consumer's surplus in Chapter Eight below. 
the market is compared with all the possible prices and out of such 
comparison comes the surplus' measureaents. 
If, however, we seek to obtain a measure of tre benefit to con-
sumers as a class from the increase in productivity and therefore in 
national output and income, it is possible that we shall arrive at a 
conception of an absolute conSllliers' surplus. For example, it may be 
alleged that consumers in the United States receive a surplus as com-
pared with consumers in China (or even Great Britain) or that consun:ers 
of 1950 receive a surplus as compared with consumers of 1850 in the 
United States. One would mean that the prices vhich the consumer is 
obliged to pay in the United States in 1950 to obtain his standard of 
living budget of conmodities represent a smaller propostion of the all-
or-none prices than do similar prices in other countries or in ages 
past. Marshall seems always on the point of saying something quite like 
this, though he never does. Samuelson does not hesitate to state the 
doctrine in this form in his pace-making text.1 
This absolute measure of consumers' surplus is no less subjective 
than the relative measure but it does have the merit of being a bit 
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more popularly acceptable. It is suspected that many first year students 
understand the consumers 1 surplus in absolute terms. Fraser seems to be 
1
"The important thing (about consumer's surplus) is to see how 
lucky the citizens of modern efficient communities really are. The 
privilege of being able to buy~ vast array of goods at low price"S'"" 
cannot be overestimated. 11 P. A. Sanru.elson, Economics: An Introductory 
Analysis (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1948) p. 484. 
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thinking in these terms when he states that 11 conswmers' surplus seems 
to me to be proved whenever we declare any purchase to have been a 
'bargain.'"l Taussig, it can be shown, likewise conceived of an abso-
2 lute measure of this surplus. And what has often been overlooked, Marx' 
surplus value may be thought of as an absolute consumer's or consumers' 
surplus, arising from the institutional advantages which the buyer of 
labor, or capitalist, has in the current form of economic organization.3 
It may even be stated, though we do not intend to prove it, that from 
at least one point of view Ricardo's rent is a consumer's surplus.u It 
will certainly be instructive to examine with some care surplus value and 
rent as we do in the next sections. 
For the moment, havrever, it will be well to consider the most tel-
ling criticism of the concept of the consumer's or consumers' surplus in 
order to complete this initial survey. This is that it is not often use-
ful to separate the consumer analytically from the producer. There, 
1L. M. Fraser, op. cit., Note to p. 86. 
2F. W. Taussig, Principles of Economics, 3d Revised Edition (New 
York, The Macmillan Co., 1921) p:-129. 
3cf. following section on surplus value. 
hit could be contended, for example, that landowners as buyers have 
a basic advantage in the exchange process in that the commodities which 
they sell are necessaries of which only they have a sufficient amount. 
Using this advantage they could charge a price higher than that necessary 
to bring forth the output of agricultural commodities. 
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however, are instances when economists seek to discover how best to 
maximize the interests of individuals in economic society as consumers, 
just as there are occasions when economists seek a measure of the maxi-
mum benefit to individuals as producers and sellers. Profit is the 
latter measure and has w.ide acceptance in this role, though no generally 
accepted definition of it exists. It would seem manifestly unfair if 
not socially blind if economists did not have som:l maximization device 
to determine ideal output from the consumers' viewpoint. It is contend-
ed in what follows that co~r•s or oonsumera' surplus is the indicated 
measure. 
Alfred Marshall sought to develop a set of economic principles for 
the business man and for the practical layman. Thus the Yarshallian 
tool box contains those devices .most readily applicable to their problems. 
These tools are presented in a context of concrete examples, so that 
definitions grow out of the uses to be made of them. Throughout his 
Principles is evidenced a determined effort to be persuasive and to make 
his work accessible to the intelligent reader. That he was as a conse-
quence often vague in his verbal presentation from the viewpoint of fellow 
economists has led to a variety of interpretations of sore of his most 
important contributions and to the rejection or relative disuse of others 
of his concepts. Especially is this true of the consumers' wrplus. 
The consumers' surplus is the sort of concept which describes a 
reality of Ybieh Marshall feels each businessman and layman should be 
aware; the fact (1) that there are alternative to any market price 
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a number of prices at which a consumer will purchase quantities of a 
given commodity, (2) that some one of these prices maximizes the sellers' 
profit and some other maximizes the buyers' satisfactions, and (3) that 
social welfare is best obtained when these prices coincide. The con-
sumers' surplus treats of consumers' satisfactions much as profit treats 
of producers' (or sellers') satisfactions. It is obvious that such a 
concept was regarded by Marshall as necessary. 
v 
Marshall first called his relative surplus concept "consumer's 
rent. 11 1 It can be suspected that he did so because he found an analogy 
to exist between the concept which 11measures the surplus satisfaction 
that a consumer derives from the purchase of a commodity over and above 
the satisfaction he sacrifices in paying away its price," and one which 
measures 11the excess of the total produce obtained from a given piece of 
land over what is required to remunerate the farmer for the outlay in-
valved in raising the produce." 
Mrs. Robinson has pointed out that rent as a surplus arises whenever 
we consider the supply curve to be less than perfectly elastic.2 But it 
needed to be added that it mattered from which point of view one looked 
1 The article on "consumer's rent" in Palgrave's Dictionary of 
Political Economy (Vol. I, p. 392) written by John Neville KeyneS'; 
father of John Maynard, from which the two following definitions were 
taken, suggesU! that Marshall came upon consumer's surplus through the 
avenue of rent. 
2cf. Joan Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition (London, 
Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1933) pp. lO~ 163. 
• 
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at the supply and cost problem whether one could conclude that the supply 
curve was perfectly elastic or was less than perfectly elastic. It is 
significant that Ricardo came to a consideration of the question of rent 
in a rather surprising way. Whereas Smith had discussed rent1 as tan-
gential to a theory of welfare and had pointed out that: 
••• the price of any instrument of husbandry, such as a 
laboring horse, is itself made up of the same three parts; 
the rent of the land upon which he is reared, the labor of 
tending and rearing him, and the profits of the farmer who 
advances both the rent of this land and the wages of this 
labor. 
and thus concluded in Chapter VI of Book I that the price of any commod-
ity has three elements--wages, rent, and profit--and that: 
••• all the three enter more or less, as componen~ parts, 
into the price of the far greater part of commodities. 
Ricardo had entered economics to defend his class and his nation from 
what he regarded as gross exploitation.3 To him rent was not a side 
issue but a major index of malallocation af resources. 
Although Ricardo has been shown to have "quite evidently regarded 
as axiomatic ••• an expenses of production theory,"4 he used the labor 
theory 11 to provide him with a particular logical link that was required 
lAdam Smith, ~· cit., p. 5o. 
2rbid. 
3Buchanan finds Smith and Ricardo to be on both sides of the "does 
rent enter into costs of production fence?" Cf. Daniel H. Buchanan 
"The Historical Approach to Rent and Price Theory, 11 Economica, Vol. IX, 
pp. 123-155 (1929). 
4J. M. Cassells, ~· ~., p. 519 • 
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in his elaborate chain of reasoning about the dynamics of distribution.111 
We have seen that he was concerned with growth and size of the net revenue 
of a society--that is, with the absolute surplus--but we should now come 
to see that he saw certain obstacles in the way of such a growth. 
Let us see if we can present his ideas in such a way as to understand 
why he should happen upon a relative surplus concept of rent.2 In current 
economic terminology, we could say that he saw the long rtm adjustment of 
production to a given state of demand as dependent upon an essentially 
constant cost curve in all but those industries in which land usage repre-
sented a major proportion of cost. If corn be taken generically to repre-
sent the produce of land, we can say that he undertook to show that the 
operation of the law of diminishing returns in conjunction with the re-
strictive control of grain importation results in an abnormally large 
proportion of the national income getting into the hands of the land-
owning class, because the price of corn--the staple food of the laboring 
class--rose in some relation to the increase in the demand for it. 
Not seeing the same danger in an increase in population that Malthus 
seemed to see, Ricardo postulated that as society advanced, population 
would increase and with it the number of laborers proportionately. The 
increase in the number of laborers would mean an increase in the total 
quantity of labor employed in producing the gross revenue of the society. 
lcassels, op. cit., p. 518. 
2The following is based upon the Cassels article. 
It would follow, then, because wages were at a subsistence level that corn 
consumption per capita could not be suffered to decrease materially and 
that, therefor~ corn production would have to increase in some direct 
proportion to the increase in the ' labor force. 
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It was in the nature of agricultural production that a source of 
inequity arose. Because of 11 the laws of nature which have limited the 
productive powers of the land" the production of each additional quarter 
of corn involved an increased expenditure of labor. Thus the amount of 
labor devoted to the production of this staple would increase at a faster 
rate than the total labor force. Since it could be assumed that exchange 
values varied in some proportion to the quantity of labor embodied in the 
product, the corn crop would come increasingly to represent a larger 
share than formerly of the total dividend. 
The increasing demand for corn would cause first a resort to poorer 
soil and,when these had been used, intensive cultivation of the total land 
supply. The movement from one grade of land to a poorer grade--the ex-
tensive margin--would bring a payment to the owner of the best land which 
more than covered his cost. This surplus was a differential return be-
cause of his advantageous position in the market. The difference between 
the price at which the corn is sold because of the state of demand and 
the price at which the corn might have sold at some lower state of demand 
is a rent. The grades of land whose costs of production are lower than 
those at the margin will earn a surplus over costs. 
The social significance of this rent to Ricardo was that it became 
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a part of the manufacturers' cost of production. Assuming a subsistEllce 
wage-and taking the consumption of corn as an index of that wage--it 
follows that as the price of corn rises the share of the national income 
that must go to the wage earner is absolutely increased. The real wage, 
or each rise in money wage, is eaten up by the increase in the price of 
corn. The only real gain from such increases in costs goes to the land-
lord who because of a fortuitous social institution--private ownership 
of land-is able to increase relatively his share of the national divi-
dend. The capitalist w:>uld find his share growing proportionately less 
fast than that of the wage earning and landowning class. 
~ent in this very simple model of an economy devoting all of one 
resource to the production of one generic crop is ultimately the differ-
ence between the zero of no production and what land can earn in the pro-
duction of one crop under given conditions of demand. It is the differ-
ence between what is paid to the farmer and the lowest amount he W>Uld 
have had to be paid in order to have him produce. Mrs. Robinson has 
fonna.J.ized this by saying that in the one use-one crop case, land has a 
transfer price of zero.1 
It is necessary to pause to notice that there is a specialized feature 
of the Ricardian theory of rent that is often overlooked. 2 The extensive 
1 
Robinson, ~· cit. 
2I owe the analysis vbich follows to John R. Hicks with l'bom I 
discussed this matter and who in tte course of his lectures covered it 
thoroughly. 
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margin set a limit to a relationship between the factors of production 
which was essentially fixed in character. Ricardo conceived of two 
factors producing one good. Two factors can be combined in three ways, 
but as we increase the number of cooperating factors the possible co~ 
binations increase. Walras' generalization-the two factors, two pro-
ducts case--is an advanced form of the problem Ricardo posed with his 
extensive margin. This is not the place to examine at full length the 
. 
implications of this production problem, 1 but it may not be amiss to 
notice something of what has been said about the issues involved. This 
Ricardian extensive margin case is what Hicks calls "a limiting case, in 
which it is possible to prove that the two factors must be complementary. 11 2 
This simply means that an increase in one must increase the marginal pro-
duct of the other. It turns out that this approach yields an interesting 
diagrammatic presentation of the rent doctrine.3 
1But cf. G. J. Stigler, Production and Distribution Theories (New 
York, The Macmillan Co., 1941) Esp. Ch. ~ also N. Georgescu-Roegen, 
"Fixed Coefficients of Production and the Marginal Theory,'' Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. III, pp. 40-49 (1935). 
2John R. Hicks, ~· ~., P• 94. 
3The diagram which follows is a rather interesting one having been 
first used, as far as we know, by Auspitz and Lieben in their Unter-
suchungen uber die Theorie des Preises (Leipzig, Verlag von Duncker u. 
Humblot, 1~):--what we have called the produce curve is called by 
them "Lebensgenusskurve. 11 They define Lebensgenuss as follows: "die 
Befriedigung nun, welche die fuer die Jahresmenge X des Verbrauchsartikel 
A geeignetste Konsumkombination ohne Ruecksicht auf die Beschaffungskos-
ten dieser Menge bietet, nennen wir den Lebensgenuss, die eben diese 
Menge gewaehrt," and point out that 11 jede Ordinate der Lebensgenusskurve 
bezeichnet die Befriedigung bei der fuer den Konsum der betreffenden (con't) 
0 
Diagram 1 (Cr. A.W.Flux, "Improvements ani Rentability", 
Economic Journal, Vol. XV, p. 277.) 
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In diagram 1, let units of produce be measured along the vertical 
axis, and units of labor be measured along the horizontal axis. Curve 
~ is drawn so that the ordinates 2' PN, and pn represent the total 
produce obtained from an outlay of labor on a given fixed amount of land. 
Outlay of labor is represented by Om, ON, and On. If, from the ordinate 
PN, the part NC be cut off so that the value of NC will just cover the 
outlay ON and the straight line OCE be drawn from the origin, we will 
have what Flux has called an 11 expense line." The intercepts ~' CP, and 
cp between the expense line and the produce curve represent the excess 
of return over the outlay for various scales of production. If a line 
be drawn parallel to the expense line tangent to the produce curve at 
~, CP will represent the greatest surplus to be obtained from the use of 
the land and ~ may be taken as an index of the rentpaying power of the 
land. The fact that the produce curve reaches a maximum, then turns 
downward is, of course, a representation of the law of diminishing returns. 
(continued from previous page) Menge von A geeignetsten Konsum-
kombination zur Verfuegungstuende. 11 (pp. 149, 150) In 1899 an article 
appeared in the Journal of the Rgyal Statistical Socie~ by Prof. J.D. 
Everett, "On the Geometrical Illustration of the Theory of Rent" (Vol. 
LXII, pp. 703-707) which presented the material in substantially the 
same way in which it appeared in an article by Prof. A. W. Flux, "Im-
provements and Reptability," Economic Journal, Vol. XV, pp. 276-282 
(1905). A year previous to the Flux article Prof. Cunninghayme in his 
Geometrical Political Economy (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1904) pp. 12lff 
had outlined the diagrammatic presentation in essentially the same form. 
He alone of the three English users acknowledges Auspitz and Lieben's 
pioneer work. An incomplete review of this diagram and its history is 
to be found in F. Y. Edgeworth, Pape2S Relating to Political Economy, 
(London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 19 ) pp. 320-339. More recently, 
this diagram in a modified form has been used by Hicks and by Enke. 
Units 
of 
Product 
0 Units of labor 
Diagram 2 (Cf. J.R.Hicks, Value am4 Ca)ital, 2d. Edition,(Ox-
ford University P.reae~946 , p. 81) 
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This presentation is that of Auspitz and Lieben as modified by J. D. 
Everett and A. W. Flux which had remained buried until Hicks' Value and 
Capital. 
Hicks' diagram is a simpler and more direct one. 1 He assumes a 
particular enterprise (say a farm) is confronted by a competitive market 
and seeks to find the necessary conditions for its equilibrium. Technical 
possibilities are open by means of which a single factor (labor) may be 
converted into one product (corn) on land. The prices of labor and corn 
are determined in the general market so that it will be to the advantage 
of the farmer to embark upon production so long as the total value of the 
product is in excess of the total value of the labor employed. 
Measuring units of the factor (labor) along the horizontal axis, and 
quantities of the product along the vertical axis, he draws a curve--
which he has elsewhere called a production frontier--which shows the max-
imum amounts of the product (corn) which can be obtained from the applic-
ation of the labor to the land. In Diagram 2, ON is the amount of labor 
being employed. QM is cut off along the vertical axis equal to ON and 
MK is marked off to represent "that quantity of product whose market value 
equals the value of ON of the factor (of production." OK is the surplus 
product or the rent of land. PN is the amount of product obtained by the 
lrhe following is based upon J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital, pp. 
79-81. Although Hicks uses this diagram in another connection, I 
learned from him something of its history. Another use of the same 
diagram is made in Section VI. 
application of ON units of labor to the given amount of land. If at 
P a line KP can be dravm just tangent to the produce curve, OK will be 
a maximum. 
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It needs now to be pointed out that this is an unfamiliar form of a 
very familiar proposition in utility theory in which the relative surplus 
concept consumer's surplus plays so outstanding a part as we shall show. 
First of all, the fact that the produce curve is convex upward at the 
point of tangency (which we have said is due to the operation of the law 
of diminishing returns) indicates that the marginal product is dimin-
ishing (or that the marginal cost is increasing). Secondly, the fact 
that PK is tangent to the produce curve indicates the slope of the pro-
duce curve at the point of equilibrium must equal the ratio of the price 
of labor to the price of corn, or put in a more fandliar way, the price 
of the land must equal its marginal product (or that the price of the 
product must equal its marginal cost). This produce curve is in many 
ways very similar to an indifference curve and thus bears a direct analogy 
to the demand curve (which we shall show to be a marginal indifference 
curve). In a theory of consumption we should point out that the two con-
ditions of equilibrium are (l) that there be an equality between the price 
ratio and the ratio of marginal utilities (or in the new Hicksian lan-
guage--the marginal rate of substitution) and (2) that the demand curve 
be inclined negatively (or that the marginal rate of substitution be 
diminishing). Such an equilibrium leads to a maximized consumer's sur-
plus, but this is getting ahead of our story. 
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Ricardo's intensive margin is the beginning of the variable co-
efficients theory of value, for he effectively assumed that the propor-
tions in which the factors were used lost their constant relationship at 
the intensive margin. It can be shown that from this intensive margin 
case came the marginal productivity doctrine that has complicated the 
presentation of the rent doctrine. The variable coefficients theory of 
value involves that changes in prices will cause changes in the propor-
tion in which factors are used so that the factor which is relatively 
cheap will be the one used. This leads to a conception of rent--called 
by Marshall producer's surplus--as a differential arising out of special 
adaptability and specificness as contrasted with the scarcity rent based 
upon the law of diminishing returns (marginal productivity). As Myint 
has indicated, "if the given units of factors were homogeneous and per-
fectly versatile, they would not receive any producers' surplus ••• even 
if they should be earning high scarcity rents.111 To state clearly this 
differential concept of rent, we may say that the fact that one factor 
(e.g. land) is not perfectly substitutable for all other factors means 
that land has a supply curve whose divergence from perfect elasticity 
may be as much due to its specific character, as to its scarcity. 
It should be pointed out that in this sense the doctrine of rent 
is analogous to the conception of a consumer's surplus and that it may 
have been some such consideration that led Marshall to call his concept 
~yint, Welfare Economics, p. 147. 
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a "consumer's rent. 11 A consumer's budget is made up of distinct com-
modities which are specific to particular uses. It is technically in-
accurate to speak of these commodities as being substitutable, for the 
marginal rate of substitution (the demand curve) could not be diminish-
ing (declining), if these commodities were perfect substitutes (i.e. had 
a marginal rate of substitution of unity). 
If Ricardo with his intensive margin suggested a method of analysis 
which developed into a marginal productivity theory, it is also true that 
with his theory of comparative costs he suggested a way to generalize 
his theory of rent, for if we generalize the Ricardian rent theory and 
postulate that land may be used either for one crop or another, we pose 
the problems covered in his theory of comparative cost. Whereas Ricardo 
begins his analysis with different nations (i.e . England and Portugal), 
we may suppose the basic producing units to be different grades of land. 
The difference between the rent theory and the comparative cost theory 
is as follows. In different countries, production is in terms of one 
product or some other, but land can only produce corn. Either corn or 
nothing. The determinative question in rent theory then is whether a 
rent can be earned by any grade of land to cause it to be used. If now 
we suppose two products to be produced on the land, we have a broader con-
ception. Taking into account the net amount of return from the production 
of the alternative crops (which we can do if we know the prices of the 
factors), the prices of the products, and all other prices of all other 
products and factors, we will know that land of grade A, for example, can 
earn so much in the production of one particular product and so much in 
the production of some other product. e could then arrange the differ-
ent sorts of land according as they have comparative advantages in the 
production of one product or another.1 As the demand for one product 
alone increases, there will be a tendency for returns in the production 
of it to rise. 
When, however, we move into the more complicated model involving 
alternative uses of the land, the rent or surplus is no longer simply 
the difference between the zero of no production and what land can earn 
in the production of one crop under given conditions of demand. It is 
now a question of differences in alternative earnings in alternative 
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uses. Then, too, rent is no longer synonymous with the everyday concept. 
The generalized concept of rent is the difference between what any factor 
(land) earns in one use and what it would earn in the best available sec-
ond use if the first use (or the present one) were not available. This 
is not an unambiguous concept and it does require careful identification. 
Rent refers only to a particular product and to the particular short 
period in review. 
Ricardo, on the other hand, compared what land earns now under given 
productive arrangements and what land would earn if no demand for the 
product existed. In the alternative use concept, the present use might 
lcf. Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theoh! of International Trade 
(New York, Harper and Brothers,-r9j7j pp. 7=444. 
disappear, but the land might still be capable of earning something 
elsewhere·. This concept, however, involves a careful definition of the 
existing use and of the nature of the disappearance of the present use. 
Then, too, there will be differences in rent between different qualities 
of product, as well as between the product as a whole and another product. 
In essence, then, the Ricardian absolute doctrine of rent was the 
forge in which the tool of relative surplus was shaped and fitted to 
its cuiTent uses. It will be seen that rent is a broader conception and 
far more difficult to define than the consumer's surplus. It was, how-
ever, instructive to have studied its development and to have thus laid 
a foundation for a more complete understanding of the nature of relative 
surplus. 
VI 
It is perhaps only because it has become impolite among Anglo-Saxon 
economists to use the phrase "surplus value" that it has not been recog-
nized how really meaningless this term is. First, lest anyone make a 
mistake, "value" should not be taken as synonymous with price, for those 
who proposed this concept of surplus used "exchange value" to mean price. 
Secondly, what is surplus is not price but income. And thirdly, the con-
cept refers to all income above wages. This terminological inaccuracy 
should not lead, however, to the conclusion some such concept does not 
exist. 
"Few concepts in the history of ideas illustrate so well the conflict 
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of forces that determine whether an idea is to live or die,"l said 
c. B. Hoover who pointed out further that though "the sword of logic" 
had destroyed the surplus value concept as a part of the theory of market 
price, it "had left surplus value as a .revolutionary slogan quite un-
scathed." It is the purpose of this section to examine the relation of 
"surplus value" to the general surplus concept in economics and in part-
icular to the consumer's surplus doctrine with which we have to treat. 
Let us first examine the body of economic doctrine in which the 
concept seems best to fit and where it was placed by Marx. 2 We will do 
well to recognize that though Marx is often credited with this idea, he 
was by no means the first to use it. Restating in rigorous form the 
classical theory of labor value, Marx postulated that labor--natural, 
purposeful activity--was the condition of human existence and that it 
lrhis and the following quotation are taken from C. B. Hoover, 
"Dictatorship and Property, 11 Virginia Quarterly Review, Vol. 13, pp. 
161, 162. Cf. also Scott Buchanan, 11 Surplus Value," Virginia Quarterly 
Review, Vol. 13, pp. 86-105 (1937) in which the following appears: 
"Surplus value enters the Marxian drama as a riddle. Locke's and 
Smith's theory of value had set the stage and money had been accepted 
as the symbolic guise in which parcels of labor are exchanged in the 
market place. But money is not merely a set of counters; it is also 
a peculiar kind of commodity, a most permanent and most mobile embod-
iment of labor. In the right hands it has a magic that obscures and 
amplifies the simplicities of barter. If all men were honest, indus-
trious, and enlightened, as Adam Smith ••• supposes, it· is difficult to 
see how one laborer can get rich while another gets poor. But it seems 
that the properly controlled saving and spending of money does bring 
this inequality about in this little worse than the best possible of 
worlds. Marx's explanation of the magic is surplus value ••• " 
2The following presentation of Marx's ideas is based upon Roll's 
treatment in his History of Economic Thought, Chapter VII. 
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satisfied human wants through the creation of "use values." Though labor 
was not the only producer of "use-values" it was convenient to regard the 
sum total of use-values as correlated with "social labor." This social 
labor in a society characterized by private property, individual enter-
prise, private appropriation and private exchange by being a carrier of 
use-value and exchange-value. 
A particular use value represented a material quality or set of 
qualities in a given commodity while a particular exchange-value became 
so because a portion of the social labor had been expended upon it. Use-
values might exist apart from exchange-values, but exchange-value presup-
posed use-value. The measure of exchange-value was the fraction of ab-
stract human labor which the commodity embodied, essentially a quantitative 
concept. On the other hand, use-value was a qualitative concept having 
reference to concrete particularized labor. 
Prior to the exchange process use-value and exchange-value are theo-
retical concepts, for it is in this process that value is created. The 
exchange represents an equivalence of the same quantities of labor time 
(exchange-value) and a non-equivalence of specific use-values. It is on~ 
because of the social invention of money--a crystallization of the ex-
change-value of commodities which they themselves produce in the process 
of exchange--that different commodities are made to appear as different 
quantities of the same commodity. 
In the exchange process one might say that commodities are sold for 
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money and with this money other commodities are purchased. This view of 
exchange sees the final result of the exchange in the spending of money 
for use-value and postulates a qualitative difference between the com-
modities exchanged. A second more realistic view would point up the ex-
change of money (generalized purchasing power) for commodities which are 
in turn exchanged for money. The purpose of the exchange--this time based 
. 
upon a quantitative difference between the sums of money--is the increase 
of exchange value. 
It is obvious that the qualitative difference in use-values is as 
necessary to the exchange as the equivalence of exchange-values. It is 
in this relationship between unequated use-values and equated exchange-
values that the surplus arises, for exchange-values are created by the 
exchange. It is the fact that exchange-value in the form of money is 
exchanged for commodities, that exchange value is exchanged for use-value 
embodied in the commoditie~which causes surplus to arise. This is true 
basically because each commodity embodies human labor power which is it-
self a commodity whose use-value has the peculiar quality of being a source 
of exchange-value. 
A specialized conception of the labor market is necessary to such a 
viewpoint. The laborer is free in capitalist society to dispose of his 
labor power--the only commodity which he possesses for exchange--in what-
ever way he chooses, but since he owns no other commodities and lives 
from the revenue obtained from the sale of his basic commodities, he is 
disadvantaged in the market. The revenue (quantity of labor power times 
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exchange-value of labor power) he obtains helps him to reproduce his kind 
while the use-value of his labor power enters into capitalist production. 
The difference ·between reproduction cost and the total production of 
society is a surplus value of which comes the incomes--profits, rent, and 
interest--of the exploiting class. 
So far trds theoretical framework differs but little from that of 
the classicists. All the trappings are here, a subsistence wage, a 
three-fold price, use-value dis tinguished from exchange-value, and exchange 
conceived of in simple barter terms. Let us see if we can state this sur-
plus value concept in more familiar terms.1 
First of all, the equilibrium condition for exchange is that exchange 
values be proportional to quantities of labor embodied in the commodities 
exchanged. Secondly, the supply curve of labor is perfectly elastic, so 
that if exchange values rise beyond labor cost, this excess is a surplus 
due to labor but paid to the capitalist. If the market price of cotton 
exceeds its "natural" or equilibrium price, capital and labor will flow 
into the cotton industry until through an increase in the supply of cotton 
cloth, its market price is made to c.onform to its natural price. Here a 
perfectly elastic supply curve is consistent with higher than equilibrium 
returns to the factors of production. There must be some underlying 
~f. Oskar Lange, "Marxian Economics and Modern Economic Theory, 11 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. IT, pp. l89ff (1934-1935). Also Oskar 
Lange, "On the Economic Theory of Socialism, 11 Review of Economic Studies, 
Vol. IV. Part I begins at p. 53; Part II at p. 123.--
assumption in the Marxian analysis which makes the labor supply curve to 
be of different sort. If there is, it turns out that we have to abandon 
classical tools and the analogy we have been building up. 
With Ricardo implicitly and with Malthus explicitly a law of popu-
lation operated to sustain the subsistence wage, but Marx rejected such 
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a reproductive mechanism in his analysis of how wages cannot exceed a 
certain maximum and thus encroach upon profits. ·what he presented was a 
mechanism distinctly different from the ordinary classical equilibrating 
market price with a tendency toward a "natural price •11 Instead, according 
to Marx, capitalism creates an "industrial reserve army." This surplus 
population grows through technical progress which replaces workers with 
machines and thus prevents wages from swallowing profits. It now becomes 
necessary to point out that for Marx, technical progress of the capital-
ist system is necessary for existence of profits and interest, but this 
is much too involved a topic to examine with care in a paper of this 
sort. 
It will be instructive to see if we can present the Marxian surplus 
value theory in diagrammatic form. Hicks' production equilibrium dia-
gram which has been examined previously will upon examination be found 
to be admirable for this purpose. Remembering that exchange and produc-
tion may be regarded as very similar processes, we can begin our analysis 
with the Marxian equation M~M'. This is a statement of a type of 
production or transformation predicated upon maximization of profit. In 
Marxian terms market price is made of three elements-£,, !' and s. C is 
(v .J. s) 
Units 
of 
Product 
of 
Labor 
Power 
Diagram 3 
Units of 
Labor Power 
the commodity's share of the constant capital of the economy (i.e. 
capital). Vis the paid amount of labor or the variable capital, while 
S is the unpaid amount or the surplus value. Thus, if we disregard c, 
- -
v plus ~ is the result of the transformation of v. 
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Along the vertical axis in Diagram 3 we may trace units of the pro-
duct (! f ~) and along the horizontal axis, units of the factor (!). 
Production will proceed up to that output at which~ is maximized, or to 
put it in another way, until M' -M is a maximum. The production curve 
traces the maximum amount of product which can be secured by the trans-
formation of given amounts of labor power. The exchange value of the 
product and the exchange value of labor--power are both given on the 
market. In the diagram production has ceased when ON units of labor 
power had created O:M units of product. MK measures the quantity of the 
product which is equal to the exchange value of labor power used. OK 
is the surplus value which accrues to the capitalist, for it is the sur-
plus over costs. The conditions of equilibrium are that !! be tangent to 
the production curve and that the production curve be convex upward. A 
third implicit condition might be insisted upon; that the surplus be 
positive. 
If we generalize the concept of surplus value so that it can fit into 
the marginal nexus, we shall cooclude with Lerner, that in modern indus-
trial society, "some surplus (value) is to be found in nearly all pay-
ments."l Once we find a factor whose supply is fixed, either in the 
~. P. Lerner, op. cit., p. 223. 
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short run or in the long run, we may conclude that the services of this 
factor would be forthcoming even if we paid that factor nothing. "Every-
thing that is paid to any factor over and above what is necessary to 
make it available to society is then in the nature of surplus. 111 It can-
not be insisted that any one factor is the principal source of the sur-
plus value, for "from the point of view of society ••• all the income 
over and above what is necessary to keep the population healthy enough 
to keep on working constitutes surplus.112 In this light, Boulding sug-
gests that any amount of "value11 which "when extracted from society 
results in no diminution of output and which is •available' either for 
redistribution, or for the extravagance of the state or for the pursuit 
of military power113 is surplus value. 
This broader concept of surplus was that developed to fullest degree 
by Patten in America and Hobson in England. As we shall see, they con-
ceived of surplus value in absolute terms. What they give us is not an 
unambiguous magnitude, but they do show that a greater proportion of 
society's current output can be diverted to "unproductive" uses without 
serious impairment of productivity. For them the process of production 
lop. cit., p. 222. 
2 Op. cit., p. 234. 
3K. E. Boulding, 11 The Concept of Economic Surplus" as cited in 
Readings in the Theory of Income Distribution (Philadelphia, The 
Blakistonlrrompany, 194~p. 655. 
"is not merely a mechanical transfonnation of acts of labor into pro-
duct, but it is a subtle complex affected by innumerable institutional 
and psychophysiological factors. 111 
It is as a relative surplus concept that we shall want to present 
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"surplus value" to show its relation to consumer's surplus. If we accept 
the statement of one commentator on Marxian economics that "neither the 
labor theory of value nor the theory of surplus value ••• say anything 
about actual prices of commodities or were intended to say anything about 
actual prices, n2 and remember that Marx said that "the exchange, or sale, 
of commodities at their value (price of production) is the rational way, 
the natural law of their equilibrium, 113 we shail not find it as difficult 
as some have supposed to present surplus value in a relative guise. 
When it is recalled that neither Adam Smith nor Ricardo, from whom 
Marx learned much of his economics, developed a rigorous utility analysis 
and in fact had quite different goals in their analysis, it will not be 
surprising to learn that Marx saw economics in a distinct way. For Marx 
"the object of the economics of capitalism specifically is the investi-
gation of the principles governing the exploitation of the proletariat, 
the fatal maladies of the system, and its dialectic disintegration into 
1 Loc. cit. 
2Brooks Otis, "The Communists and the Labor Theory of Value, 11 
American Economic Review, Vol. XXXV, p. 134. 
3Karl Marx, Capital, Kerr Edition, (Chicago, 1909) Vol. III, 
p. 221 • 
• 
socialism and communism. 111 But just as it has been shown that narginal 
utility analysis has been quite oonsistent with works of Smith and 
Ricardo, so it can be shown that it is oonsistent ~th that of Marx. 2 
It will be well for the sake of our presentation to compare the 
ideas of Marx with those of Schumpeter. Both Marx and Schumpeter adhere 
to the doctrine of perfect oompetition and cost-of-prodUction price as 
norms in capitalistic evolution. Marx, on the one hand, saw surplus 
value "as a certain average minimum over and above what "WOuld otherwise 
be (if the capitalist did not have a monopolistic advantage in the pro-
cess of exchange because of his ownership of the means of production and 
' 
large stocks of liquid capital) the cost of production" which impelled 
the constant introduction of machinery to replace v.orkers and thus the 
advance of social production whose benefits, however, the workers oould 
not share. Schumpeter, on the other, saw profit, a surplus return over 
that which would obtain in a stationary non-progressive state, as the 
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result of monopoly and "innovation" and as a force which induced society's 
advance. Hicks has defined a relative surplus as "the difference between 
what a factor is paid and what it needs to be paid to cover cost. 11 By 
such a criterion surplus value is a relative concept. 
Perhaps a diagrammatic presentation of this relative approach to 
1u. M. Bober, "Marx and Economic Calculation," American Economic 
Review, Vol. XXXVI, p. 344. 
2 
The following is baaed in part on the Otis article. 
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T 
Output, w. 
Diagram 4 (Cf. s. Enke, "Resource Ma1a11 ~cation Within Firms", 
.Quarterly Journal 2£ Economics, Vol. LXIII, p. 574) 
u 
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surplus value measurement will be in order.1 We shall attempt to show 
the relation between the increase in use value which result from an in-
crease in output of product and the increase in the exchange value of the 
labor power which went into the product. Along the horizontal axis in 
Diagram 4 are calibrated units of output while along the vertical axis 
units of exchange value (money). The graph presents the point of view 
of the worker and shows the extent of exploitation. 
OE traces the "exchange-value function" which shows hovr the exchange 
value of the labor power of the worker increases as the output increases. 
OU traces "the use-value function" which shows how the use value of the 
labor pov1er of the worker increases as the output increases. Both 
functions have a rising phase and a falling phase. Both the rising and 
falling phases result from the taking into account of the principle of 
diminishing marginal use-value. At an output just above zero, use-value 
and exchange-value closely approximate each other, but as output in-
creases, exchange-value falls behind use-v~lue, because of the weaker 
bargaining power of the worker. If the output increases from zero to 
ON, use-value increases from zero to NR, while exchange-value increases 
-- -
from zero to NP. The marginal cost of output ON is thus NP, while the 
marginal revenue is NR, with resultant surplus value of PR. The in-
crease in output from ~ to OM is at a marginal cost MQ-PN, which is 
~is diagram is adopted from S. Enke, "Resource Malallocation 
Within Firms, 11 Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXIII, p. 574. 
zero. The marginal revenue of output OM is MT, with surplus value QT, 
but the increase in surplus-value which resulted from the increase in 
output from ON to OM is ST, which is marginal surplus-value which is 
akin to consumer's surplus. 
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This will be seen if now we change the point of view with which we 
looked at the diagram. Let us now regard OE as the cost to the consumer 
of a particular good (say labor power) and OU as the use-value obtained 
from that good. It now appears that the difference between OU and .9! 
is an absolute consumer's surplus, while the increments in it represent 
the relative consumer's surplus, the Marshallian concept. 
It can be seen that a definite analogy exists between the concept 
of a consu."ller 1 s surplus and surplus-value ideas of Marx. Such an 
analogy is suggestive of the comparability of the viewpoints of Marx and 
Marshall regarding the theories of economic process. Because this an-
alogy be misleading, it is perhaps best to conclude that while l!arshall' s 
consumer's surplus and Marx's surplus value have a basic interrelation, 
there is no reason to suppose that this interrelation indicates a strong 
similarity in social viewpoint. 
In addition to its definition, description and classification of 
surplus, this chapter represents an attempt to clarify the distinction 
between consumer 1 s surplus, rent, and surplus value. There remains a 
doubt lvhether such an attempt can really be successful, for the soci-
ologist plus philosopher, for example, may argue that the differences 
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are ultimately in degree rather than in kind. Because such doubts must 
be reckoned with, Chapters Four, Five, and Six may be more satisfactory 
to those impatient with economists 1 quibbles. These chapters seek to 
examine the thought patterns of the important writers on welfare eco-
nomics who used the oonsumer 1s surplus, in order that we may understand 
clearly the part consumer's surplus plays in welfare analysis. However, 
before we can do this, we Imlst give attention to a more technical matter, 
what is the relation of consumer's surplus to consumer demand theory? 
CHAPI'ER THREE 
CONSUMER'S SURPLUS AND 
CONSUMER DEMAND THEORY 
The definition of the consumer's surplus has from the first been 
closely associated with conceptions of demand. It will be necessary, 
then, to see what is meant in economics by demand and to show how the 
notion of a consumer's surplus could arise from it. This analysis will 
· be developed as follows: Sections I, II and III outline in a general 
fashion the growth of the modern theory of consumer demand and show how 
the various demand conceptions of economists from J. B. Say to Hicks 
and Allen are related and how in each instance subjective considerations 
underlie the presentation. Sections IV and V examine the relation be-
tween consumer's surplus and demand analysis at the pre-Marshallian 
and Marshallian levels of analysis. Section VI digresses to consider 
the Marshallian assumption of constant utility for money; its meaning 
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for consumer demand theory and its use in the presentation of consumer's 
surplus. In Section VII is continued the examination begun in Sections 
IV and V, this time on the post-Marshallian level. Finally, Section VIII 
recapitulates the results of the investigation. 
I 
The elements of an economist's conception of demand are many. It 
will be useful to consider only a few of these elements. Involved in 
any demand theory or statement regarding "the state of demand" are, 
(1) income, real or money, of the individual consumer; its relation to 
the national income; its time dimensions; and the nature of its flow; 
(2) the commodity demanded, the size of the customary units in which it 
is wont to be sold and purchased, its permanence, its relation to other 
commodities available to the consumer, its various possible prices in 
real or money terms, the possible quantities in customary units which 
the consumer will be likely to purchase at those various possible prices; 
and (3) a notion of satisfaction received from consumption which is 
generally subsumed under the heading "utility." Let us see what can be 
said about the origin of the current concept of demand. 
From the setting out of the classical neffectual demand" by Adam 
Smith to the very latest works of Hicks and Allen, demand has always 
meant demand at a price, or rather, willingness to buy at a price. This 
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willingness to buy was evidenced by the actual purchase and not by desire. 
It can be said that in general the classical writer did not relate 
potential desires or "ex-post" satisfactions to the concept of demand. 
The neo-classical writer does postulate such a relationship. 
French writers were first to attempt a mathematical expression of 
demand.l J. B. Say made price vary directly with quantity demanded and 
inversely with quantity supplied. His equation: 
(1) p = ~ 
is an interesting one, but it does not furnish a working hypothesis of 
sufficient flexibility. It does not, for example, give us any meaningful 
relation between consumer income and quantity demanded. It does not tell 
lHenry Shultz, The TheBT ~ Measurement of Demand (Chicago, 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 193 is used as a base for the mathematical 
formulae presented above except where noted. Chapter One is an 
especially clear and precise history of demand theories. 
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us anything about consumer income and quantity demanded, nor cioes it ~ell 
us anything about consumer satisfaction. It will be noticed, however , that 
it is the beginning of a quantity approach1 to price analysis which has 
played a major role in monetary theory--as yet an unintegrated realm of 
economic thinking. 
Cournot, who blended the post-physiocratic writing of Condillac with 
Say's translation of English classicism, made demand to be a function of 
price . This mathematical abstraction has been regarded as a significant 
step forward, for it enabled Cournot to picture the demand relation in a 
plane curve. This functional rela~ionsnip is far more complex than a 
simple curve implies and in Cournot 's formulation needed some underpinning 
assumptions to have definite meaning . 
(2) D = F (p) 
Dupuit supplied some of those underpinings by his assumptions that 
the curve traced the marginal utility (or satisfaction) received by the 
consumer and that any possible price of the commodity or service would 
not represent an overly large portion of the income at any moment of time. 
Thus, his curve (traced on a graph with the vertical axis as the quantity 
1It will be noticed that the Fisher formula for the value of oney 
is of the same order. Such reasoning as Say used leads rather to a theory 
of prices than to a theory of price . Cf. A. H. Hansen, Monetary Theory 
and Fiscal Policy (New York, McGraw- Hill Book Co., Inc., 1949) Esp . Ch. 3; 
Don Patinkin, "The Indeterminacy of Absolute Prices in Classical Economic 
Theory, 11 Econo etrica, Vol . 17, pp . lff. 
axis and the horizontal axis as the price axis) ended in the horizontal 
axis. There was some finite price- quantity combination where the consumer 
would be on the point of deciding to do without the commodity or service. 
Income by this technical device was brought explicity into consideration. 
Fleeming Jenkin who was first in England to draw a demand curve as 
such was aware of the subjective nature of demand, having read and admired 
the work of Jevons. However, he used a technique which helped him to 
avoid taking subjective satisfaction into explicit consideration . Each 
buyer and seller was assumed to have set a value upon units of the com-
modit.y, or what is now called a reservation price . By setting down the 
reservation prices in or er , it could be determined how much would be 
bought at each successive price. For him then , demand (i . e . the quantity 
demanded) was a function of price. 
Marshall who followed Cournot rather closely in the setting out of 
his demand curve made demand a function of the price of a co~modity and 
a constant relationship between all other prices and demands . 
(3) Y = F (x) 
1 Thus: 
1
cf. A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th edition (London: Mac-
millan & Co., Ltd; 1930) Note VI, mathematical appendix, P• 841,842. 
It will be noticed that this demand curve involved assumptions (i) that 
the subject commodity is possessed in amounts 11 in excess of absolute 
necessaries, (ii) that it is one of a (small) number of commodities 
which can supply the same need, and (iii) the marginal utility of "money" 
was the same (constant) throughout the range (continued the next page) 
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where is the quantity demanded of a commodity Ya is the price. 
This Marshallian law of demand is bu~ a special case of the law 
of demand of' Leon Walras , whose generic formulation follows: 
In this formula, a necessary one for general equilibrium, demand is 
made a function not of one price of a single commodity, but of all 
prices of all commodities currently available on the market. Marshall 's 
assumptions regarding the consumption budget which we shall examine 
presently were designed to avoid the admittedly real but unworkable im-
plications of such a general presentation. 
II 
It is possible to go two steps further than Marshall did. The 
first of these will be illustrat.ed by the work of Henry Shultz. Shultz 
regarded each of the foregoing concepts as stepping stones to a clearer 
presentation which could be used in empirical research. His own 
(continued from previous page) of alternative prices. These 
assumptions involve that the tastes and preferences of the consumer 
(and the group of which he is a part) and the consumption budget 
(constant prices of other consumers' goods than the one, or sometimes 
ones, in question) remain unchanr;ed or to put it in another way that 
the prices and quantities demanded of every other commodity did not 
change . For a further discussion of this demand curve, see page ~ 1 
below and also J. R. Hicks "The Rehabilitation of Consumer's burplus 11 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. VIII, pp . l08ff. R. L. Bishop, 
hdonsumer•s Sur:plus and Cardinal Utility, 11 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. LVII , PP • 42lff. 
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formulation of demand becomes by his definition dynamic1 because of the 
addition of the time element. Thus, his primary formula is: 
where T is a "catch-all for factors which change slowly and smoothly 
with time . tt 2 Notice that when an assumption is made that time is 
fixed, T cancels out, and we have the ialrasian equation. I f we assign 
constant values to all p's except Pl, we get Marshall's or Cournot's 
presentation. The advantage of this formulation, Shultz found to lie 
in the fact that it furnished an "operational procedure." 
The secondary form of his equation: 
(6) x1 = F(y1 ,y2, ••••••••••• ,yn,R,t) 
is more general . In it, ~ is the quantity demanded, y1 its price. 
y2, •••••••••••• yn represent the prices of other commodities, or "other 
influencing factors ." R is the size of income, and t is time. 
1 
Ra~ar Frisch has defined dynamic in the following operational 
definition: "A system is ynamic if its behavior over time is deter-
mined by functional equations in which variables at different points 
of time are involved in an essential way. 11 11 0n the Notion of Equi-
libri urn and Disequilibrilnn, 11 Review of Economic Studies, Vol. III, 
pp. lOOff. Cf. also P. A. Samuelson,-roundations of Economic Analysis 
(Cambride, Harvard University Press, 1947) esp. Ch. 11; J. R. Hicks, 
Value and Capital, 2d Edition (Oxford Univ. Press, 1946) esp. Ch.9; 
R. F. Harrod, Towards a Dynamic Economy (London, Macmillan and Co., 
Ltd., 1948). It shoulu be noted that the Harrod book has caused Hicks 
to redefine dynamics . 
2 Shultz, ~ cit., p. 10. 
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Demand is made to depend upon not only the price of the co~modity under 
consideration, but also upon the demand and prices for all other commodi-
ties, as well as upon individual income and its distribution, the length 
of time during which the wants remained unchanged, and "all other influ-
encing factors." 
With this formulation Shultz was enabled to work out significant 
correlations between available data and corroborate manJ- of the hypothesis 
regarding "Lhe nature of demand under changing price, the elasticity of 
demand, and shifts of demand which had been without proof, though they 
had been so often stated that they had the similtude of fact. Essentially, 
this formulation is objective as is the whole of Shultz's work in its 
orientation. What role, then, did he assign to subjective satisfaction? 
Shultz insisted that one had to look to the utility theory for the 
beginning of a clear statement of the nature of demand as well as for 
the subsequent enlargement of the concept. This was, however, not the 
only service of the utility theory, for its "most important contribution ••• 
lies in the setting out of the conditions under which demand functions 
for individuals and related commodities. These conditions enable us to 
determine whether the behavior of consumers is consistent or rational 
and whether the commodities compete with or complete one another.n1 
1shultz, op. cit., P• 54. 
III 
The second step beyond Marshall carries us into what is a compara-
tively new realm. IVhile a number of mathematical economists have been 
equally active in reformulations of the theory of consumers' demand, we 
shall examine the summarizing work of R. G. D. Allen.1 At a later 
point we shall return to Hicks' reformulation. To restate the elements 
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of a theory of demand, we have a consumer with a given income ! confronted 
by an ~ array of goods which are obtainable on the market at given prices 
Thus far, the formulations of demand have been such as 
to enable us to say that the consumer's demand is determinate, uniquely 
determinate. This means that his purchases~' x2, ••••••••• ,xn are single 
valued functions of Y, p1 , p2, •••••••• ,pn. It has also been possible 
to say that with proportionate chanees in income and all prices, demand 
does not change. The purpose of these formulations has been to trace 
how demand changes as income and prices are changed. 
As Shultz sought to show, the test of a demand theory is not its 
internal mathematical consistency but its use in explaining empirical 
economic facts. For that reason Allen seeks the simplest model of the 
several which may be constructed to explain the same phenomena. The 
~he following is based upon R. G. D. Allen, "The Mathematical 
Foundations of Economic Theory," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. LXIII, pp. lllff. The mathematical argument has been modified 
with the help of lecture notes taken in J. R. Hicks 1 course in 
Economic Analysis. 
common model of consumers' demand prior to the pioneer work of Pareto1 
2 
and Johnson was based upon considerations of cardinal measurement of 
utility. The simpler model of Johnson and. Pareto which was improved by 
Hicks and Allen3 assumes an ordinal preference field "with properties 
ensuring that, for any given i ncome and prices, there is a unique set 
of purchases at the maximum level on the preference scale.n4 In other 
words, the tangency between the price line and the indifference curve 
determine a unique set of price-quantity combinations which are better 
than any other in utility terms. 
Allen, Hicks, and Samuelson5 have shown that a very simple in-
equality condition underlies demand conceptions and that from this 
inequality 11we get practically everything we want"6 in the way of' a 
demand theory. This inequality condition stands behind the tangency 
solution of consumer equilibrium, as weil as behind the alternative 
~.Pareto, Manuel d'economie politique. Translated from the 
Italian by Alfred Bonnet, (Paris, V. Giard and E. Brieri, 1909) 
2w. E. Johnson, "The Pure Theory of Utility Curves," Economic 
Journal, Vol. XXIII, PP• 490ff. 
3J. R. Hicks and R. G. D. llen, "A Reconsideration of the 
Theory of Value," Economica (New Series) Vol. I, pp. 52-76, 196-219. 
4R. G. D. Allen, "Foundations, 11 ~· cit., p. ll8. 
5R. G. D. Allen, op. cit. 
P. A. Samuelson,"'"]"ounaations, pp. 96-117. 
J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital, PP• 51-.52, 329-333. 
6Allen, op. cit., p. 120. 
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formulations Yi"e have thus far considered. It is in a form ideally re-
futable from empirical data and is thus logically one step above Shultz 's 
"operational procedure" and thus t o steps beyond Marshall's formulation. 
It will be necessary to turn aside momentarily to a consideration 
of two possible positions of consumer equilibrium to understand the na-
ture of the inequality condition •1 In Diagram 5 we picture these alter-
native situations . Our basic assumptions are a fixed consumer income, 
fixed prices and consistency a~ong consumer preferences as they are 
revealed. Vhen the consumer has allocated his income in accordance with 
the given prices, we have a picture of his preferences which can be rep-
resented as follows: Line AB drawn from the clothing axis to the food 
axis shows the possible collections of food and clothing which the con-
sumer will buy (if he spends all his income) at the price ratio 4:3. 
Likewise, line ££ shows the possible collections of food and clothing 
at the price ratio 1:2. AB is the begim1ing state of preferences which 
shifted in time to CD either because of a shift in relative prices of 
food and clothing or because of a movement in one of those prices with 
a fall in income. Triangle AOB represents the market situation at the 
1cf. J. R. HicKs, "The Valuation of Social Income, 11 Economica 
(New Series) Vol. VII, PP• l05ff. The follzyNing exposition is based 
upon a diagrammatic interpretation of Hicks' mathematics. 
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price ratio 4:3 while triangle COD represents that at the price. ratio 
1:2. Within these triangles any point is a possible one. 
By inquiry, it is possible to determine which of the many combina-
tions available in each market situation is the 11best11 for our consumer. 
Let us assume that within triangle ~ the consumer finds point ~ to 
represent the best possible combination of food and clothing for him. 
Likewise, within triangle COD S is denominated the best possible com-
bination. The combination P is not available to the consumer in the 
market situation COD, nor is the combination Q available to the ·consumer 
at the market situation AOB. N0w, if we sought to find ~hat combina-
tion within triangle OB which is best along line CD {or that portion 
of it within triangle,)the consumer would select some such point as~· 
On the other hand, if we sought to fin the combination within the 
triangle COD which is best along the line AB, we should ind the con-
sumer to have selected E· 
If P is the most preferred point within the triangle ~' ~ is to 
be preferred to~· By the same. reasoning, 2 is to be preferred toE· 
Since Q was selected as the best possible combination within the tri-
angle COD, 2 is to be preferred to ~· Likewise ~ is to be preferred 
to E· It cannot be shown by evidence now in our possession that E is 
to be preferred to ~' nor can it be shown that ~ is to be preferred 
to Q. In fact, if there is any proportionality between AOB and COD, 
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it is likely that £. is indifferent with .9., ana that ~ is indifferent with 
~· This is tantamount to saying that E and .9. lie along one utility sur-
face, hile ~and~ lie along another. It should be opvious that the 
utility surface containing ~ and ~ is superior to that containing £. and 
.9.• Out of such reasoning comes the indifference curve. 
Y~ have now to consider the effect of the shift in the market sit-
ua tion from AOB to COD. Let ~ and ~ be the amounts of food and cloth-
ing, respectively, purchased at~ 1vithin triangle AOB at prices p
1
, and 
P2• Income at P was Y. Likewise, let x
11 and x 1 2 be the a~ounts of 
food and clothing, respectively, purchased at ~within triangle COD at 
prices p 11 and p 
1 
2• Income at -~ was ! 1 • We can now compare the cost 
of the purchases of the second situation at the prices of the first with 
the actual cost of the purchases of the first situation; i.e., we com-
pare p1x
1
1 f. p2x• 2 with p1~ f. p2x2• If p1x 11 f. p2x 1 2 is equal to or 
less than p1~ .j. p2x2, then the quantities x• 1 and x 1 2 could have been 
purchased in the first situation with the income ~hen available, here-
as in fact ')_ and ~ were purchased. This leads to the conclusion that 
the consumer prefers the quantities~ and~ to quantities x 1
1 
and x• 2• 
Next we can compare the cost of the purchases of the first sit-
uation at the prices of the second situation it the actual cost of 
the purchases of the second situation; i.e., p• 1~ f. P 1 2x2 ith p 1 x 1 f. l l 
If p ' x f. p' x is less than or equal to p ' x' f. p 1 2x 1 2, the 1 l 2 2 l l 
consumer prefers the quantities obtained in the second situation to those 
obtained in the first situation . If the first inequality holds, the 
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second cannot and vice versa. It follows, therefore, that the fact that 
p1x• 1 I p2x• 2 is less than or equal to PlXi I p2X2 implies that p 11x11 
P'2X2 is greater than p• 1x• 1 ~ p• 2x• 2• 
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Translating the above information into a difference equation, we have 
if: p1(x• 1 - x1 ) I p2(x• 2 - ~) is greater than zero 
and 
p 11 (x• 1 - x1 ) ~ p 12 (x 1 2 - ~) is less than zero then (p• 1 - p1 ) 
(x• 1 - x1 ) ~ (p• 2 - p2) (x• 2 - ~) is less than zero. (7) 
It needs now to be pointed out that the movement from ~ to S is 
that which Hicks has called the substitution effect. It represented a 
change from one position on an indifference curve to another. Q was 
selected because P was not available at the new income Y•. Concerning 
this substitution effect Hicks has said: 
When we consider a change in prices, which is such that 
it leaves the consumer on the same indifference level, we can 
always say that the new collection of goods purchased must have 
a higher value in terns of the old prices than the old collection 
of goods had. For the old collection was the only collection 
on this indifference level which was available to him at the old 
prices. Similarly the old collection of goods must have a higher 
value in terms of the new prices than the new collection of goods 
has.l 
This is a literary form of the mathematics presented above. The first 
inequality meant that the sum of the increments in amounts purchased must 
be positive when valued at the old prices. The second inequality meant 
that the sum of the same increments valued at the new prices must be 
1Hicks, Value ~ Capital, P• 52. 
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negative. "These tvo statements can only be consistent with one another 
if the sum of the increments, valued at the increment of the correspond-
ing price in each case, is negative.nl Thus, we have that the most gen-
eralized change in prices must lead to a change in demand in the oppo-
site direction. Allen and Samuelson insist with (7) we have all we need 
about demand. 11There is no need to postulate an indifference map or to 
assume that the consumer acts to maximize utility or minimize expendi-
ture.112 
Once we have established such an inequality condition as (7) we have 
the beginning of a theory of the valuation of oocial income, or vilat is 
generally called a theory af index numbers with which we cannot be con-
cerned in this paper} Also, such a condition enables us to d:> away with 
\.oc. cit. 
- - --
2 
Allen, 2£• cit., p. 121. 
3But cf. J. R. Hicks, "Valuation," 2E• cit; R. G. D. Allen, "The 
Economic Theory of Index Numbers, 11 Economica ---rNew Series) Vol. XVI, 
pp. 197ft; I. M. D. Little, 11The Valuation of tm Social Income, Econ-
omica (New Series) Vol. XVI, pp. llff; Simon Kuznets, 110n the Valua--
tion of Social Income--Reflections on Prof. Hicks' Article," Economica 
(New Series) Vol. XV, pp. ll6ff; E. Ames and Allen R. Ferguson, "Techno-
logical Change and the Equilibrium Level of National Income," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. LXII, pp. 44lff. Allen's article is the 
definitive one. It attempts a synthesis 11of what might be called the 
•classical' economic theory of index numbers, •••••• The problem can be 
expressed in its simplest form as follows. A given individual is con-
sidered in two situations, 1 and 2, usually (but not necessarily) two 
points of time. Complete price-quantity data are available for the 
consumer in each of the situations, i.e., the prices of (n f 1) commodi-
ties, p,p' ,p"(n) •••• p(n), and the quantities purchased q,q' ,q", ••• q(n), 
at situation 1, and the corresponding prices and ~antities denoted at a 
suffix 2 at situation 2. A definite preference map, subject to the 
usual conditions of convexity, etc., is assumed for the consumer (Cont•d) 
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the concept of elasticity of demand with respect to the variation in a 
single price . As lien points out, it is really easier to let all prices 
vary together. More to the point in the search for an empirical law of 
demand, we can nm'f deal Ylith finite changes in prices and quantities. 
IV 
We have examined demand theory formulations at three levels. It was 
our purpose in examining the various conceptions of demand to see how the 
doctrine of consumer's surplus arose out of them. Vk shall nrra turn to 
an investigation of the relation of consumer's surplus to demand analysis 
at the pre-Marshallian level, at the Marshallian level, and at the post-
Marshallian level of analysis. This division is made more to serve the 
chronological order of the data which we have to examine than to accord 
with mathematical reality. 
The two economists who made explicit use of the consumer's surplus 
prior to Marshall had quite a bit to say about market demand. Though both 
Dupuit and Jenkin1 drew curves to represent the demand situation of an 
individual consumer, in their analyses of specific economic problems, they 
had reference to the combined demands of many individuals for a given 
connnodi ty. This needs to be said in order to understand how they came 
upon the use of the consumer's surplus, for they were not principally 
(continued from previous page) in each situation, but the map for 
situation 1 may be different from that for situation 2. The consumer is 
assumed to have free choice ••• Can we define an index of the change in 
prices and an index of the change in the volume of consu~ption from situ-
ation l to situation 2? If so, can we obtain a measure of each index or, at 
least, limits for each index? 11 
1cf. pp. 146 to 161 below. 
concerned with individual consUIOOr gains from exchange, but with tm 
benefit accruing to society from the purchase and sale of commodities 
and services. 
Dupuit, who was the first to use it, defined consumer's surplus 
(which he called relative utility) as follows :1 Since the consumer pays 
for every unit consumed of a given commodity that price vilich the margi-
nal increment was worth to him, and since each unit prior to the last 
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one consumed had a higher utility than had the last one, the consumer re-
ceived a surplus of utility on the portions consumed earlier. It is ap-
parent that though his demand curve was drawn to soow the explicit rela-
tion between price and quantity demanded, utility was an implicit con-
sideration. The fact that he drew his demand curve to reach the price 
axis (a fact alluded to above) indicates that he mde the specialized 
assumption that the commodity or service under examination did not repre-
sent a major portion of the oonsumption budget. 
Fleeming Jenkin did not examine the Sllbjective reasoning behind the 
demand curve men he out lined his 11buyers 1 gain from trade. u2 This gain 
is predicated upon a system of reservation prices ~ich are present in the 
minds of the buyers in a given ma!Xet. Reasoning that only tre mrginal 
buyer obtains the goods just at his reservation price, Jenkin deduces that 
all those whose reservation prices were higher vould gain an amount equal 
1The definition is not a direct quotation from Dupuit's articles but 
is that ~ich Whittaker gives. Cf. Whittaker, ! History of Economic Ideas 
(New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1940) pp. 444, 445. · 
2Jenkin's exposition will be examined more carefully in Chapter Five. 
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to the difference between their reservation prices and the market price. 
Thus, if a given reservation price (say xa) were set by a group of buyers 
upon a given portion of the goods (say a y) which are available for sale 
and purchase in a given market, and if a market price (say x) were deter-
mined lower than this reservation price, then the gain fran the purchase 
at the market price will be represented by the product Ay(xa- x). When 
the benefits derived from the sale of each successive quantity of goods 
are integrated, an area lying beyond the rectangle (see Diagram 2) which 
represents the total amount paid and subtended by the demand curve will 
represent the whole gain to the buyers by the purchase of l units of the 
good. With Jenkin also, his demand curve is drawn so as to indicate that 
there is some all or none amount of the coimnodi ty and thus that the com-
modity is not a necessity and does not occupy a significant role in the 
consumption budget. 
Morgenstern1 has shrr«n that the market demand curve is one of the 
most unsatisfactory analytic devices in economics. It is not reasonable 
to expect that every individual demand which is a component of the col-
lective will bear a fixed relationship to every other component demand. 
The most that we can say about the collective demand curve is that there 
is every reason to expect it to have a monotonic negative slope. It 
should be noted that this negative slope need not depend upon diminish-
ing marginal utility and that exact~ the same collective demand curve 
l 
o. Morgenstern, "Demand Theory Reconsidered,n Quarter~ Journal 
of Economics, Vol. LXII, PP• 165ff. 
can be obtained in an infinite number of ways from very different indi-
vidual demand curves. It follows from this that whatever criticism be 
made of the individual demand conceptions of the pre-Marshallian users 
of the consumer's surplus on tre basis of the poor psychology involved 
will not affect the significant part of their argument in favor of the 
concept. 
Both Jenkin and Dupuit dealt rather with consumers r surplus than 
consumer's surplus. The principal objection to the consumers' surplus 
is that it is alleged that the surpluses of different persons cannot be 
added. Dupuit sought to measure the total benefit Yilich a comnnmity re-
ceived from the provision. of a given good or service.1 He measured this 
total benefit by the aggregate of the maximum prices that would be paid 
for the individual small units of the commodity corresponding to the 
costs of alternatives to the various uses. Jenkin likewise sought to 
measure the ~ole benefit which society received from the exchange pro-
cess and thought he had proved that the apportionment of the benefit 
among 11the two communities" of buyers and sellers was determinate. 
With the argument that surpluses cannot be added is usually associ-
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ated one alleging that the consumer's surplus aris:ing from different com-
modities are not independent and cannot be added to one another. Hotel-
ling2 has shown that if we have a set of n related goods whose demand 
1 See below, Chapter Five, Section I. 
~. Hotelling, "The General rveJ.fare in Relation to Problems of Tax-
·ation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 11 Econometrica, Vol. VI, pp. 242ff. 
Cf. alsoP. A. Samuelson,. Foundations, p. 218. 
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functions are: 
(i. = 1,2, •••••• ,n) 
then the natural generalization of the integral representing total bene-
fit, of which the consumer's surplus is a part, is the line integral: 
(9) J <f1dq1 .f. f 2dq2 .f. •••••••• I fnd~), 
taken from an arbitrary set of values of the q's to a set correspond-
ine to the actual quantities consumed. The net benefit is obtained by 
subtracting .from (9) a similar line integral in which the demand func-
tions f 1,f2, •••••• ,fn are replaced by the marginal cost functions: 
(i = 1,2, •••••••• ,n) 
If we put hi = fi - qi the total net benefit is then measured by the 
line integral 
(ll) w = 
"Such indeterminacy as exists in this measure of benefit is only that 
which arises with variation of the values of the integral when the path 
of integration between the same end points is varied.111 The condition 
that all these paths of integration shall give the same value is that 
the integrability conditions 
(12) Q~ .. cJ h~ ~ =- d\t. 
be satisfied. If they are satisfied, the surpluses arising from dif-
ferent commodities, and also belonging to different persons may be add-
ed to give a meaningful measure of social value. 
1 
Hotelling, 2E• cit., p. 246. 
It would thus appear that both Jenkin and Dupuit were correct 
in their application of this measure of consumer gains to problems 
involving taxation; the services of bridges , canals, and public high-
ways; etc . While it is possible to reduce the technical argument be-
hind the consumers' surplus to indifference diagrams and to show what 
conditions must be satisfied in order to prove its existence, such 
reasoning is not helpful in those problems where some such concept 
must be used to give determinacy to otherwise indeterminate situations . 
A government monopoly, a public utility, a system of education--all 
are economic enterprises in as real a sense as is the profit-oriented 
corporation or individual enterprise, but it cannot be assumed that 
the marginal cost-marginal revenue equality rule will shed sufficient 
light on their problems of ideal output . Typically these enterprises 
have declining cost curves (and from the technical viewpoint, at 
least two points of intersection between demand curves and the average 
cost curve) . Careful consideration will reveal that some maximization 
device other than profit must be used to determine ideal output, for 
it cannot be the normal assumption that such enterprises will seek to 
obtain a maximum net revenue. It is most logical that consumers' sur-
plus which emphasizes the role of the buyer considerations of whose 
1 
welfare are paramount in such enterprises should have been developed. 
One critic of the consumers' surplus admits that it is perhaps the only 
technique the economists possess "to help make decisions in the large-
lsee Chapter Seven below for an examination of problems of ideal 
outputs of social goods . 
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9S 
i.e., to decide whether it would be better to take a large finite (rather) 
1 
than small) step away from a particular position." 
v 
On the Marshallian level of demand analysis, we will find two tech-
nical devices in use whose purpose is to give generality to the law of de-
mand. One is the assumption regarding the nature of the consumption budg-
et. The other is the assumption that the marginal utility of 11money" can 
be regarded as operationally constant. 
Marshall's individual demand curve for a particular commodity is 
predicated upon the assumption of a consumption budget of fairly ample 
proportions. Each individual commodity which composes the budget is but 
one of a relatively large number . It is well to recall that Marshall 
made a secondary assumption that all income is spent so that the problem 
of saving is ignored. At any moment of time in the market with prices al-
ready given, the consumer will buy a wide range of individual goods, the 
quantity of each good bought being a function of the price . 
If we make .£ stand for the consumption budget (or real income), we 
will find it to be composed of purchases of goods,!' ~' 9_, •• •• ••••• ,! 
at the given market prices. In order to know how much of !_will be pur-
chased, it will be necessary to know its price . This being known, we may 
present the consumption budget in the following form: 
1 
P. A. Samuelson, "Review of Myint ' s Theories of Welfare Economics," 
P• 372. 
(l3) C = A f B ~ C f ................... . ......... f N 
or 
(14) C = Pa~ f Pb~ f pcqc f········· · ·······t Pn~ where paqa is 
the price- quantity combination of A, etc. 
~ is not a necessity and is but a relatively small proportion of the 
consumption budget . Thus 
(15) if: C - Paq t (pbqb t P q t••···· ···········f p q ) , then we 
- a c c n~ 
may substitute a composite commodity, very large in relation to !' for all 
other commodities than A which compose the consumption budget . Thus : 
(16) C = Pa~ f Pn~ 
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where N is a composite commodity . With such a view of the consumption budget , 
Marshall examined the relationship betrffeen the price of A and the quantit y 
that will be bought as the price varies , with the assumption that a change 
in the price of A will but little affect the prices of the other commodities . 
This is an exampl,e of what has been called the partial equilibrium technique 
of analysis . 
It will be necessary to look ver y carefully at what Marshall did say 
about the nature of demand curves, especially with respect to the area sub-
tended by tHem . This will be done by seeing first what he had to say mathe-
matically, then by examining his geometry , and finally by presenting his 
verbal conclusions . 
Though Marshall insisted 11 that to measure directly, or per se , either 
desires or the satisfaction which results from their fulfillment is impossible 
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if not inconceivable, 111 in his demand analysis he does fall back on nthe 
measurement vbich economics supplies" or cardinal utility. Utility analy-
sis enabled him to derive the monotonic negative inclination of tre demand 
curve. Each individual commodity composing the consumption budget was as-
sumed to have marginal utility dependent solely on the amount of that com-
modity likely to be consumed, and2 independent of the amounts of all other 
commodities consumed by the consumer as well as of the amounts of all com-
modities consumed by all other individuals. In effect, then, Marshall's 
demand curve is a marginal utility curve. 
We have noticed previously that Marshall's demand curve involved as-
sumptions that the tastes and preferences of the consumer as well as his 
consumption budget remained unchanged throughout the range of alternative 
prices for the subject commodity. Bishop has translated Marshall's mathe-
matical argument as follows: 3 
where ~ is the amount of commodity A which will be demanded, Pa is the price 
of A; Pb Pc' etc., the prices of the other camnodities; and qb, qc, etc., 
luarshall, Principles of Economics, 8th Ed. (London, Macmillan & Co., 
Ltd., 1930) N. 1 to P• 92. 
2 Cf. Bishop, "Consumer's Surplus 11 for a clear etatuent of the inde-
pendence postulates. 
3 Cf. Bishop, £E• cit., pp. 423, 424. 
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the quantities demanded of other commodities. The bar placed above the 
letters indicates that prices and quantities are held constant for the range 
of the values Pa• 
Another form of the Marshallian demand curve is of the nature:1 
(18) ~ = f(pa;P ;p ; • • • · · · • • • • · • • · • ;pn) b c 
or 
here qa is the amount of commodity A which •Till be demanded; pa' pb, pc,· · ··Pn 
are the prices of the commodites A, B, C, ••••••• ,N which compose the consump-
tion budget . Thus we have the amount of a to be purchased as a function of 
the price of A. Note that as the price of A changes, the price of other com-
modities are allowed to vary as they will . In the equation (19) composite 
commodity N is substituted for all other commodities . A further variable 
might have been introduced - - total money income . Thus: 
or 
lA recent article seeks to distinguish between "orthodox" Marshallian 
demand curves which hold money incomes constant and an alternative inter-
pretation which holas real incomes constant . It will be noticed that in 
his Mathematical Appendix, Marshall employs a demand curve which is obtained 
by retaining the consumption budget ("Their real income") the same through-
out the range of price changes of the subject commodity and adding the average 
price of the composite com..1odity. "Constancy of real income for uifferent 
prices of the com.rnodity implies compensating variations in money incomes . " 
This is the sort of demand curve we insist in this paper (Cont'd next page) 
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the bar above Y indicated that it is held constant under a ceteris paribus 
assumption. 
Though this concept of Marshallian demand is common, it should be ob-
vious from the foregoing that Marshall ' s demand curve is, in reality, some-
what different from th~t epicted in equations (18) to (21). In Marshall 's 
curve, the total consumption budget is held constant instead of total money 
income . Y is allowed to vary in such a way as to keep the a~ounts of all 
other connodities constant. Likewise , since all the amounts eJccept of that 
of A are held constant, the prices of all other commodities are not allowed 
to vary. That the result of this proceaure is to hold the marginal utility 
of the composite comdoaity constant, (i. e . marginal utility of all other 
cownodities) should be obvious . The same assumption which allowea Marshall 
to hold all prices other than that of A constant also allowed hi~ to hold 
the quantities and therefore the marginal utilities of all other commodi-
ties constant. In equilibrium, then : 
(21) dU 
aN 
Pn 
du du 
aaao 
Pa ~ 
du du 
dc =· ......... ·= dii 
In this presentation the marginal uti ity of A varies in exact propor-
tion with the price of A and thus the demand curve traces out the marginal 
utility of commodity A. To change the utility- quantity marginal utility 
(Cont' d ) to be the Marshallian demand curve as contrasted with 
demand curves illustrated by equations (18) to (21) . Cf . Milton Friedman, 
"The Marshallian Demand Curve," The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
LVII, pp. 46Jff . 
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curve to a price-quantity demand curve requires only that a price unit be 
chosen for ~he vertical or price axis . It is obvious t hat this is what 
Marshall had in mind because he moved f rom the utility analysis to demand 
analysis without a pause . 
It now becomes possible to say that if qa be the quantity of A which 
will be demanded at the price p , the demand curve will be of the order :1 
a 
Then the total utility (the area under the demand curve) is measured by 
( 24) J ~ (?a ) d '\a 
0 
where a is the amount of A consumed. It will be recalled that Marshall 
assumed that A is not a necessity . 2 There will therefore be some readily 
available substitute for A and there will be no amount of A for which the 
demand curve will have zero elasticity. This follows from the fact that A 
is not a necessity . 
3 Turning to Marshall ' s geometry, we find that when he addressed himself 
1Equations (23) and 24 are of the same l'orrn as those which appear in 
Marshall's Mathematical Appendix, Note VI, with the notation changed to 
correspond with our argument . 
211 e must take life for granted, and estimate separately the total 
utility of that part of the supply of the commodity which is in excess 
of absolute necessaries . .. .. ... Marshall, op . cit . , p . 841. 
3of the 24 demand curves drawn by Marshall , 13 are drawn so as to touch 
the price axis, while the remaining curves approach an asymptote with the 
axis . Demand curves appear on pages 96 , 99 ,104,106 , 110,128 , 346, 384, 388, 
389, 464 , 466 , 467 , 468 , 469 , 473 , 48o ,483,h88, 490, 806,8ll,839, and 840 of the 8th 
Edition of the Principles . 
to a consideration of individual demand , he drew his demand curves do1~-
ward from some point on the price axis, which is the geometrical form of 
what we have been saying. There will be no amount of the commoaity A 
which the consumer will regard as absolutely necessary so that the demand 
curve will not be as~~ptotic to the price axis or to a vertical parallel 
to the price axis. At some price, the consumer will be on the poli1t of 
choosing to do without the commodity . The summation of individual demand 
curves wil~ yield a market demand curve hich approaches an asymptote to 
both ax~s, though most of Marshall 's market demand curves touch the price 
axis . 
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Verbally, Marshall points out that "there is one general law of demand: 
the greater the amount to be sold, the smaller must be the price at which it 
is offered in order that it may find purchasers; or in other words , the 
amount demanded increases with a fall in price, and diminishes with a rise 
in price . n1 These words are simple and inexact for they imply much but say 
little . As a result, it may be felt that Marshall did the literary econo-
mists a disservice . 
First of all, it must be admitted that in mathematics , whether algebra 
or geometry, Marshall was but seeking to give a more exact formulation of the 
material he presented literarily. 
lMarshall, ££· cit., P• 99 . 
2 The advantage of geometry over algebra 
2This section comparing methods of presentation of economic ideas fol-
lows Boulding, Economic Analysis, 2d Ed., (New York, Harper & Bros., 1948) 
PP • 669,670 . 
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in terms of ease of exposition and generality of conclusion is obvious 
as the supremacy of the Marshallian curve-system can demonstrate. 
Literarily, Marshall was seeking to express his opinion with respect 
to a phenomenon he was very conscious of, and concerning which his atti-
tudes and understanding changed . 
Secondly, it must be remembered, whatever, the textbook writer may 
object, that the concept of demand exists apart from any particular 
presentation of it and from every interpretation. It cannot be alleged 
that Marshall, or for that matter, any economist, discovered demand. 
1T.hat he did was to attempt a description, noteworthy in clarity and ~~-
lytical usefulness, as compared with those before him, of the societal 
and individual phenomenon of demand. 
Whether presented in a geometric, algebraic or literary form, when 
once the demand curve has been defined as a marginal utility curve, the 
area subtended by it is total utility. The difference between total 
utility and the cost to the consumer, then, is the consumer's surplus. 
If we know the price at which a good sells in the market, we can kno-vr 
by an examination of the individual demand curve how many units of the 
. 
good will be bought and thus the total cost to the consumer of the good. 
e can also tell by inspection how much utility was obtained by the con-
sumer in his purchase. It should be noted that Marshall with Dupuit and 
Jenkin assumed that the consumer bought so small a proportion of the 
total supply available in the market that the individual purchase did 
not affect the price at which the good sold. 
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The market demand curve in the Marshallian schema is likewise a mar-
ginal utility curve or rather the summation of many individual marginal 
utility curves. If we assume 11 that by far the greater number of events 
with which economics deals, affect in abou~ equal proportion all the dif-
ferent classes of society,nl then we shall conclude that 11 the money meas-
ures of the happiness" arising out of economic occurrences are equal. If 
we add to this assumption a necessary one that: 
When a person buys anything for his ovm consump-
tion, he generally spen s on it a small part of his total 
resources; while when he buys it for the purposes of trade, 
he looks to reselling it, and therefore his potential resour-
t d . . . h d 2 cesare no ~knlS e ••••••• 
so that in either case there is no significant change in the marginal util-
ity of "money" (i.e., all other commodities given up in order to purchase 
the subject connnodity) and the willingness to part with money on the part 
of the buyers is not affected by the amount of the commodity purchased. 
VI 
Marshall's assumption that the marginal utility of money may be regarded 
as operationally constant will receive careful consideration in Chapter Five 
against the background of his welfare thinking . It played a significant 
role in the setting out of the measure of consumer's surplus and led to wide 
lMarshall, op. cit., p. 131. 
2Marshall, op. cit., p. 335. 
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discussion of the meaning of "moneyn1 and the relations between 11all other 
commodities in the consumption budget . " 
It will be useful here to see what Marshall meant by 11money •11 For 
this is a necessary prop in the Marshallian demand analysis . Some have 
supposed that Marshall referred to some money- commodity or 11 numeraire . 11 
others have said that he implied 11 general purchasing power . " We have 
adopted the device of the composite commodity follmrlng Lange ' s rtLaw of 
Composition,"2 because we insist that one needs to recall the nature 
of the consumption budget with which Marshall dealt . He outlined a demand 
relationship involving a single commodity in the consumption budget while 
all other commodities are held unchanged in the ceteris paribus pound. 
This means that in same way all commodities which compose the consumption 
budget are substitutes . No attempt to measure the extent to which these 
commodities are substitutionary seems necessary, but the fact that all 
individual component commodities are assumed to have demand curves which 
touch the price axis indicates that at same very high price for every 
lFor example, cf . P. A. Samuelson, "Constancy of the Marginal 
Utility of Income," Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press , 1942) pp . 75ff:--F . Drenckhahri 
and E. Schneider, Wirtschaft und Mathematik (Leipzig, Verlag und Druck 
Von B. G. Tuebner, 1931) Ch. l;Bishop, "Consumer ' s Surplus and Cardinal 
Utility. " 
2 Cf . 0 . Lange, Price Flexibility and Employment (Bloomington, 
Indiana; Principia Press, 1944) p . 106cf. also s . Weintraub, Price 
Theory (New York, Pitman Publishing Corp ., 1949) pp . 19 , 20 . 
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commodity within the budget, substitution is almost perfect.1 
11 General purchasing power" 2 must be rejected as too vague. It does 
not take into account except tangentially all the commodity relations 
subsumed under the budget concept. It is entirely at odds with the Mar-
shallian spirit to suppose that he meant some money-commodity, for he 
does not assume that money is wanted for itself by the average consumer. 
Others who have suggested income as the Harshallian meaning are likewise 
in error.3 The composite commodity concept enables one to work in the 
two-conmodity world of indifference and to derive the unitary relation 
between price and quantity demanded that lies behind the Marshallian 
demand curve. Hicks4 has shown that these definite assumptions regarding 
the consumption budget lie behind the Marshallian presentation, while 
BishopS has proven that the composite commodity concept must underlie 
the assumption of constant marginal utility of "money. 11 
~he presumption would have to be that the indifference level re-
mained the same . It must be admitted that some commodities which would 
be substitutes on a low level of income may become conplements on a 
much higher level. 
211General purchasing power" as a definition overlooks the relation 
between the subject commodity and the whole consumption budget. Prof. 
Machlup points this out in his "Professor Hicks' Statics, 11 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics , Vol. LIV, p. 279. n.4. Cf. also R. T. Norris , The 
Theory or-consumer's Demand (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1941) pp. 2~28. 
3Income is subject to the same criticism as general purchasing power. 
4see Chapter Six below. 
5See Chapter Five bel~K, Section III. 
109 
VII 
Marshall 1 s general law of demand as apart from his geometry , his 
algebra, and the many underlying assumptions is quite simple and rather 
fascinating. We have already shown that recently demand theorists have 
reduced the concept of consumer's dema~d to a simple inequality. It will 
be noticed that this inequality is the logical result of Marshall's verbal 
presentation of the law of demand. What can be said on this level about 
the notion of a consumer's surplus? 
First of all, it will be necessary to return to inequality (7) and 
translate it into the finite difference form as follows: 1 
whereap,t1 x are changes from one market situation to the other. Samuelson 
has shown that the pure theory of consumer 1 s behavior llwhen its empirical 
meaning is finally distilled from it, turns out to be one simple hypothesis 
on price and quantity behavior.u2 The simple inequality (7) or (25) does 
not refer at all to a utility function~ a preference scale, only to what 
Samuelson has called 11revealed preferences. 11 On this basis, it becomes 
doubtful whether the utility analysis is an integral or i:nportant part 
of economic theory. 
~his is Allen's formula in his article, "Foundations of Economic 
Theory,u cited above. 
2p. A. Samuelson, Foundations, P. 116. 
llO 
Secondly, following a suggestion of Allen, we may notice that included 
in (25) is a special case: 
( 26) if 2 '? ~ X. -- c then 2 !:1 '? ~ )(. < 0 
(26) implies that there has been a series of changes in prices as well as 
changes in the income of the consumer, for: 
(27) 6. Y = ZC'?+A~)()I. +-A){)- '2 '?X= 2x iJ? 
~vC~ is the conpensation in income1 for the changes in prices and is such 
that the quantities now purchased (following the compensated price changes) 
could have been purchased at the prices of the first situation and the income 
of it ( i • e • p1x f p X or L xp) • 1 2 2 
Thirdly, if all the prices move upward, or at least some of them move 
upward while others remain unchanged, it is not possible to determine whether 
all demands are decreased, but it is possible to say that on balance the 
total demand of the consumer has decreased. If we allow p of x to increase 
l l 
to p 1
1
, all other prices being held constant, it can be shov1n that xt
1 
will 
be less than~· It must 11be emphasized that this holds only for a move-
ment along the same indifference locus, i.e., for a compensated change in 
price , and does not mean that with a given money income a change in one 
price will necessarily result in a decreased amount taken of the correspond-
lThis corresponds to the compensatory changes in Y necessary to keep 
amounts of all other commodities constant noted above . It is in effect a 
consumer's surplus of the compensating variety to be examined in the fol-
lowing chapters. 
l ll 
ing cor:rmodity."1 The compensated change in price is analogous to the 
consumer's surplus . 
Hicks' rehabilitation of the consumer's surplus grows out of such 
reasoning . It has been alleged that in his hands, the consumer's surplus 
"becomes nothing more nor less than a particular reformulation of indif-
ference loci. n2 The present debate between Hicks and Samuelson over the 
usefulness of the consumer ' s surplus, in reality, revolves about a choice 
between the Marshallian level of demand analysis and the post-Marshallian 
demand analysis . Arguing that the interpersonal aspects of output deci-
sions can safely be disregarded, Samuelson insis s that all the questions 
to which consumers ' surplus has been applied (e . g., provision of a par-
ticular public utility, the effect of indirect as compared with direct 
taxation, the role of discriminatory pricing , etc . ) 11 can more conveniently 
{and more honestly! ) be answered in terms of the consumer ' s ordinal prefer-
ence fiela . n3 Hicks would argue that Samuelson 1 s disposition of the con-
sumer ' s surplus involves an interesting but unneccessary mathema~ical analy-
sis, and that most questions in the welfare field involve a finite deviation 
from the ideal organization of resources and markets here the partial 
surplus concept is readily adaptable as a tool of practical value . 
It requires now to be said that if we extend the application of (7) 
1 A. Samuelson, op . cit ., P• 109 p . 
2p . A. Samuelson, "Review of Myint," op . cit., P• 372 • 
3!"' . A. Samuelson, Foundations , p . 197 . 
ll2 
or (25) to the whole boqy of consumers, we can say that if p1x •1 f p2x r2 
is less than Plxl f p2X2 (i.e., if the prices of the first market situ-
ation times the quantities of the second situation give a product less 
than the prices of the first situation times the actual quantities of 
the first situation) and if p 11x1 f p 12x2 is greater than p 11x• 1 f p 1 ~ 1 2 , 
for all consumers taken together, then (7) or (25) is satisfied. ' e 
know that the behavior of the consumers is consistent in the two periods 
and we can say that there has been a fall in real social income.u1 On 
the other hand, if we should find that p1x• 1 f p2x• 2 is less than 
p1x1 f p2X2 while p 11x1 f p 1~2 is also less than p 11x• 1 - p 12x• 2, (7) 
or (25) would not be satisfied. ve could then conclude that something 
has happened as between market situation AOB and .2912. such that the pattern 
of consumers' behavior has changed significantly. It is admittedly pos-
sible to continue on this wise without any explicit reference to or im-
plicit assumption of utility. However , both Allen2 and Shultz3 have 
1 Allen, "Foundations," p. 121. 
2
"But does it follow that we should scrap utility analysis altogether? 
We should not be too hasty. I am inclined to think that we should keep 
utility analysis, as developed by Hicks and others, at least for purposes 
of exposition and interpretation. It is useful to be able to say ••• that 
it seems possible that the indifference maps of the individuals have 
changed. It is useful to be able to describe the well-knmvn terms (of) 
••• compensated price changes, corresponding to the maintenance of a given 
utility level. Any change whatever in prices is conveniently split into 
a change along the indifference surface (the substitution effect) and a 
proportionate change in all prices (the income effect) • 11 Allen, op. cit., 
p. 121. - --
J"But the most important contribution of the theory of utility to 
the study of demand still remains to be mentioned. I have in mind the 
conditions which the theory of utility (continued on following page) 
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insisted that utility analysis while perhaps superfluous in a pure 
theory, in general offers a test of rationality of action on the part 
of the economic agents, a modus vivendi without which nothing meaningful 
can be said about the social significance of certain changes. Perhaps 
on the principle of Occam's razor, we shall conclude, in this case, it 
is best to keep the utility analysis. 
VIII 
To recapitualte, this chapter has sought to outline three major 
trends of thought with regard to a concept of consumer's demand and its 
relation to consumer's st~lus. This was done by presenting first a 
development of the concept of demand. There followed this an analysis 
of demand on three levels--Pre-.Marshallian, Marshallian, and Post- Mar-
shallian. On each of these levels, the meaning of consumer's surplus 
was shown together with a weighing of its usefulness to the particular 
conception of demand. It was concluded that on the Pre-Marshallian and 
Marshallian levels consumer's surplus is a very useful conception and 
that though there might exist doubt about the usefulness of consumer's 
surplus on the Post-Marshallian level, it seemed best to continue its 
application. 
We can say that the demand curve purports to show hovf far the price 
(continued from previous page) gives on the demand function for 
individuals and related commodities. These conditions enable us to de-
termine whether the behavior of consumers is consistent or irrational 
and whether commodities compete with or complete one another. They also 
have an important bearing on the theory of the incidence of taxation." 
Henry Shultz, op. cit., P• 54. 
of a given commodity would have to be raised to reduce the quantity 
purchased by any given proportion. Only one point on the demand curve 
is known empirically; all others are hypothetical. Of exactly the same 
sort of hypothetical magnitude is the consumer's surplus which seeks to 
answer: what is the largest amount of money which an individual would 
pay for a given amount of a certain commodity if he had to choose be-
tween that given amount on such terms or none at all? It follows that 
the consumer's surplus is the difference between the amount so defined 
and the amount of money actually paid out. If it appears best to con-
serve the use of the demand curve analysis, the explicit conception of 
a consumer's surplus must also follow. 
1~ 
CHAPTER FOUR 
A RECONSIDERATION OF THE 
WELFARE POSTULAT S OF ADAM SMITH 
Thus far it has been shom that consumer's surplus as a tool of 
welfare analysis has a functional relationship to the concepts of rent 
and surplus value and that it fits into the concept of consumer demand 
as a useful measure in equilibrium analysis. It needs now to be shown 
how the tool developed at the hands of those economists who gave it 
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its present form. This presentation will take the form of a review of 
what the forgers of consumer's surplus had to say in relation to those 
matters of welfare analysis with \\hich consumer's surplus has to treat. 
Lest this seem repititious, it will be observed that though we hav~ 
described the tool, examined its relation to other tools of similar 
character, and considered the methodological context in which the tool 
developed, we have not yet given attention to the ideas of those men 
whose role in this realm of welfare economics was detenninative. In 
this largely subjective realm, it cbes appear that we shall not know 
fully the meaning of oonsumer 's surplus until we have coliV3 to know some-
thing about the way in which these economists saw the world in which 
they lived. 
In this chapter and the tw:> that follow it (i. e. Chapters 
Five and Six), it is proposed to outline in detail the schem of 
welfare thinking of Dupuit, Jenkin, Marshall, Patten, Hobson, and 
ll6 
Hicksl and to show why they turned to the concept of a consumer's surplus. 
We do not insist either that each of these men meant exactly the same 
thing in his use of the concept, nor that all of them made it fit in the 
same way into their analysis. We do feel, however, that it can be cor-
rectly asserted that their thir~ing is of sufficient similarity that com-
bined it is a revealing mosaic of economic analysis of the benefits of 
modern society. 
Before such an analysis can begin, it seems necessary to look once 
again carefully at the welfare postulates of Adam Smith. In Chapter Four, 
then, we examine Smith's investigation of the nature of economic society 
with a view to understanding his measure of its Hprogress". This hardly 
exhaustive treatment is divided into two sections. Section I treats with 
the Smithian equilibrium analysis and the role of the labor theory in 
this analysis. It seeks to show that the labor theory implies a welfare 
1 
These men have been selected for two reasons. They have written 
definitively on consumer's surplus and have made original contributions 
to the concept. Their use of the concept was to assess gains to society 
from the operation of economic institutions. It may be objected that more 
than these have made contributions. However, it can not be shown that 
those omitted from this listing have played a significant part in the 
present use of the concept, but insofar as possible, we have attempted to 
give due consideration to all--especially the more recent--whose writings 
do amend and enlarge present use of consumer's surplus. We refer to these 
men in the text or by footnotes. Perhaps in this way we shall have met 
same of the possible criticism. It may also be objected by those who find 
no fault with this listing that Patten and Hobson are usually considered 
to be on the fringe of neo-classical economics. The best answer to this 
is that the analysis in Chapter Five will show that Patten and Hobson have 
made solid contributions whose significance has had to wait the renascence 
of welfare economics. 
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measure which is absolute. On the other hand, Section II is a reconsid-
eration of the paradox of value, a phase of Smith's presentation in which 
he seemed to be suggesting a relative measure of welfare. It is sought, 
here, to show that out of such reasoning has come the consumer's surplus. 
I 
Having set for ourselves the task of discovering the welfare signifi-
cance of Adam Smith's equilibrium analysis, let us go about it in the 
following manner. We will, first, look at the labor theory of value in 
an attempt to see wny Smith chose to use it as the base for his reason-
ing. Then we will consider the role of demand and cost in the determina-
tion of the "central price". Lastly, we will collate our investigations 
to see if we can evaluate the welfare content of Smith's presentation. 
The Wealth of Nations1 is not principally concerned with the genesis 
of price. Price serves only as an indicator of welfare, an objective 
money valuation of wealth and the most practical measure of its increase.2 
1 
In what follows the quotations are from the Modern Library Edition 
of the Wealth of Nations which contains an introduction by Max Lerner 
and is edited by Dr. Edwin Cannan, late of the University of London. This 
edition corresponds to Smith's second edition which appeared early in 1778. 
2 
Smith is seeking to determine the principles of what modern econo-
mists call welfare analysis. The classical economists, including Smith, 
were more concerned with economic growth than production. But insofar as 
they were concerned with production, they moved in the realm of welfare 
economics. 
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Smith insists that "the only universal, as well as the only accurate 
measure of value, or the only standard by which we can compare the values 
of different commodities at all times and at all placestt1 is labor. La-
bor ''is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities.n 2 
The presentation of a universal standard obviously serves to provide a 
basis for comparison of levels of welfare as between times, countries and 
places within countries. The common denominator of all value considera-
tions, labor quantified is the relevant indicator of progress. It should 
be noted that in postulating a ttlabor theory of value"3 Smith is seeking 
a relative measure, not an absolute one,4 for he proceeds after comment-
ing on the difficulty of finding exact techniques by which quantified 
1Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, P• 36 
2Ibid., P• 30. 
3The labor theory of value still retains its validity. It is, in 
fact, that part of Adam Smith's theoretical framework which is a constitu-
ent part of modern economics. The Labor Theory applies to a simplified 
concept of the world, with labor as the only scarce resource. Two con-
ditions are necessary for such a simple state: (1) factors of production 
other than labor are not scarce and consequently have no price (2) labor 
is homogeneous. This does not mean that all workers are identical, but 
that all have the same relative capacity for all manner ofwork. If A 
is better than B in c, he must be better than B in D, E, F, G, etc. Thus, 
the number of labor units is undifferentiated, homogeneous. So much undif-
ferentiated labor is supplied, the better workers supplying consistently 
better labor. Capital--ruled out of consideration--does not enter into 
calculation of value. The process of production is not continuous, but 
broken up into self-contained cycles at the end of which production is 
concluded and labor paid. 
4The task of a theor,y of value is the determination of the relative 
prices of commodities. 
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units of labor m~ be compared, to a consideration of price in terms of 
money which is of more use "in buying and selling, the more common and 
ordinary transactions of human life."1 
If labor be the real price or value of a commodity or service, 
money is the best measure of its nominal price. As between nominal and 
real price, there is always a factor of proportionality such that at 
"the same time and place, the real and nominal price of all commodities 
are exactly in proportion to one another."2 What is more, decisions in 
the market are not made in terms of real price but is it "the money 
price ••• which finally determines the prudence or imprudence of all pur-
chases and sales, and thereby regulates almost the whole business of 
common life."3 When, however, we seek to measure the wealth or welfare 
of an individual we do have to admit that "every man is rich or poor 
according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries, 
conveniences, and amusements of human life"4 and that "but a very small 
part of these ••• a man's own labor can supply him."5 Each component part 
of his wealth, or welfare at any moment of time, has a value "to the 
person who possesses it, and who means not to use or consume it himself, 
libid., P• 37. 
2Ibid., P• 31· 
3Qe_. cit., P• 38. 
~. £.!.:!!., P• 30. 
SLoe. cit. 
--
but to exchange it for other commodities, ••• equal to the quantity of 
labor which it enables him to purchase or command.nl In society, 
wealth at any moment of time is always compose·d of goods as symbols of 
labor expended or saved. If the aims of society are given, and we can 
la:> 
assume that the individual member of society has oriented his wants more 
or less in accord with the general aims of the society, then welfare is 
a concept of progress toward those aims. ~ ealth, the objectified stock 
of welfare, has as a "real price ••• the toil and trouble of acquiring 
. it." It is important to see that Smith seeks behind the facade of money 
and the market a measure of progress toward the society he conceived of 
as ideal, in which leisure has a "proper11 valuation, and in -which wealth 
is increased by means requiring less "toil and trouble. 112 
Whatever the role of labor cost as an ultimate measure of welfare, 
in the modern market, under capitalism, costs include the outlay for 
money capital, the outlay for land as well as the outlay for labor. Al-
though commodities may exist, the cost of which are solely the amount of 
labor, or the amount of land plus capital required in their production, 
they are, according to Smith, exceptional,) for "into the price of the 
far greater part of cammodities ••• in ever.y improved society ••• enter all 
lr..oc. cit. 
--
2The labor theory value is especially useful for such a concept of 
welfare. It need not be assumed that at all times the value of the com-
ponents of wealth be proportional to the quantities of labor used, merely 
that a tendency toward such a proportion exist, so that no other value 
ratio is consistent with equilibrium. Disequilibrium acts to drive 
values toward reallocation is terms of proportions of labor. 
3~., P• 5o. 
three more or less, as component parts •111 
The equilibrium or "natural price" obtains "when the price of arry 
commodity is neither more nor less than what is sufficient to pay the 
rent of the land, the wages of the labor, and the profits of the stock 
employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to market."2 This natu-
ral price must be understood to include more than price cost, for if the 
person who brings the commodity to the market "sells it at a price which 
does not allow him the ordinary rate of profit, he is evidently the loser 
by the trade. 113 Thus, natural price is the average cost of production 
of the commodities brought to the market by the seller (i.e. "the lowest 
at which he is likely to sell them for aey considerable ti.mett4) plus the 
rate of profit which he might have obtained by employing his stock in 
some other way. 
While Smith does emphasize the cost side of equilibrium price 
1Roll, using Marx as his standard of reference, finds Smith incon-
sistent in presenting what appears to him to be an entirely new theory 
of value. Cf. Roll, Histo;r of Economic Thought (New York, Prentice-
Hall, 1942) ~ 17lff. I, rather, contend that in addressing himself to 
problems of objective market price in any market at any time, Smith 
took cost of production as an index of social cost. His major purpose 
in all this is to suggest a relation between the measure of welfare he 
considers most applicable in comparative static and dynamic analysis and 
the measure the market affords. Neither is ultimately "correct but the 
latter is readily available and most frequently used, while the former 
more nearly indicates the true relation between commodities in a social 
context. 
2Q£. ~., P• 55. 
3~. £!!:_., 
~. ill•' P• 56. 
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determination, he also points out that demand has a role to play.l 
While natural price does not change in the short nun, being "an ordinary 
or average rate" regulated by the particular nature of each market and 
employment, demand does fluctuate causing the market price to vary. 
Demand and quantity brought to the market must both be regarded as 
"effectual",not the ultimate possible. Market price "is regulated by 
the proportion between the quantity which is actually brought to market, 
and the demand of those who are willing to pay the natural price of the 
commodity ••• which must be paid in order to bring it thither."2 If 
effectual demand (i.e. the demand of those who are willing and able to 
pay the natural price) exceeds the quantity supplied, a competition 
ensues which causes "market price... (to) rise more or less above the 
natural price, according as either the greatness or the deficiency, 
or the wealth and wanton luxury of the competitors, happen to animate 
more or less the eagerness of the competition."3 When the quan ity 
supplied exceeds the effectual demand, "it cannot be all sold to those 
who are willing to ~ay the whole value of the rent, wages, and profit, 
which must be paid in order to bring it thither. Some part must be sold 
to those who are willing to pay less, and the low price which they give 
for it must reduce the price of the whole."4 
~ut equilibrium values are entirely unaffected by demand. 
2Q£. Cit., P• 56. 
3Loc. cit. 
~- cit., P• 57. 
The natural price is the equilibrium price, or Smith says "the 
central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually 
gravitating."l The nature of the equilibrating forces are such that 
though the price can continue for indefinite periods above the natural 
price, "it can seldom continue long below. 112 The lack of symmetry in 
the equilibrating force is traceable to the threefold division of cost 
behind which lie the interests of three different classes of producers. 
Under perfect competition, or Smith calls it "perfect liberty,n3 
"whatever part of (the commodity) was paid below the 
natural rate, the persons whose interest it affected would 
immediately feel the ~oas, and would immediately withdraw 
either so much land, or so much labor, or so much stock, 
from being employed about it, that quantity brought to 
market would soon be no more than sufficient to supply the 
effectual demand." 
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Though in the short run in any employment of stock, land and labor, 
natural price may be constant, in the long run it varies with the 
"general circumstances of the society, their riches or poverty, their 
advancing, stationary, or declining condition." This consideration of 
the long run involves a study of labor and the conditions of ita em-
ployment, of the rate of profit and of interest, and of uses of the 
soil; or, put it another way, it involves a stuqy of relative costs 
lQE. cit., P• 58. 
2QE_. £!1., P• 62. 
32£. cit., P• 62. 
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125 
and their effect upon equilibrium price.l 
In conclusion, Smithian equilibrium price determination is objec-
tive with no independently determinative role assigned to demand. The 
cost of production in any market, and within that period of time in which 
a given institutional relation holds as between the laboring class, the 
capitalist class, and landowning class, sets the price. While produc-
tion exists only for consumption, yet the consumer is the weaker bar-
gainer in the market so that all improvement in his status must be sought 
in improving the means of production.2 Assigning production a major role 
in the achievement of welfare, Smith refers to utility or considerations 
of ultimate satisfaction only in the citing of the so-called paradox of 
lFor other very critical analyses of Smithian equilibrium price 
determination cf. Edmund Whittaker, A History of Economic Ideas (New 
York, Longmans Green & Co., 1940) Esp. Ch. IX.-w. A. Scott, The 
Development of Economics (New York, D. Appleton-Century CompanY,' 1930) 
Esp. Ch. VI, VII. Scott's analysis is arid and faulty. 
2m te:rms of geometrical analysis the essence of Smithian equilib-
rium price determination can be presented as follows: Let AC (: average 
cost of production) be so drawn as to indicate that for anyrelevant 
amount of production in a given market the relative costs of land, labor, 
and capital are such that the average total cost of the product is a 
constant. Thus, there is abstracted from the analysis changes in the 
proportion of three factors of production to one another. Let Ql, !22, 
~1 represent various possible conditions of effectual demand such that 
snifts to the right of the demand curve represent an overall increase 
in demand. Then the market price will fluctuate about AC. Beginning 
with demand at £2 at equilibrium price ~0, a rise in demand causes 
price to rise to P, but it must fall, because the average cost remains 
constant, as production increases to ~01. Likewise, a fall in demand 
to £1 causes price temporarily to drop to ~2, but as production con-
tracts price must rise to cover cost at P0Il. (See Diagram 6 which 
follows.) -
value--a matter which is treated at some length in what follows. 
Smith, then envisioned a society whose major problem was to in-
crease the production of goods and thus advance wealth.1 The period in 
1::6 
which he wrote was, as it were, a turning point at which the wealth acquired 
through clever exploitation of the international division of labor had 
now to be applied to domestic production where a new rationale obtained. 
Smith postulated that in improving domestic production, liberty was neces-
sary so that the many producing units might in competition prevent the 
siphoning off unduly by any one of them of the surplus which provided the 
incentive to continued increased production. It was not his concern to 
determine whether the individual consumer benefitted by more or by less 
as between aqy price-quantity alternative, for it was obvious that if 
production did increase faster than population each consumer would bene-
fit and the wealth of nations would in fact rise. It was the social sur-
plus as a whole--not any division of it--for which he set out measures 
of growth.2 
1
"(Smith 1s) first interest lay in the economic system best adapted 
to promote 'The Wealth of Nations', and here he looked to continued 
quantitative improvement in efficiency of production within an unchang-
ing framework of private property and whatever approach to 'natural 
liberty' humanity might achieve." John M. Clark, "Statics and Dynamics," 
Encyclopaedia of~ Social Sciences, Vol. XIV, p. 352. 
2Because he regarded qualitative measures of welfare (i.e. use 
value, etc.) as possessed of little importance, his surplus concepts 
are quantitative in nature and productive in character. What follows 
suggests that his paradox of value implied a qualitative surplus con-
cept from the consumer's viewpoint. S. N. Patten finds Smith to have 
distinguished two cost concepts--consumer's and producer's cost. cr. 
S. N. Patten, ,.The Theory of Dynamic Economics," Essays in Economic 
Theory {New York, A. A. Knopf, 1924) p. 46. -
II 
Though he was not the first to state the so-called paradox of 
value, Adam Smith presented it in so succinct and striking a form that 
it has continued to have life in the dress he gave to it.1 Seeking to 
' determine what rules govern the "relative or exchangeable value of 
goods," Smith paused to note that value had in fact two very connnon 
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meanings, the one having reference to the utility of the good in ques-
tion and the other describing the power of purchasing other goods, 
"which the possession of that object conveys. 11 2 Water, he pointed out, 
was of such a character that "nothing is more useful," while sora.e other 
commodities such as diamonds had "scarce any value in use." Yet the 
diamonds have the greater value in exchange, water having so lit tle 
value in exchange that "scarce anything can be had in exchange .for it." 
This is the only definitive reference to the concept of use-value in 
the Vealth 2£ Nations and occurs at the end of the chapter on t e origin 
and use of money in such a way as to indicate, as Roll has intllnated, 
that he wanted "to get it out of the way before beginning the really 
important work, the analysis of exchange value."3 Here,then,is the 
1Smith also refers to this paradox in his Lectures (which were 
taken down b.1 a student to be published after Smith's demise). 
2Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 29. 
3Roll, ! HistoT of Economic Thought (Revised Edition; New York, 
Prentice-Hall, 1942 P• lb4. M. Rist suggests that the cavalier hand-
ling of use-values was "more a matter of expression than of reasoning, 
for in (Smith's) Lectures on Justice, value in use, coupled with the 
purchasing power possessedby those who desired the commodity, was re-
garded as one of the elements which determined the demand for it and 
fixed its market price." Gide and Rist, HistorY of Economic Doctrine 
(Boston, D. c. Heath) p. 76. 
paradox of value in a very challenging form, a form which was to pro-
vide the starting point for the theorizing of the economists of the 
later nineteenth century who developed the marginal utility analysis of 
welfare.l 
The study of the paradox of value is important to a consideration 
of the consumer's surplus for at least two reasons: (1) the challenge 
of the paradox led to marginalism and (2) the consumers' surplus is in 
effect a restatement of the paradox of value. In the first plac:e, in 
the paradox, utility (or use-value) is set apart from exchange value 
clearly.2 Thus, no confusion can arise with regard to an interpreta-
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tion of Smith's rules for the determination of equilibrium price. Price 
is entirely objective and behind objective price lies objective real 
labor cost. In the second place, the paradox shows that not even Smith 
could consistently ignore the subjective element in value, and utility 
considerations played a significant role in all classical writings, 
though few went beyond Smith's paradox until the complete reformulation 
of value and equilibrium price determination implicit in marginalism. 
Lastly, consumers 1 surplus compares the utility (or use-value) obtained 
by the consumer with the exchange value paid out, which is the basis 
1von Mises in his ~ Action (New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1949) refers to the role played by the paradox of value in the devel-
opment of marginal utility. (p. 123). See also Roll, ££• cit., 
PP• 163, 164. ---
2This will be challenged by those who insist on a narrow concept 
of consumer's surplus. 
for the Smithian paradox. It remains to be shown that the marginal 
utility doctrine did not solve the paradox of value.l 
Before passing to a more close consideration of the paradox, it 
will be instructive to examine the language Smith uses in its statement. 
Smith has apparently opposed use to satisfaction, for when he pointed 
out that a diamond which has the greater value in exchange "has scarce 
any value in use,"2 he might be accused of having become a moralist. 
If by utility is meant the power to satisfy a desire or to serve a 
purpose, it cannot be insisted that diamonds do not possess this power 
in great degree, for unless they had it, they should not be demanded 
and would not have any value in exchange. If, however, by value in use 
is meant some "comparative estimation of different uses in the judgment 
of a philosopher or moralist,"3 there is no paradox, only an error. It 
can then be said that the economist has substituted some moral calculus 
for the calculus of the market. 
Use value and exchange value are contained in the same article at 
the same time, the latter always bearing some relation to the former. 
lThe "solution" of the paradox as used in what follows is used in 
a relative sense. It is "solved" when the elements that make it a 
paradox are clearly seen. It is contended that all the first generation 
marginalists, with the possible exception of Marshall, did not see the 
paradox for what in reality it was. 
2smith, 2£· cit., p. 29. 
3John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (London, George 
Routledge & Sons, Ltd.) p. 299· 
Thus, as Mill has put it, 11value in use is the extreme limit of value 
in exchange. nl A good may sell, as does water, for far less than its 
use value; it cannot sell for more. Smith then intends to say that 
water's price in the current market is far short of its utilityll while 
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a diamond's price quite nearly approximates its utility.2 In modern 
terminology, it would be said that the demand curve for water is elastic 
in the neighborhood of the market price (in fact, approaching perfect 
elasticity at some very low price) but that there is a portion of the 
demand curve in which the elasticity becomes perfectly inelastic (i.e. 
there is some amount of water that is necessary to life). Diamonds, 
on the other hand, have a demand curve which begins at some finite 
price and is elastic throughout its length ending at some finite amount. 
The paradox of value was assumed to be solved by the doctrine of 
marginal utility.3 The economist no longer concerned himself with 
estimates of the possible total utility of a given commodity; he now 
examined the additional utility of a unit of the commodity, when these 
lYill, 2£.• cit., p. 299. 
2He does not define use-value except by implication. The follow-
ing passage from his Lectures on Justice may serve to throw some light 
upon the definition of utilityhere referred to: "There is no demand 
for a thing of little use; it is not a rational object of desire." 
Charles Rist accuses Smith of being unable to conceive "the possibility 
of a demand or even a desire for a commodity which was useless from a 
rational point of view." This, he adds, "is evidently a great mistake.'' 
Cf. Gide and Rist, Historz of Economic Doctrines (Boston, D. C. Heath 
& Co.) (translated by R. RiChards) P• 75. 
3cf. Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis (New York, 
McGraw Hill, 1948) pp. 482, 483 for a recent statement of this assumption. 
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units were arranged in a non-temporal substitutional order. In any 
given moment in a given market situation the buyer and the seller are 
considering the unit of utility which will be added to a stock already 
possessed or to be possessed. 0! significance is the marginal tUlit of 
utility with which is equated the utility of the money or other commod-
it.y to be given up in exchange for the commodity in question. The 
economist was no longer concerned with total utilities (or mathematical 
curves or relations which traced them) but with marginal utilities (or 
curves tracing the slope of the total curve). It was now possible to 
say that water while possessing a very high total utility had a ver,y 
low marginal utility when compared with diamonds whose total utility 
was much smaller.l 
However, this was not the whole story, for it was obvious that 
tl1ough the consumer might pay a price determined by his marginal utility 
for water, because the previous units might have obtained a hig er price, 
he had in reality gotten an addition to his store of utility for which 
he might have been induced to pay a higher price. If one assumes, as 
did Marshall, that the consumer does his purchasing of free choice and 
acquires additional units of a commodity to increase llis total utility 
from its consumption, then the marginal utility curve is the relevant 
indicator of the nature and the changing effect of the additional units 
lsamuelson, 2£• ~., p. 403. 
upon the consumer's total satisfactions. The last unit added yields 
only so much incremental utility, but if this unit be considered apart 
from its current circumstances and be compared with the utility which 
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the consumer would gladly give up rather than go without this unit, the 
consumer will be found to have obtained a "rent" as Marshall first 
called it.l The Marginal Utility curve traced downward from some ver.y 
high addition to total utility implied a surplus of utility for all 
units acquired before the last.2 
The notion of a consumers' surplus was a natural development from 
marginal utility ideas.3 The first economist to draw a marginal utility 
demand curve was also the first to state the existence of a surplus of 
utility implicit in the concept of demand.4 Though Dupuit was the first, 
it was not until Jevons had rediscovered a mathematical presentation of 
demand based on diminishing utility that consumers' surplus could again 
be treated. Marshall, explaining how he came upon the idea, defers to 
lAlfred Marshall, The ~ Theory of Domestic Values (London, Re-
print of The London School of Economics, 1930) pp. 20ff. 
2samuelson, 2£• cit., p. 484. "It is not hard to see how this 
surplus arises. Every unit of good that the consumer buys costs him 
only as much as the last unit is worth. But by one fundamental law, 
the earlier units are worth more to him than the last. Therefore he 
enjoys a surplus on each of these earlier units." 
3cf. J. M. Keynes, "Alfred Marshall, 1842-1924, 11 Memorials of 
Alfred Marshall (London, Macmillan, 1925) P• 43. -
4Jules Dupuit, De L'Utilite et de ~ Mesure (Turin, Ecrits 
Choisis et Republies par Maria de Bernardi, La Riforma Sociale, 1933). 
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Jevons as the "first to publish a clear analysis of the relation of 
total to marginal (or final) utility" and says that "the notion of con-
sumers' rent was suggested ••• (to me) ••• by a study of the mathematical 
aspects of demand and utility under the influence of Cournot, Von Thunen, 
and Benthcim.ttl 
Smith had avoided a clear statement of the influence of utility 
on value. Ricardo and Mill likewise did no more than lip service to 
the concept of utility; yet, as Von Mises has insisted, "whoever wants 
to construct an elementary theory of value and prices must first think 
of utility. 112 The paradox of value was the stumbling block that. pre-
vented classical economists from using utility as a base for value, for 
the apparent fact that diamonds are somehow more appreciated than water 
seemed incompatible with any theory of value and prices involving the 
concepts of utility (or use-value). From this rock of offense they 
turned seeking to explain the phenomenon of value and market exchange 
by other theories. 
Taussig~ following in the steps of the first generation of margin-
alist~ gives a refined treatment of their position on the relation of 
lA. Marshall, Principles of Economics (London, Macmillan, 1890) 
lst Ed., Footnote to Book III, Ch. VI. Par. 3. 
2von Mi.ses, ·.2E· cit., p. 121. 
3F. w. Taussig, Principles of Economics (New York, Macmillan, 
1921) 3rd Revised Edition, Vol. I., pp. 116ff. 
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value of utility. He begins with the statement that an object can 
have no value unless it has utility," that is, "no one will give any-
thing for an article unless it yields him satisfaction.tt The very fact 
that an article has exchange value indicates that it must have tility, 
but it is evident that "the value of an object is not in proportion to 
its utility," for 11 great utility often goes with low value." On the 
other hand,"some things whose exchange value is high have utilities 
which we do not ordinarily reckon great." So far Mill had gone. 
Referring to the relation of scarcity to utility, Taussig insists 
that "the mere fact that a thing is rare (relative to desire) ••• gives 
utility to things otherwise useless," but with all things regardless of 
their scarcity there is tendency to diminishing utility. Though some 
sources of pleasure may yield increasing units of satisfaction for a 
time, "the qualifications (to the law of diminishing utility) that may 
be needed are of no great importance." The law leads to the conceptions 
of total utility and marginal utility. Here is a presentation that does 
not really yield an answer to the paradox. Implicit in it is the recog-
nition that water is more "useful" than diamonds; the marginal utility 
mechanism simply helps to avoid a clear statement of this hedonistic 
judgment. 
It must be repeated that Smith had stated the problem in such a 
way as to be misunderstood. It was to be expected that the answer to 
his problem might result from this misunderstanding. The economist 
cannot concern himself with whether water is more ttusefult' than diamonds 
in any ultimate sense. This lies in the province of ethics as Mill 
recognized.l The monetary theorist faces a somewhat similar problem 
when he attempts to explain the phenomenon of the value of gold. Many 
pages have been written2 to show how "useless" gold is as a monetary 
metal; yet its "utility" is a real fact, attested to by the high black-
market prices currently being quoted for it in the fear worn captials 
of the East. Can it be that the precious metals and objects of luxury 
have been unscientifically treated by the economist with a utilitarian 
bias? Might it not be best to admit that the value of gold (and other 
luxuries) is culturally determined and that their use and usefulness 
is well nigh universal? Surely there is more to the paradox of value 
than mere anti-bullionisml 
Von Mises3 suggests that the "valuations and choices that result 
in the exchange ratios ••• (of water and diamonds in the market) ••• do 
not decide between ••• (them)." In fact, the consumer in the market is 
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never in a position where he has to choose between all the diamonds and 
all the water. He chooses "at a definite time and place under definite 
~11, 2£• cit., p. 299. Mill insists that Smith is ambiguous 
in his language, "employing the word use, not in the sense in which 
political economy is concerned with it, but in that other sense in 
which use is opposed to pleasure." He suggests a better term, 
teleologic value, after DeQuincey. 
2c.r. Kent, Money ~ Banking (New York, Rinehart, 1947) Chaps. 2 and 3 
for a complete statement of arguments for and against gold as a standard 
money. 
3von Mises, ££· cit., pp. 120-127. 
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conditions between a strictly limited quantity ••• (of water) ••• and a 
strictly limited quantity of ••• (diamonds).n Thus, the decision does 
not rest upon the highly improbable situation of having to choose be-
tween all the water and all the diamonds. "llhat counts alone for his 
actual choice is whether under the existing conditions he considers the 
direct or indirect satisfaction•' which so many units of water could 
yield him as greater or smaller than the direct or indirect satisfaction 
which the same number of units of diamonds could yield him. Thi s is a 
matter of choosing between alternatives; not one of measuring ut ility 
or value. There exists no abstract concept of total utility in the 
realm of this choice. 
The marginal utility doctrine as stated by Taussig erects a smoke 
screen which effectively hides two very important questions that under-
lie the paradox of value: (1) What is the social measure of ttut ilitytt? 
and (2) How account for the relatively low prices of so many necessities? 
Taussig has accepted some aprioristic measure of utility which clashes 
with his concept of marginal utility. He does not reveal on what basis 
he has detennined that some things which command a high price yield 
satisfactions that are not of a high order. 
The social measure of utility must be stated before one proceeds 
to any discussion of marginal utility. It is precise~ because they 
have failed to do this that most of the members of the marginal utilit,r 
school have failed to solve the paradox of value. Max Weber defines 
utility to mean "the specific and concrete, real, or imagined advantage 
or means for present or future uses as it is estimated and made an 
object of specific provision by an economically acting individual.nl 
The marginal utility school, taking consumers' wants and their satis-
faction as the point of departure, have implied or explicitly st£ted 
that economic action is a psychic phenomenon.2 Weber rejects this 
analysis, insisting that even "the subjective valuation of goods, if 
(it is) an empirical process" is far from being merely a psychic phen-
omenon. Utility is definable within the social environment alone so 
that whatever serves as a means for the ends of economic action is a 
utility. ithin this social environment the nature of economic action 
i~ determined 11by custom, by the constellation of interests, or by a 
conventional or legal order for the purposes of an economic unit."3 
137 
· ~eber adds that the theory of marginal utility cannot be ~psychologically 
substantiated, but rather--if an epistemological term is to be applied--
pragmatically, i. e., on the employment of the categories; ends and 
means." To understand what is "useful" one must consider the society 
in which it is used. 
1Max Weber~ The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,. 
translated by Talcott Parsons (New York, Oxford University Press, 
1947) P• 163. 
2Max Weber, £E.• ill•' P• 159. 
3Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur issenschaftslehre, 
(Tuebingen, 1922) p. 372, also P• i49.---
Welfare analysis requires in the ultimate, a concept of the social 
measure of utility. It is apparent that Marshall was not unaware of 
this. His consumers' surplus, he pointed out before beginning the 
analysis of the surplus from the marginal utility viewpoint, is in 
reality "a benefit which (the consumer) derives from his opportunities 
or from his environment, or to recur to a word that was in ccmmon use a 
few generations ago, from his conjuncture.nl His aim in developing the 
concept of a consumers' surplus was "to apply the notion •••• as an aid 
in roughly estimating some of the benefits which a person derives from 
his environment or his conjuncture." Keynes avers that though the 
"conception of consumers 1 rent or surplus ••• has perhaps proved l ess 
fruitful of practical results than seemed likely at first," "one could 
not do without it ••• in the Principles."2 Edgeworth3 finds Marshall to 
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have shown through the use of the consumers' surplus "that laissez-faire, 
the maximum of advantage attained by unrestricted competition, is not 
necessarily the greatest possible advantage." Thus, as Keynes eontinues, 
"Marshall's proof that laissez-faire breaks down in certain conditions 
theoretically, and not merely practically, regarded as a principle of 
maximum social advantage, was of great philosophical importance .. " 
lMarshall, Principles of Economics (London, Macmillan, 1930) 
8th Edition, note to p. 12s;-
2Keynes, ~· ill•, P• 43. · 
3F. Y. Edgeworth quoted in Keynes, ~· cit., p. 43. 
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Marshall had developed a means whereby it could be determined to what 
extent individuals acting within the assumption of pure competition fell 
short of the possible maximum of welfare. Thus welfare was not always 
achieved by purely competitive economic means. 
Von Mises has shown that it is possible to define marginal utility 
witr~ut reference to other than the existence within the social environ-
ment of economically rational ends. He avoids Gossen's first law of 
the saturation of wants and deals neither with sensuous enjoyment nor 
with saturation and satiety, in obtaining the following definition: 
We call that employment of a unit of a homogeneous supply 
which a man makes if his supply is n units, but would not make 
if, other things being equal, his supply were only n-1 units, 
the least urgent employment or the marginal employment, and 
the utility derived from it marginal utility.l 
When it is recognized that the economically acting individual in 
society pursues ends which are set by that society within the means 
socially provided, it becomes apparent that some things at any moment 
of time better serve economic ends than others and are thus more "useful" 
than others. A modern society endowed with rich resources concerns 
itself not primarily with the continued acquisition of these resources 
but with their use for some social pu~pose. Having water readily avail-
able, an economically rational individual must regard it as less useful 
than diamonds, which few possess and many want, in the accomplishment 
1
von Mises, 2£• cit., p. 124. 
of specific economic ends. This does not involve an academic or 
philosophical judgment regarding tre "absolute" or total value of 
diamonds or water. In choosing between two satisfactions Which he 
cannot have at the same time, he selects that one commodity mich at 
the time of choice seemed to him to be most capable of fulfilling eco-
nomic ends. A productive society makes it possible for him to avoid 
making his choice on tre basis of survival.l 
Back of the paradox of value, back of tm concept of marginal 
utility, indeed back of the notion of a consumers• surplus,must lie 
some conception of the wealth and the prochctiveness of the conumnity. 
Essentially, the paradox describes a society in ~ich a basic necessity 
is available at a very low price. Water cannot be done without oo that 
a high price for it \'Ould mean that less of soll2 other commodity or 
conmodities not quite so necessary v.culd be obtained by the average 
consumer within his mcome. The fact that the nargina.l utility of 
water was low indicated that expenditures on water played a very minor 
role in the consumption budget of the Englishman and Scotsman of the 
late eighteenth century. The CXHlsu.mers • surplus available because of 
the low price of water could be used to increase the variety of commod-
ities obtainable within the mcome of the average citizen of the United 
Kingdom. Rical'OO and Malthus by their espousal of what was later called 
lutility :is thus closely tied to s:>cial motivation as well as pro-
ductivity. 
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a doctrine of "iron•• wages, and formulated into a wages fund doctrine} 
seemed to imply by so doing that they felt that but few commodities fit-
ted into the category of the Smithian water. The consumption budget of 
the average worker yielded him but very few commodities, all of ~hich were 
relatively high in price. 
Perhaps the recantation by Mill of the wages fund principle is as 
much an indication that the relative prices of the commodities t hat made 
up the consumption budget of the avera ,e worker were coming down in the 
late 1860's (or that income was rising) as of a change of heart on the 
part of the last classicist. He who could state that one hundred years 
of the machine age had brought no advance to the average welfare of the 
working class had possibly found evidence that at long last some such ad-
vance was in fact occurring. 
The economic ends of the average worker were now becoming more than 
mere survival at some subsistence level; they could include means to widen 
the range of choice of foodstuffs as well as to increase the incomes they 
obtained from their work. The social surplus had grown to such levels 
that it was apparent that there were not enough productive opportunities 
for its use unless some means could be found f or increasing the purchasing 
power of the individual worker. 
~or a careful presentation of what Mill's statement of the wages 
fund doctrine involved, see A. C. Pigou, "Mill and the l ages Fund n 
Economic Journal, LIX:l7ff (1948). ' 
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The paradox pointed up the existence of a surplus in the days of Adam 
Smith.l The widening of that surplus gave rise on the one hand to 
Marxian socialism and on the other to the doctrine of marginal utility. 
Marginal utility concerning itself with little increments to a store of 
commodities already possessed seemed to provide a better explanation of 
the reaction of the consumer to an increasing income. Insofar as it did 
not explain what utility in fact was and how income was increasin& it 
was not the answer to the paradox of value. The paradox consisted in a 
recognition that as social wealth and its distribution increased, use-
values changed. Because Smith was not prepared to examine society dy-
namically,he did no more than state the paradox. Because the margina-
lists likewise did not give a dynamic theor,y of economic development, 
they could not answer the paradox, though they bet understood it.2 
Utility is relative to social ends. Social ends are defined within 
lMuch of the Wealth of Nations involves a discussion of the extent 
t o which labor is productive of the surplus as well as a treatment of 
the nature of productive labor as compared with unproductive. 
2Marshall was fully aware that social surplus must be exami ned dy-
namically. The treatment of consumer's surplus, producer's surplus, and 
saver's surplus are all part of a static theory of exchange and distribu-
tion. In the first chapter of his book on distribution he refers to 
11 the growing power of nature (which) makes her yield an ever larger sur-
plus above necessaries, and that this is not absorbed by an unlimited 
increase of the population." Cf. rshall, ~· cit., p. 504. One of 
the problems of a theory of distribution is to explain "what are the 
general causes which govern the distribution of this surplus among the 
people?" 
• 
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the social environment.l The environment,insofar as it consists of re-
sources and people, is either progressing in the sense of finding more 
productive ways of using these resources in sat isfying the changing wants 
of its people, or retrogressing. Since the end of the fifteenth century , 
at least, ours has been on the whole a progressive society, and the ver.y 
nature of this progress has meant that the individual in the society has 
been able to turn himself to the satisfaction of successively less impor-
tant urges (from the standpoint of survival). Modern economics arose to 
explain the way in which choices between these relatively less important 
urges are made as well as why and how society can go on increasing the 
level of satisfaction (or the ealth of Nations). 
Consumer's surplus is a more refined tool for analysis of the choices 
to be made by any individual within the income that is his. 2 The paradox 
implied that such a surplus of satisfactions existed. The consumer's sur-
plus throws into more precise technical language the conception involved. 
1 Cf. J. C. Gillin and J. P. Gillin, Cultural Sociology (New York, 
The Macmillan Co., 1948). ~Values cluster around (1) activities and 
attitudes which serve needs of the group, or a large or dominant por-
tion of the group, or (2) about ways of life which have become habitual 
or customary and therefore require little conscious adjustment from day 
to day, or they are (3) so intertwined with other elements in the cul-
ture, disturbance of one part of the complex threatens others." Cf. 
also John F. Cuber, Sociology, Ch. XXX. 
2z. C. Dickinson in his Economic Motives (Cambridge, Harvard Uni-
vers ity Press, 1922) argues that though the "calculation (of consumer's 
surplus), to be sure, is static, ••• wants are constantly changing." Yet 
he insists such a measure is "grounded in solid physiological mechanism." 
Though it might be called "implicit", the society affords "an enormous 
surplus in utility" as it advances because the necessities are available 
at such low prices. 
CHAPI'ER FIVE 
THE MARGINAL REVOLUTION 
CONSUMER'S SURPLUS AND 
WELFARE ECONOMICS 
In this chapter we trace the development of an explicit measure of 
consumer's surplus. We begin with Dupuit's pioneer subjective demand 
analysis and proceed to Ho.bson 1s twentieth century analysis and critique. 
The factor that gives unity to this presentation is the basic similarity 
in the methodological viewpoint of each of the economists whose work is 
treated here. It is seen that, in the case of each, welfare thinking led 
to a search for a measure of the benefit accruing from society's economic 
institutions,with especial reference to the market organization. 
The order of presentation is chronological and proceeds as follows. 
Section I assesses the contribution of A. J. E. J. Dupuit, early French 
marginalist, with a view to understanding just why he should have devel-
oped a doctrine of consumer's surplus (or as he termed it "relative 
utility"). Because Dupuit 1 s .work did not receive great publicity, it was 
unknown in England until long after he had written. Therefore, it becomes 
necessary to give attention to an English pioneer, H. c. Fleeming Jenkin. 
This we do in Section II where we also give consideration to his welfare 
schema. Section III gives a complete treatment to Alfred Marshall's con-
ception of the consumer's surplus. An attempt is made to clear up the 
common confusion about Marshall's meaning with respect to consumer's 
surplus. 
Sections IV and V examine the welfare economics of the American, 
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Simon Nelson Patten, and the Englishman, John Atkinson Hobson, contem-
poraries of Alfred Marshall, who made significant changes in the concept 
of consumer's surplus. Both are found to differ from their contemporary 
in their strong limitations upon the welfare content of the concept, and 
these sections set out the reasons for the limitations so imposed. 
Throughout t his chapter and the next, reference is made to the works 
of many other economists whose analyses suggest more useful ways of re-
garding the consumer's surplus. They are not given special treatment be-
cause, as will be seen, their contributions tend to be in the nature of 
amendments to and clarifications of t he work of these five. However, a 
general impression of the significance of their ideas can be gained from 
our treatment. 
Consumer's surplus--a measure of the flow of subjective satisfactions 
arising from the consumption of goods produced within an economyl- is the 
key to an understanding of what, after Pigou, has come to be called wel-
fare economics.2 Welfare economics concerns itself with the study of 
1In urging that "consumer's rent" rather than "consumer's surplus" 
be used to describe the concept, G. P. Watkins points out that "the 
thing designated is not a fund but a continually replenished flow. 
'Rent' is, at any rate, income. Hence the term 'consumer's rent' which 
recognizes the character of the utility in question as income, is pre-
ferred to the other." Cf. Welfare as an Economic Quantity (Boston, 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 191S) p. 173-
2cf. Rol~! History of Economic Thought, Revised Edition (New York; 
Prentice-Hall, Inc.; 1942;-pp. 440ff. 
those kinds of economic arrangements which will be needed to bring about 
a given objective. We are not limited to a particular goal or set of 
goals, nor do the goals need to be complete goals in themselves; they may 
be partial ones. It, in f act, is not the purpose of Welfare Economics to 
set the goals. Any society has a hierarchy of objectives, some of which 
are consistent with others and some of which are inconsistent. The ques-
tion of an economic summum bonum must be left to agencies outside the 
economic machine. elfare Economics, however, can help to provide tests 
for determining whether the goal (or goals) are being attained and with 
what efficiency. 
Assumptions which rightly belong in the province of welfare economics 
underly the writing of all the classical economists and to a great extent 
that of more recent and modern economists. Such aims as equation of mar-
ginal cost to marginal revenue, pure competition, equality of sacrifice, 
free trade, even the equation of supply to demand involve basic welfare 
assumptions which must be recognized. 
I 
Jevons in the preface to his Theory of Political Econo~ said that 
Dupuit "must be credited with the earliest comprehension of the theory of 
utility." Although Cournot had written somewhat earlier, giving mathe-
~. s. Jevons, ~Theon of Political Economy, 4th Ed., (London, 
Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1911 Preface, p. )0. 
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matical form to the ideas of J. B. Say and Condorcet, Dupuit was first1 to 
point out the weakness of calling the value of a thing only what is paid 
for it. There must be taken into consideration, he said, some other ele-
ment than the objective price paid as an indication of the benefit re-
ceived by the purchaser. 
In two articles in the French engineering journal, Annales des ponts 
/ / 
et Chaussees, A. J. Etienne Juvenal Dupuit (1804-1866)-- •De la mesure de 
l'utilite des travaux publics" (1844), and "De 1 1 influence des p6ages sur 
l'utilite des voies de communication" (1849), outlined his utility theory 
of value. Because these articles were not directed to economists and 
treated of matters that concerned prima~ily members of his profession, they 
laid forgotten until after Jevons had rediscovered the essence of the mar-
ginal utility concept. When once Jevons knew of Dupuit's accomplishments, 
he was not reluctant to give to the French engineer and mathematician the 
honor due him. The two articles of Dupuit have been combined into a 
republished work entitled De 1 1 utili te" et de ~ me sure. 2 
In a manner now familiar, Dupuit drew a curve in a cartesian plane 
representing the variation of demand with price. Along the abcissa he 
traced the movements of price while the ordinate measured the quantity of 
the commodity purchased, obtaining a curve, which like Cournot's differs 
lRoll calls Dupuit "an important pioneer of the utility theory and 
of the geometrical method." Cf. Roll, op. ~· p. 354. 
2Jules Dupuit, De L1 Utilit~ et de sa Mesure (Turin, Ecrits Choisis et 
Republies par Maria ae Bernard, r.aRllorma Soc1.ale, 1933). 
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from the modern ~arshallian curve in making quantity the dependent 
variable. 
If one were to seek the total benefit to be obtained from the serv-
ices of a canal, one should take into account the maximum prices that 
would be paid for the individual small units corresponding to the costs 
of alternatives to the services of the canal. Thus, if q = f(p) is the 
cost of the best alternative to the use of an additional small unit of 
the services of the canal, when !l units are already in use, then if So 
units are used altogether, the definite integral of the function of price 
with respect to a series of small changes in the price within the limits 
zero and So is the measure of the total benefit (or utilitt) which re-
sults from the existence of the canal or other such facility which makes 
possible the services in question. 
Geometrically, 1 because 11 il n'y a d 1utilite' re'elle que celle qu'on 
consent a payer" the total utility corresponding to the consumption of 
the amonnt or is measured by the area ornP. Absolute utility is the 
utility of each portion of the commodity or service which the consumer 
is just willing to give up for that portion. This value being subtracted 
lDiagram 7 is similar to that used by F. Y. Edgeworth to describe 
Dupuit's analysis. Cf. article "A. J. Etienne Dupuit (1804-1866)" 
Palgrave's Dictionati: of Political Economy (London, Macmillan and Co., 
Ltd.) Vol. I, p. 65 • --
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from total utility, relative utility is obtained. Dupuitl has assumed 
that the consumer would pay for every unit that price which the last 
consumed or marginal increment was worth to him. Since the other units 
consumed had a higher utility than had this last one, it followed that 
the consumer had received a surplus of utility or relative utility, on 
the portion consumed earlier. At the price ~ in Diagram 7, ~ units 
would be consumed yielding a total utility of ornP, an absolute utility 
of ornp, and relative utility of npP.2 
In the second of his papers Dupuit applied this analysis to 
questions involving the advantages accruing to the public from the use 
of roads and other means of communication which have been provided by 
the government. Two very significant propositions are treated: (1) 
that the net loss accruing to the community in terms of utility result-
ing from an increase in the tax rate to pay for the services rendered 
by public means of communication is proportional to a square of the 
tax rate,3 and (2) that a government seeking a minimum return to meet 
1Dupuit held that "l'economie politique doit prendre pour mesure 
de 1 1utilite d'un objet le sacrifice maximum que chaque consommateur 
serait dispose a faire pour se le procurer." p. 40. 
2cf. Edmund Whittaker, A History of Economic Ideas (New York, 
:Wngmans Green & Co., 1940) -PP• 444,43. -
>:He also sought to show that there were occasions when although 
the cost of the services of a given public utility could not be covered 
at any possible charge, yet a surplus of utility might accrue to the 
public through its provision. In modern terms we could paraphrase his 
argument as follows: Although the demand curve for a given series of 
units of service of a public utility lies (continued on next page) 
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fixed charges and the maxinnun advantage to the public will in general 
impose a different scale of charges for the services of canals and 
railways from that imposed by a monopolistic company seeking a maxi-
mum return upon its investment.l 
The second of these propositions is treated in some detail by 
Marshall2 while the first was overlooked until resurrected by Professor 
Hotelling in a new famous article, "The General Welfare in Relation to 
Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates,tt3 and applied by 
him to problems under current discussion. The significance of both of 
(continued from previous page) at all points below the average 
total cost curve, yet at a given price total utility~ll exceed total 
cost. Thus in Diagram 8, total utility ( = OA.QPN) is greater than total 
cost (= OBQCPN) (DABQ DQCP). Cf. H. R. Bowen, Toward Social Economy 
(New York, Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1948) p. 170, 171. 
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1Hotelling has put Dupuit's proposition as follows: In Diagram 9, 
DB is the demand curve and SB is the marginal cost curve with CB the 
equilibrium price. If a ta.X(=NL) be imposed per unit raisingt:he 
marginal cost curve to RL, the new equilibrium price Will be greater 
than CB by GL. At CB consumers' and producers' surpluses are DAB and 
SAB respectiVely. The rise in price drops consumer 1 s surplus toDLIC 
and producer's surplus to RCK. If MNLK be drawn equal to total benefit 
of government revenue from~, then at price OK, SNLD is total benefit 
at price OK. NBC is not loss from rise in priCe because of tax. NBL = 
~L x GB.-GB i"S'"itecrement in production. Since NC is tax rate, there-
fore tne loss resulting from tax is half the product of tax rate times 
decrement in quantity. Net loss is proportional to square of tax rate. 
2A. Marshall, Principles of Economics (London, Macmillan, 1930) 
8th Ed., PP• 477ff. -
>Econometrica 6:242-269 (1938). 
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them lies in their practical application to problems of monopoly and 
consumer advantage and in the evidence they give of the usefulness of 
concepts of consumer's surplus from their origin. Because a more 
careful analysis of the implications of such analysis is given in the 
discussion of Marshall's work, none will be necessary here. In effect, 
utility analysis and consumers' surplus were born together, the latter 
being a tool by which utility analysis can find fit employment. 
II 
Henry Charles Fleeming Jenkin rediscovered the doctrine of consumer's 
surplus in 1871, becoming the first English writer to propose this measure 
of the benefits from exchange. Fleeming Jenkin was not an economist by 
profession but a professor of engineering at the University of Edinburgh 
who was concerned by the seeming inexactness of a social science which 
offered so many tools of measurement. His works in economics were not 
published widely, appearing only in technical publications of the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh and in the North British Review. All his papers 
were brought together at his death by Sidney Colvin and J. A. Ewing, 
fellow townsmen, and published as a two-volume collection with a very 
charming biographical note by Robert Louis Stevenson.1 
lcf. S. Colvin & J. A. Ewing, editors Papers, Liter~, Scientific, 
Etc. by the late Fleeming Jenkin, Vol. I, II {LOndon, LOngmans, Green 
& Co.;-1E57):--Those papers which have interest to economists have 
subsequently been republished by the London School of Economics. 
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Jenkin is very seldom mentioned and almost never quoted.l His 
contributions were overshadowed by those of Alfred Marshall and Stanley 
Jevons, younger contemporaries of his and workers in economics proper. 
This should not lead to the conclusion that his contributions are not 
solid ones, well worthy of careful consideration by the sincere student 
of English economics. This section will examine the nature of his 
achievements. 
Jenkin's first published article appeared in 1868. "Trade Unions"2 
sought to examine the degree to which these organizations of workmen were 
to be justified and to what extent they might expect to accomplish their 
purposes. Rejecting the general economic opinion that trades unions 
could not succeed in raising the wages of their members, Jenkin makes 
a masterful use of what he calls "the law of supply and demand." This 
law is presented in mathematical form showing a functional relation 
between price and demand and price and supply. His equation of demand 
is D = f(!); or more fully, D = f(A f !), where xis the price, and A X X 
lNeither L. H. Haney, History of Economic Thought, 4th Edition 
(New York, Macmillan, 1949) nor E. Roll, I Hlsto1 Of Economic Thought, 
Rev. Ed. (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1942) mention eruun. Whittaker, 
op. cit., however, gives a very complete treatment of his accomplish-
ments:- Marshall refers to Jenkin in a note (Principles of Economics, 
n. 1 to p. 475) while Jevons speaks slightingly of the "Iiigeriious and 
instructive, and probably correct at almost all points" accomplish-
ments of Jenkin, but insists that he had been using similar techniques 
before Jenkin had written his essays. (Cf. Jevons, op. cit., p. 333) 
2North British Review, 1868 cited in an article by F. Y. Edgeworth 
on Jenkin in Palgravels Dictionary of Political Econo~. Vol. II, 
p. 473. --
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is an unknown oonstant; so "that the decrease of x, or increase of i , 
corresponds to what has since been called an 'extension' of demand, the 
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increase of A to a 'rise'." A similar equation for the supply function, 
S: F(B f. x), was outlined. Thus, F(B f. x)= {f(A .f. l) will detemine 
X 
the price x. From this exposition, he proceeds to a very thorough 
analysis of trade union policy and the justice of the workers' demand 
for increases in their wages. This clever combination of mthematical 
presentation and practical first-hand knowledge can still be recommended 
1 highly. 
In the same year, 1868, there appeared in the Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh a paper entitled "The Graphic Representation 
of the Laws of Supply and Demand, and their Application to labour." 
Here Jenkin continued his mathematical analysis by drawing diagrams of 
his demand and supply functions. These representations are almost 
exactly like those of Cournot. Jenkin did not concern himself with the 
psychological assumptions that underlay his constructions nor did he 
examine completely the conditions of production. He oought simply to 
deal with supply and demand as they existed in tm mrket and to show 
how price was determined. 
Jenkin's graph is reproduced in Diagram 10 where tm vertical axis 
measures quantities of commodities bought and sold and the horizontal 
1
rt should be noted that this first mathematical form presents 
an individual demand curve. 
axis measures price in money terms. His First Law of Demand postulated 
that: 
In a given market, at a given time, the market price 
of the co~di ty will be that at which the supply and demand 
curves cut. 
It should be noticed that Jenkin pointed out that "the law only comes 
into operation where buyers and sellers can approximately estimate 
whether at a given price the quantity wanted or the quantity for sale 
is the greater."2 
For our purposes, his most significant essay was that which 
appeared in the Proceedings for the Session of 1871-1872, "On the 
Principles which Regulate the Incidence of Taxes." He began by refer-
ring to the conclusions which he had reached in his two previous papers 
and by presenting a simplified demand and supply function. He now 
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wanted to point up the fact that "the graphic method may also be employed 
to indicate the advantage gained by each party in trade, and to show how 
it may be estimated in money.n3 
The tools which he had developed in his two previous essays, he was 
now prepared to use in setting forth his concept of gains from trade. 
1
c. H. Fleeming Jenkin, The Graphic Representation of the Laws 
of Shppfr and Demand and otherEssays on Political Econoiiii "{A" reprint 
01 t e noon School or-Economics, LOnaon, 1931) p. 78. 
2colvin & Ewing, .Q.E• cit., p. 86. 
3Jenkin, .Q.E• ill•, p. 108. 
It was obvious to him that one had to assume some motivating force 
behind the act of exchange and as a corollary there needed to be some 
measure of the gains from exchange. His presentation is as follows. 
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waking at the demand curve in Diagram 10 the ordinate x1 from the 
axis OY to A represented the value set on some units of the commodity 
under consideration by one or more buyers of that commodity. Since the 
equilibrium price was represented by the ordinate x = OM, the difference 
between these two ordinates xA - x yielded the difference in price terms 
between "what was given and what might have been given for a certain 
small quantity." If y represents that small quantity purchased, then 
y(xA - x) is the measure of the benefit received by the buyers from 
the purchase. Integrating the benefits derived from the sale of each 
successive small quantity, the area MDN represents the gain in money to 
the buyers. If there was added to this buyers' gain, an analogous 
sellers' gain, equal to the area PDM, the whole benefit to "the two 
communities" would be represented by the area PDN. 
This suggestive analysis is used by Jenkin to work out the par-
tition of the gains from production and sale of goods in organized 
markets. By extensions of his diagrammatic presentation, he worked out 
the meaning of elastic and inelastic demand curves in terms of buyers' 
gains. His most fruitful statements in this phase of the matter have 
to do with the loss which would be sustained by final buyers' when the 
production of a given commodity ceases. He finds this loss (which is 
really another way of looking at the consumers' surplus) to be less 
than that sustained by the inability to purchase goods necessary for 
further production which would include the loss of wages, profits, 
and interest. 
l6o 
Just as Dupuit had examined the incidence of taxation, so Jenkin 
sought to prove that a tax levied as a fixed sum per unit of a commodity 
would have an effect such that the gain to the government from the tax 
plus the consumers' and producers 1 surpluses would be less than the 
total gain to the community prior to the imposition of the tax. Such a 
tax became, in his terms, unproductive, when the loss of benefit became 
larger than the gain in governmental revenues. 
A previously unpublished paper which is included in the collection 
of his works, "Is one man's gain another man's loss?111 sought to give 
a philosophical as well as technical enhancement of the conclusions which 
he had reached by the use of his surplus concepts. Using the now 
familiar circular flow diagram, in which money moves in one direction 
while goods and services move in another, he thought he had shown how 
the absolute surplus was the source of the relative surplus and how 
both might increase with no loss to any member of the community. 
As more and more emphasis is placed upon the doctrine of the con-
sumer's surplus, it is natural that his works receive more study. He 
will be found to have shown that a gain concept, as a maximizing device, 
~his was published for the first time in Colvin & Ewing, op. cit. 
is as necessary on the consumption side of the market as profit on 
the production side. Edgeworth found him to have contributed an anal-
ysis of "the highest theoretical importance and of considerable prac-
tical interest,"1 and it cannot but be concluded that he deserves 
better mention. 
III 
Alfred Marshall came to economics from a study of mathematics and 
philosophy. His family's desire that he should take orders for the 
Anglican ministry conflicted with his love of mathematics.l Rather 
fortuitously he found economics to occupy, for him at least, a middle 
ground between the orderly world of figures and the complex but fascin-
ating world of the ideal. It was precisely a problem in welfare econom-
ics--"how far do the conditions of life of the British (and other) work-
ing classes generally suffice for fullness of life?"3--that made him seek 
out this middle ground. 
His economic reasoning sought to establish a fundamental unity, a 
"Principle of Continuity"4, as it were, for to him, "Economic Science is, 
and must be, one of slow continuous growth."5 All of his works had as 
~dgeworth, op. cit. 
2cr. J. M. Keynes, "Alfred Marshall, 1842-1924" in Memorials of 
Alfred Marshall (london, Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1925) 
3cf. A. Marshall, Industry and Trade (london, Macmillan Company, 
Ltd., 1919), preface. 
4cf. A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th Ed. pp. v to xi • 
.5Loc. cit., p. v. 
a purpose the setting out of the means by which the "fundamental idea" 
developed. If, as a consequence, his works have a peculiar Victorian 
tinge of moral determinism, they are nonetheless not without direction. 
Not all the truth, but only that which is important finds its place in 
this schema of thought.l Having as a goal an understanding of the 
reality of economic life and of the prospects for progress in modern 
society, Marshall thinks his works to have to provide a measure of such 
understanding. 2 
Although he read Mill carefully, translating many of the latter's 
postulates into mathematical symbols, it was from Von Thuenen and 
Cournot that he ac~uired the inspiration that was to give his economics 
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a distinctly different flavor from that of his predecessors and contemp-
oraries in England.) It is a mistake to picture him as in some way 
1cf. A. c. Pigou, "In Memoriam: Alfred Marshall" Memorials, p. 85. 
2"Economics is thus taken to mean a study of the economic aspects 
and conditions of man's political, social and private life; but more 
especially of his social life. The aims of the study are to gain know-
ledge for its own sake, and to obtain guidance in the practical conduct 
of life, and especially of social life. The need for such guidance was 
never so urgent as now; a later generation may have more abundant leisure 
than we for researches that throw light on obscure points in abstract 
speculation, or in the history of past times, but do not afford immediate 
aid in present difficulties." p. 42,43; Marshall, Principles of Economics. 
3n ••• my main position as to the theory of value and distribution 
was practically completed in the years 1867 to 1870; when I translated 
Mill's version of Ricardo's or Smith's doctrines into mathematics; (so 
that) when Jevon5' book appeared, I knew at once how far I agreed with 
him and how far I did not ••• I worked (my theory of capital) out for the 
greater part while still teaching mathematics; and while still regarding 
myself as a mere pupil in the hands of great masters, expecially Cournot, 
attempting a synthesis of the marginal utility economics of Jevons, 
Menger, or Walras, and the objective labor theor,y economics of Smith, 
Ricardo, and Mill, for he had found his basic philosophic orientation 
together with his method in the years 1867 to 1870.1 Though he always 
deferred to Jevons the pride of place in marginal analysis, he owed 
nothing to him. His economics was essentially a reformulation of 
Ricardo in marginal terms. Though it was indeed far more than this, 
it is to Ricardo, rather than to Jevons, that one must go if he seeks 
antecedents for the Marshallian presentation.2 
The consumer's surplus (first called consumer's rent)3 came quite 
naturally out of the Marshallian postulates of demand and was in fact 
(continued from previous page) Von Thuenen and Ricardo. Between 
1870 and 1874 I developed the details of ~ theoretical position; and 
I am not conscious of any perceptible change since the time when Boehm 
and Wieser were still lads at school or College ••• ", from a letter to 
Professor J. B. Clark, dated 24 March 1908 and printed in Memorials of 
Alfred Marshall, pp. 416, 417. --
lcf. J. M. Keynes, ££• cit. 
2If one doubts this, a careful rereading of Appendix I to the 
Principles will show the truth of this assertion. 
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3The first publication of the doctrine of consumer's rent appeared 
in the privately printed Pure Theory of Domestic Trade (1879). In this 
work Marshall described cons-umer's rent as ''the amount of (the) pleasure 
or satisfaction which a person derives from being able to purchase a 
particular commodity at a given price; or in other words, ••• the amount 
of the excess or surplus satisfaction which he derives from his purchases 
of the commodity over the value to him of the money he pays. Now that 
which a person would be just willing to pay for any satisfaction rather 
than go without it is ••• the •economic measure• of the satisfaction to him." He admitted that "it is somewhat difficult (con•t. on next page) 
present in the form of the paradox of value in the writings of the 
classical economists.1 It can be seen to be one of the sort of tools 
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Marshall would early have fashioned for by it he could set out the 
"benefit which (an individual in society) derives from his opportunities 
or from his environment.n2 It was suggested to him, as he said, "by a 
study of the mathematical aspects of demand and utility under the influ-
ence of Cournot, Von Thuenen, and Bentham.n3 
I have already shown that there are at least two aspects to a con-
sideration of the social surplus.4 One might regard it as absolute--
being the difference between the cost of maintenance of society and the 
total produce of the society in a given period or relation. Marshall 
(continued from previous page) to discern clearly the nature of 
this surplus satisfaction and of its economic measure, but when this 
difficulty has been overcome, the apparatus of diagrams that is here 
supplied will be found to be easily handled and to be capable of 
achieving important new results." Mathematically, he pointed out 
that it will be noticed "that if y = f(x) be the equation (of the 
demand curve) and a,b the coordinates of A, the consumer's rent is 
S f(x)dx-ab." Cf. pp. 20 to 25 of the London University Reprint of 
Pure Theory (1930). 
lcf. pp.l27 to 143 above. 
2Principles,p. 124. 
3Principles, First Edition, footnote to Book III, Chapter VI, 
section 3. 
4cf. Chapter Two, supra. 
placed the absolute surplus in Benthamic language .1 The sum of sat-
isfactions (or pleasures) is greater than the sum of dissatisfactions 
(or efforts, sacrifices, ete.) by a surplus whose total is the measure 
of the society's benefit from the civilizational pattern or cultural 
complex. Such a surplus ~volved complexities of a character that it 
was difficult to reduce it to a usuable measure. Marshall turned from 
it not because of "philosophic doubts nor the methodological difficul-
ties involved" but simply because he "did not think it practically 
possible to arrive at a reasonably accurate estimate."2 
1.65 
Marshall's consumer's surplus concerns itself with "such changes ••• 
as would accompany changes in the price of the commodity in question in 
the neighborhood of the customary price.••3 It was therefore relative. 
It sought to measure changes from one price-quantity combination to 
another price-quantity combination within the consumption budget of the 
individual. Especially applicable to necessaries, but to other goods 
as well., it was a component part of a theory of consumer demand which 
sought to explain why "the greater the amount to be sold, the smaller 
must be the price at which it is offered.•4 
lPrinciples, note XIV to Mathematical Appendix, pp. 846-852. 
2cf. Hla Myint, Theories of Welfare Economics (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1948) p. 14b: 
3Principles, p. 133. 
4Ibid. p. 99. 
Price 
Marshall's Presentation 
Area DQP is Consumer's Surplus 
Area ONPQ is Effective Utility 
0 Quantity 
Diagram 11 (Cf. A.Marshall, Principles, p. 128) 
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That Marshall's demand curve is in reality a marginal utility 
demand curve has been shown.1 It now needs to be shown the manner 
in which consumer's surplus arises 6ut of this demand concept. The 
demand curve traces the slope of the total utility curve, if we accept 
Marshall's assumption that the demand curve is a marginal utility curve. 
Each successive increment of the subject commodity in the given market 
within a certain period of time during which the consumer's wants do 
not change adds to the store of utilities. In accordance with the 
principle of diminishing marginal utility, the slope of the total 
utility curve declines (i.e. the marginal utility curve is traced 
downward in a negative direction toward the quantity axis). The con-
sumer will pay the amount of utility indicated by the marginal utility. 
The marginal unit multiplied by the number of units acquired will yield 
the tteffective utilitY'' which, so long as marginal utility is assumed to 
be diminishing, rill always be less than total utility. Total utility 
less effective utility is the measure of consumer's surplus. (See 
Diagrams 11 and 12) This was the Marshallian presentation. Dependent 
upon cardinal utility and diminishing marginal utility, consumer's sur-
plus was given to economics as a tool for analysis. 
It has subsequent~ been pointed out that consumer's surplus may 
be shown by a diagram which avoids the pitfalls of cardinal utility.2 
lsee Chapter Three above. 
2see Chapter Six below. 
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The utility indifference map with an emphasis upon ordinal utility can 
be used to present as neat a diagram of the concept as that which appears 
in so many economics texts •1 In Diagram 13, the consumer enters the 
market with OB units of ! and OC units of ! which places him on indif-
ference level .!1 at point ~· He wishes to obtain more units of A. The 
movement from~ to ~ along budget line PP1 yields him CW units of! at 
a price of VP1 units of !! given up. ~ is on a higher indifference 
level than ~ and is thus to be preferred to it. However, the consumer 
facing a perfectly discriminating monopolist might have been induced to 
give up ,Y! units of ! in an aU-or-none transaction. He would thus 
find himself on the same level of indifference subsequent to the exchange 
as that prior to it. !J! is the measure of the consumer's surplus ob-
tained in the exchange.2 
These relatively simple geometrical presentations imply a deceptive 
ease of analysis which does not exist. The student will readily assume 
from a quick perusal of Marshall that he supposed that the area difference 
between effective utility and total utility was the only measure of 
lThe diagrammatic presentation used here is an adaptation of that 
which Boulding uses. Cf. K. E. Boulding, Economic Analysis, Revised 
Edition {New York, Harper and Brothers, 1948) pp. 767-773. 
2rt should be noted that the gain in utility equal to P1X in Diagram 13 is the usual Marshallian measure only if we assume that 
A is not a necessity. If A were necessity, it would then follow that 
the area under the demand curve would be less than P1X. 
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0 y Quantity 
Diagram 14 
consumer's surplus.1 If this were the case, it would be not too dif-
ficult to show that special reasoning lay behind the drawing of the 
demand curve and that the consumer's surplus does not exist, if one 
makes somewhat different assumptions about the demand curve. Certainly 
if the demand curve is not a marginal utility demand curve, it will be 
an error to describe the area difference as a surplus. Chamberlin, 2 far 
example, seems to suspect that the demand curve is an average utility 
(or average price) curve and that the rectangle whose area is given by 
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the price-quantity co-ordinates at the equilibrium price is total utility. 
• (See Diagram 14) He contends that if the consumer were willing to take 
OB units of A at the price BC, all of them at the price BC, he would be 
willing to take less than ~' if he had paid more than BC (say XY) for 
a part of them. Thus, ~· traces the average price at llhich successive 
units of A will be sold. Triangle ~is not a consumer's surplus.3 
Marshall in the text describes consumer• s surplus as "the excess 
of price which (the consumer) would be willing to pay rather than go 
without the thing, over that which he actually does pay."4 This 
lBishop takes this measure as the primary one. Cf. R. L. Bishop, 
"Consumer's Surplus and Cardinal Utility ,n Quarterly Journal of Econ-
omics, Vol. LVII, pp. 42lff. Cf. also P. A. SamuelSon, Foundations-
of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1947} pp. 197-202. 
2cf. E. H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, 
Sixth Edition, (Cambridge, Harvard Univ:-Press, 1948) Footnote 1 to 
page 27. 
3rhe issues involved in this passage are treated more carefully in 
Chapter Seven below. 
4Principles of Economics, p. 124. 
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description does not depend upon the construction of and the assumptions 
behind a demand curve. It is apparent that if Marshall had regarded 
the geometric presentation as the more important, he would have put it 
in the text rather than in a footnote. He had first called this concept 
consumers' rent.1 Whereas agricultural or land rent is the excess of 
the price of the total output from a given bit of land devoted to agri-
cultural production orer what is a necessary agricultural outlay cost, 
consumers' rent was the excess of the money equivalent of the satisfac-
tion derived from an individual consumer from the total amount of the 
commodity acquired, as measured by the total price that he would, if 
necessary, have been willing to pay out, over the total price actually 
paid out. While the concept of land rent grew out of a careful delin-
eation of what constituted production cost, the concept of consumers' 
rent, analogically, grew put of an attempt to define consumption cost 
and tangentially out of a doubt whether marginal utility was in fact a 
true measure of the actual satisfaction obtained by the consumer in the 
market. 
There is a third possible interpretation of Marshall's consumer's 
surplus.2 It is to regard the area roughly triangular in shape lying 
beneath the demand curve and above the rectangle which measures actual 
money expenditure as consumer• s surplus. This area is the one which 
lsee Chapter Two above. 
2
cf. Bishop, op. ~., p. 422. 
the beginning student comes to regard as the true measure of the con-
cept. It remains to be shown that these three concepts of consumer's 
surplus, all of which Marshall fathered, are not the same and approxi-
mate one another only when an assumption is made concerning the con-
stancy or at least approximate constancy of the marginal utility of a 
composite connnodi ty ! . When an admission is made that the marginal 
utility of ! can and does change as we acquire more and more units of 
!' the three definitions diverge. Bishop feels that the basic defi-
nition is ntotal utility minus effective utility." Vinerl has shown 
that the area under the demand curve is not a correct index of the 
gains from trade because this ma.gnitude does not coincide With the 
amount which could be derived from an all-or-none offer. Although 
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Samuelson has derived six, not t.hree, separate concepts of consumer's 
surplus, 2 he does think that Marshall would have agreed with Bishop that 
the area under the demand curve and the verbal description in his text 
are good or bad approximations depending upon the particular situation 
under consideration.) 
The verbal description of consumer's surplus treats of an extra 
expenditure that the consumer might be induced to make for the comnod-
ity !• It should be obvious that unless this extra expenditure comes 
lcf. J. Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade 
(New York, Harper ana Brothers, ~37) Chapter IX, Section IV. 
2cf. P. A. Samuelson, op. cit., pp. 197-202. 
3.sut see the analysis of Hicks infra. 
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(Cf. R.L. Bishop, "Consumer's Surplus and Car-
dinal Utility", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. LVII, p. 42lff.) --
from a commodity in the consumer's budget whose marginal utility is 
exactly constant, the increased expenditure on ~ must increase the mar-
ginal utilities of all other commodities (i.e. composite commodity !).1 
It would seem unlikely that an increase in the amount of ! given up to 
obtain the same amount of A would leave the marginal utility of !! un-
changed. It is, however, not necessary to assume constant marginal 
utility of! to validate the concept of consumer's surplus. 
1.77 
If !! represents a fairly large assortment of individual commodities, 
no one of which makes up a significantly large proportion of the consump-
tion budget, an increase in the price of ! in terms of ! given would, if 
spread equally over each of the commodities represented by !, affect each 
such commodity relatively little. The marginal utility of each of these 
commodities would be changed very slightly and thus we can regard in-
crease in marginal utility of each of the commodities as negligible. 
In Diagrams 15 and 16, dd• is the marginal utility demand curve for 
! while ~' is the marginal utility demand curve for !! • The equilibrium 
price of ! is ~while that of !! is BC. ~ is the average utility curve 
for commodity !' so that the rectangular area obxu1 is the measure of 
total utility obtained by the purchase of ob units of _!, while obcu0 is 
the measure of effective utility. Thus, ~CXUJ is the measure of con-
1It has already been shown that the composite commodity concept 
is another wa:y of Jr esenting Marshall's "money·" Cf. Chapter Three. 
sumer•s surplus obtained from the purchase of ob units of A at the 
price ~.1 
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DD' is the result of adding together the negative slopes of a ver.y 
large number of mar ginal utility demand curves and thus its slope is 
smaller absolutely than the slope of a.ey one of its components. DD 1 is 
in fact possessed of a very small slope. DD 1 becomes asymptotic to a 
line parallel to the utility axis, because there is some amount of ! 
which is necessary to life, but over the range with which we are concerned 
its slope is small. Small changes in the amount expended on ! will have 
but relatively little effect on N•s marginal utility. 
Marshall's verbal definition of consumer's surplus involved an 
attempt to find what the maximum amount was "ffh ich the consumer woul.d 
pay for (say) ob units of !• let B'C'C"B" be an area equal to obxu1, 
the total utility obtained from ob units of !• B' is determined such 
that the area under ~· from~~ to ~ is equal to ~cxu1 , the consumer's 
surplus from the purchase of ££ units of !· Thus, BCC"B" is a measure 
of effective utility, equivalent to obcu0 • The consumer will decrease 
his consum i on of !!. from~ to ~· before giving up the consumption of 
A. If he gives up the consumption of A at some price greater than bx, 
- -
he will substitute BB" units for ob units of A. The fact that the 
marginal utility of !!. has declined over the relevant range of DD' does 
~his analysis with modifications follows that of Bishop. 
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not affect equality between the extra-expenditure which could be induced 
by some discriminating monopolist and the consumer's surplus in terms of 
an excess of total utility over effective utility. This will hold so long 
as we assume total utility to be in the neighborhood of twice effective 
utility and that the marginal utility curve of ~ is linear over the 
relevant range. It can be shown that the larger the consumer's surplus 
is relative to effective utility, the more likely is extra-expenditure 
to be less than consumer's surplus. So long as there is an approximate 
equality between effective utility and consumer's surplus (with the pro-
vision that relevant range of N•s demand curve is linear), one is just-
ified in taking Marshall's verbal delineation and his geometric treatment 
as essentially equivalent. 
Once the assumption of a marginal utility demand curve is dropped, 
there is on~ one special case in which the area above the amount repre-
senting total expenditure and below the demand curve can be shown to be 
equal to what we have defined as consumer's surplus (i.e. total utility 
less effective utility). If the consumer is assumed to devote some 
fixed proportion of his income or consumption budget to the purchase of 
a given commodity (say A) and his income does not change within the 
range of our examination of his reaction to price changes for that com-
modity, we shall have obtained a demand curve which has unit-elasticity. 
The unit-elastic demand curve approximates the marginal utility curve, 
for as the price of ~ changes, the amount spent on all other commodities 
or the composite commodity ~ does not change and thus its marginal 
utility is not affected. 
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If the demand curve has an elasticity greater than one, a rise in the 
price of ! causes a greater than proportional drop in the expenditure on 
A and leaves available for increased purchases of ! more of the total con-
sumption budget. When the demand curve is inelastic, the rise in price 
causes a less than proportional drop in the expenditure upon!· Ricci1 
has shown that the approximation to the marginal utility demand curve which 
the ordinary demand curve represents depends upon (1) the nearness to unit 
arc-elasticity of the given demand curve and (2) the constancy of marginal 
utility resulting from the expenditure upon the subject commodity. It 
will be noted that to assume unit elasticity for the demand curve is to 
assume infinite consumer's surplus, for a unit-elastic demand curve is a 
rectangular hyberpola. There is no price which will induce the consumer 
to give up the purchase of A. 
These three Uarshallian presentations of the consumer's surplus are 
not carefully set apart by the master, not because he was not aware that 
they were distinctive, but rather because he sought to give without resort 
to tedious mathematical methods a general measure of a concept whose use 
would always be in the realm of greater or less. These three distinct 
concepts which we have shown to exist are sufficiently alike in the gen-
erality of cases for them to be used interchangeably, though we should 
want to be careful to avoid drawing any but the most general of con-
1cr. Umberto Rice~ "the Psychological oundation of the Law of 
Demand", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. XXXIX, p. 145. 
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elusions from their use. Certain~ consumer's surplus does not stand or 
fall on the correct choice of one of these concepts. 
IV 
Shortly after the publication of Marshall's Principles "the moat 
original and suggestive economist that .America has yet produced"l set 
out an interpretation of economic society in terms of its dynamics. 
"There are," Patten said, 11two possible starting points for economic in-
vestigation--man or nature." It was his purpose in the Theory of Dynamic 
Economics2 (and likevnse in the Theory£! Prosperity)3 to study man and 
to develop an understanding of the problems of value and distribution 
from an unfolding of a theory of consumption. Thus production was re-
garded from a subjective point of view.4 
Society receives a surplus from the application of its efforts to 
the r esources of nature.S This surplus is the means by which society 
1cr. Henry Rogers Seager's Introduction to Essays in Economic 
Theo;y. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1924). A collection of 
Patten's major essays. 
2s. N. Patten, The Theory of Dynamic Economics (Philadelphia, The 
Publications of the Tiniv. of Pa:; Political Economy and Public Law 
Series, Vol. III, No. 2, 1892). 
3s. N. Patten, The Theory of Prosperity (New York, The Macmillan 
Company, 1902 ) • -
4nindeed," said Patten, "the life of men is made economic by their 
need of goods suitable for consumption.n Theory of Prosperity, p. 13. 
5cr. Chapter Two above. 
progres ses and the laws of the distribution of this surplus form an all 
important science. It is a mistake to regard natural forces, inherited 
industrial qualities, and consumption1 "with its habits, customs, and 
feelings" (p. 62) as costs of production, though these three together 
1.82 
with labor do enter in "to determine the gross produce of society." (p. 62) 
In fact, labor itself (i.e. the doing of work) cannot be regarded as 
simply a cost, for in order to understand the nature of cost, one must 
have regard for the nature of the dynamic of society. 
The dynamics of society are dependent upon the six laws of conswnp-
tion which work to impel men to constantly vary and increase consumption 
goods. These laws 11 are not simply the laws of nature; they are laws de-
rived from the particular combination of natural f orces of which the soci-
ety makes use." (p. 53) The ~ of necessity is predicated upon the fact 
that life itself is precious and in primitive societies this law compels 
most persons "to make up their consumption from a group of articles from 
which they get little satisfaction." (p. 55) Every life contains certain 
absolute utilities plus positive utilities along with negative utilities.7 
In a primitive society, only the absolute utilities are obtained and they 
1All the quotations except as noted, are from "Theory of Dynamic 
Economics," as published in Essays in Economic Theory, (New York, 
A. A. Knopf, 1924). --
2This distinction among utilities which is further developed in 
G. P. Watkins, Welfare as an Economic Quantity (Boston, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1915). ----
must be obtained "no matter how great a sum of satisfactions is 
sacrificed." (p. 55) 
The law of variety decrees that once the absolute utilities are 
obtained, "an increasing consumption of any one commodity reduces the 
utility of each increment until a point of satiety is reached." (p. 55) 
To avoid this point of satiety, a new commodity satisfying the same or 
a similar want must be substituted. The law of harmony is based upon 
the fact that complementary commodi ties1 "forming natural groups It yield 
in their sum more utility than would result from their separate use. 
"From this law it follows that the total utility of a group of commodi-
ties will be greater than the sum of the separate utilities, if the com-
bination is harmonious, and less, if it is discordant." (p. 56) 
The law of ~ seeks to place cost analysis in its correct social 
relationship. The law compares the present society with one in which 
all consumption goods are free. It states that in the present world 
"articles that are consumed are not estimated according to their total 
utility, but only by the surplus of utility above cost." (p. 56) A 
fifth law, that of grouping, attempts to provide an understanding of the 
nature of intensity of pleasure. Each consumer will so arrange his budget 
and the articles which compose it, as to obtain as much as possible of the 
pleasure-giving commodities and will limit his use of other articles 
Bauby Turner Norris, The Theory of Consumer's Demand, ( ew Haven, 
Yale University Press, 194I): Esp. Cfi: VII and VIII. 
(insofar as they are discordant) to that amount needed to supply the 
absolute utilities not secured otherwise. 
The sixth ~ brings into consideration those absolute utilities 
which are at t he same time negative utilities. Medicine, a pie which 
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gives a stomach ache, cigarettes, etc., commodities or services which have 
painful results. Some of these articles are unpleasant from the start, 
but are necessary. Others give pleasure (and positive utilities) from 
the start but later yield negative utilities. In any case, negative 
utilities tend to disarrange the consumption of mo st persons and thus to 
reduce the sum of positive utilities. 
In accordance with these laws, "the primary law of social progress 
•••• is that society progresses from a simple, costly, and inharmonious 
consumption to a varied, cheap and harmonious consumption." (p. 57) By 
the operation of these laws, as society advances, andwith its produc-
tivity, consumption both extends and deepens. Since both wants and 
production are progressive, equilibrium can be conceived of only in terms 
of equality of the utility of the marginal increments of consumption with 
the utility of the marginal increments of production.1 Production creates 
1
such an equilibrium is in Patten 1 s term unattainable in a dynamic 
economy, for »progress ceases to be a series of waves that spend their 
force in vain upon the unyielding barriers of nature, and becomes a 
steady, onward movement that cannot find an equilibrium." Theory of 
Dynamic Economics. (Knopf edition, p. 54). --
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utilities while consumption gives value1 to these utilities. The total 
utility and the total value advance together, but value increases more 
rapidly in the later stages of society, while utilities increase more 
rapidly in the earlier stages. 
If we begin with a primitive society just obtaining enough to yield 
it absolute utilities,2 we will observe that the surplus over necessaries 
that arises from better and better methods of application of labor to the 
economic environment first causes utilities to grow greatly for society 
is enabled to partake of the relatively large marginal increments of 
production. But when the law of variety begins to operate, total values 
come to catch up with total utilities in their rate of growth "because 
of the rise in value of the marginal increment of consumption. Each sue-
cessive stage of society causes the total value of commodities to approach 
more nearly to their total utility.") (p. 61) 
Adam Smith and his successors in the English classical tradition 
assumed a direct proportionality between the subjective satisfactions of 
~atten's use of this word is inexact and inconsistent. At times 
he seems to mean subjective value and at others market price. 
2The analogy with Schumpeter's Stationary State is too clear to be 
overlooked. Cf. J. A. Schumpeter, ~Theory of Economic Development. 
English translation by Redvers Opie. (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 
1934). Esp. Ch. 1. 
3m J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 2d Edition 
(New York, Harper & Brothers, 1947) is to be found the outlining of a 
principle, the "law of decreasing satisfaction." The very dynamic 
analysis which gives Patten his optimistic (continued on next page) 
the individual citizen in the economy and the amount of production.1 
Thus, Smith saw an increase in welfare as consistent with an increase 
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in the production of physical goods and equal to it. Patten, making the 
consurm r the starting point of his analysis, sees an increase in goods 
as equal to an increase in satisfaction only 11ex post." Looking at the 
path of growth or at the .rmrginal increments of consumption, and at the 
marginal increments of production, Patten has w:>rked out the laws of 
their divergence and of their equilibrium. 
In the .roodern society, tre effect of the increasing prochctivi.ty of 
labor points up the need for modification of Smith's viewpoint. One can 
not assume constant wants, for wants themselves are dynamic. Thus, "the 
increase of industrial efficiency is used in supplying new wants of 
greater intensity, instead of supplying old wants more completely." (p. 
74). Values rise in today' s society because each successive ns.rginal 
increment of consumption supplies a more intense want (which has been 
substituted for the old want). Smith with his assumption of constant 
wants concluded that lowered real prices (in ter.ms of labor expense) 
were the indices of advancing welfare, while Patten, on the other hand, 
presented the progressing society as Characterized by increasing 
(Continued from previous page) air, gives Schumpeter a view of the 
end of capitalism. Capitalism fails because it produces wants faster 
than goods, because it is too efficient a producer. 
lMyint says of this tendency on the part of the classical econo-
mists that "the subjective level of analysis was pushed to the. back-
ground by the broad assumption that quantities of consumer's satisfac-
tions are roughly proportional to the quantity of physical procllct. 11 
Cf. Hla Myint, 11The Classical View af the Economic Problem." Economica 
(New Series), Vol. XIII, p. 123. 
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marginal values.1 
Increasing marginal values, however, do not seem to fit into a 
theoretical analysis in which increased productivity of labor is also 
postulated, for the increased production of goods would seem to lead to 
lowered marginal values. A very ingenious diagrammatic presentation 
helps to solve this apparent discrepancy in the Patten theory of con-
sumption and value. The key "to the solution of this problem lies in 
the increasing intensity of the pain of prolonged labor." (p. 74) The 
marginal increment of labor cost is obtained only with an increase of 
pain to the laborer, and with Jevons,2 Patten concludes that the laborer 
will cease to work "when the pain of the last increment of labor equals 
the utility of the last increment of consumption." 
In Diagram 183 utility is measured along the vertical axis, while 
pain (disutility) is measured along the horizontal. Line ad traces the 
~ marginal value, Pat ten means value of last unit consumed. In 
this reference value is viewed subjectively. 
2The Jevons diagram is reproduced here. (Cf. Diagram 17). Jevons 
measured pleasure along gz and pain along oyl, while produce is measured 
along ox. Curve 5 traces the pleasure obtained from consuming the pro-
duce orlabor with pleasure diminishing as amount of produce increases. 
Curve abed traces the pain and pleasure of labor performed. Above ox 
there is pleasure, below pain. The first unit of work ob yields pain; 
afterwards from b to c there is pleasure; then from c tnere is pain. 
Pleasure will be-maxiiiiized if production stopped at am where the final 
degree of utility of product (qm) is equal to the final degree of dis-
utility of work which has to be-done to get it. cr. • s. Jevons, 
op. cit., p. 173. 
3Patten's diagrams are poorly drawn and involve geometrical errors. 
The author has thought it best to modify them somewhat by the use of the 
two coordinate graphs. 
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increasing pain of work as the day of work grows longer. Line ad begins 
at ! along £l because Patten supposes the first hour of labor to involve 
some subjective pain. When the marginal increment of consumption is 
represented by oh, the length of the working day will be ol, and the 
• marginal increment of production lfi.ll have its pain measured by bl. 
When the marginal increment of consumption is increased to og the work-
ing day will have been lengthened to ~ and the pain of the marginal 
increment of production will have increased to ~· A further increase 
in consumption to of would extend the working day to £E where the cost 
of the increment of production would be ~' "if no new motives enter to 
influence the producer." (p. 75) 
At what we shall call a critical point, the efficiency of the 
laborer becomes so great in terms of total output produced, that he must 
have time to devote to the consumption of this output, or to put it in 
another way, he begins to weigh the value of an alternative use of time 
with that of production returns (or wages). Patten assumes that at some 
increment of consumption such as of, the length of the working day will 
reach its maximum, say £!'! (less than op). There accrues above this a 
surplus to the efficient workman equal to the pleasure "that could be 
obtained in using his time in unproductive consumption." Thus, 
in a highly civilized society the pain of the marginal incre-
ment of production is reduced absolutely as well as relatively. 
The labor becomes so mechanical that it is less painful, and 
the length of the m rking day is shortened through the influ-
ence of forces made active by the increase of consumption. (p. 75) 
lpatten's proof of this assertion is not rigorous nor very clear. 
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In effect, what Patten has described is a backward bending labor 
supply curve.l In reality, the use of the average total cost curve, which 
is common in much of the current literature of labor economics, is no 
more than a first but very useful approximation. There are other costs 
which must be considered when we direct our attention to the upper portion 
of the labor supply curve. These costs will best be described as oppor-
tuni ty costs for what we will have to examine in this upper range is the 
cost not in terms of outlay on the product alone, but also in terms of 
other uses for the product given up, or to be given up. 
There is some maximum work day beyond which the worker2 will not be 
willing to work (nor indeed can he). Some of the hours of the day will 
have to be devoted to sleep, to eating, to getting to and from the place 
of work. In a society in which it is possible to get only enough to 
barely subsist during the working hours of the day, there will be no 
effective alternative use to labor. The worker will have to work to 
live. As society becomes more productive, it becomes possible to earn 
the bare minimum with less than a maximum total of hours in the working 
day. Insofar as Patten's law of variety operates, the supply curve of 
1Boulding, using Edgeworth's analysis of the foreign trade demand 
curve, has presented a careful picture of the backward bending supply 
curve. cr. K. E. Boulding, op. cit., pp. 742-746. Cf. also F. Y. 
Edgeworth, Papers Relating to-Political Economy, Vol. II (London, 
Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 192'5)pp. 3-60. 
2The following assumes the institutional complex of capitalism. 
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labor up to this attainment of the bare minimum will be elastic. The 
number of hours required to obtain the bare minimum will be set a 
critical pointl beyond which the supply curve of labor will become in-
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creasingly leas elastic. At some upper limit, or second critical point, 
the worker will no longer be willing to increase the length of his work-
tng day, because an alternative use of these last few hours becomes more 
important than the money revenue (real income) use. Beyond this critical 
point, the labor supply curve will bend backward, indicating that the 
laborer, at the increased wage, can work less total hours and maintain 
(and even increase) his income while at the same time increasing the 
number of hours he devotes to non-income uses. This may be illustrated 
by Diagram 19.2 
The increase in the marginal increment of consumption, in affecting 
the relation of total value to total utility, also affects the relation 
of the surplus of utility which consumers receive because of the excess 
of total utility over total value. As the subjective cost of the incre-
ments of consumption decreases, as variety of consumption increases, as yl 
labor is used more and more efficiently, consumer's surplus is "swallowed 
up." Whereas Marshall saw the consumer's surplus as an index of the 
increasing benefit that capitalism gave to the average consumer as its 
lcf. w. E. Johnson, "Supply," Palgrave 1s Dictionary of Political 
Economy, Vol. III, p. 491. 
2The diagram is the author's. 
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productivity increased, Patten saw consumers losing more than they 
gained by social progress. WWbat they gain they secure chiefly through 
their power as producers to compel society to give them a larger share 
in distribution." (p. 78) 
This conclusion points up a need for a reexamination of the laws 
of distribution. Just as Ricardo had made his system of distribution 
to depend on the differences of nature and the common qualities of men, 
Patten has worked out· a new economics which starts from man in society. 
Men differ from one another because social progress brings about sub-
jective differences. From the social point of view, all nature's resour-
ces are without cost; but for each member of the society, they do have a 
cost. Likewise, the store of knowledge and techniques which characterizes 
a culture are without cost to the societal whole, but involvesan expendi-
ture on the part of the members of the society. Only those with inherited 
qualities which make them capable of utilizing efficiently the accumulated 
wisdom can appropriate it, much as the landowners appropriate the soil in 
the Ricardian presentation. 
Thus, while Ricardo would stress the differential returns from the 
various instruments of production which man uses in the production of 
his income, Patten would give emphasis to the subjective difference 
among men. There are according to Patten, two kinds of men as distinguished 
by their economic instincts.1 Those with economic instincts well developed 
lcr. T. Veblen, Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the 
Industrial Arts (New York, Viking Press, 1918). - -- - --
get the benefits of the advancing production. Those without must lose 
from society's advance.1 
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If we could assume that there was a society in which these subjective 
differences did not exist, what has been said in the foregoing about the 
increase of production having the effect of enlarging the variety of con-
sumption and thus causing total value to more and more approximate total 
utility would be the unalloyed truth. These differences must, however, 
be taken into consideration for they lead to an unequal distribution of 
wealth. Insofar as wealth is unequally distributed, the tendency referred 
to above is reversed and the marginal increment of consumption is de-
creased, not increased. 
For the wealthy, then, Veblen's ostentatious demand operates. The 
basic wants of this class have been satiated, and the increase in their 
incomes is devoted to the supplying of old wants more fully. With per-
verted pleasures, they expend their incomes in ways which are conventional 
and which will distinguish them from their fellows. Thus they buy more 
ornaments, bigger mansions, hire more servants, operate four car garages, 
etc. 
At the other end of the scale, the very poor, whose wages are low-
ered by the progress of society, find themselves giving up articles of 
consumption in the reverse order to that in which we should expect them 
~his would seem to lead to a bargaining theory of distribution. 
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to acquire these articles. Thus articles of a high degree of positive 
utility are given up first with articles possessing but absolute utility 
replacing them. 
A society which is static is one in which, then, the wealthy get 
more wealth, and the very poor are increasingly reduced to absolute 
utilities. On the other hand, a dynamic society, tends to operate in 
accord with the law of variety. To show this more clearly, Patten 
divided the total utility which a community derives from its economic 
environment into five parts--cost, rent, producer's surplus,l consumer's 
surplus, and free goods. In a static society, rent goes to the land-
owners, consumer's surplus to those few whose incomes are quite large, 
free goods are appropriated largely by the consuming class. The lower 
producing classes are the less fortunate in this society, for they are 
enabled only to obtain articles which possess absolute utilities and 
but few positive utilities. 
In Diagram 20, the quadrilateral abed represents the total utility 
a community obtains from its "conjuncture" (as Marshall called it). Ohkd 
is the cost, or the utilities needed to restore to the producers the 
vitality lost in production. ~ represents free goods, or those utili-
ties which are furnished by nature without the cooperation of man. Ofb 
~ost economists would have producer's surplus and rent to apply 
to the same income flow. Cf. D. A. orcester, "A Reconsideration of 
the Theory of Rent," American Economic Review, Vol. XXXVI, p. 258ff 
for a classificatory system of ifrent.lt 
is the rent, the share received by the owners of natural resources. 
Heck is producer's surplus, that amount Which producers receive above 
the subjective real oost of production. Edc is the consumer's surplus, 
that which consumers receive above the value of the commodities they 
consume. 
The interests of the producers center about the rectangle ~ 
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whose size depends upon the marginal increment of oonsumption be. The 
larger the marginal increment of consumption, the smaller the consumer's 
surplus, and the larger the producer's surplus. Rent likewise falls with 
the rise in the marginal increment of consumption. A dynamic society, 
then, will be characterized by falling incomes to landlords, falling con-
sumer's surpluses, and rising prowcer 1 s surpluses* 
The conswrer 1s surplus has an effect upon objective values (prices) 
which needs to be noticed. In this dynamic analysis, Patten ould have 
us observe that changes in Objective values result from changes in the 
relative rates of increase of the various factors of production. At any 
moment of time, there is s:>Jm low limit to which the share of each factor 
can be reduced should its rate of increase be relatively too rapid. It 
might be supposed that this low limit w::>uld be reached when all the sur-
pluses had disappeared because of distribution, ani when the subjective 
costs of the factors were equal to subjective values of their products. 
To suppose this, however, would be to reckon without the reality of the 
standard of life, the institution of private property, and differential 
inte~ligence. It is perhaps unlikely, then, that in any modern state, 
Units 
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wages would ever get so low that the subjective costs of the products 
of labor would be just equal to their subjective values. 
Another diagram (Cf. Diagram 21) served to illustrate this prin-
ciple of limits. The whole figure represents the sum of satisfactions 
to be derived from a produced article of commerce by a given society. 
The rectangle obcd includes within it the sum of the subjective values, 
the line bo is the marginal increment of consumption, a,nd the area oefb 
is the total subjective cost of production for the increasing quantities 
of goods. If be is the marginal increment of consumption, and be the 
marginal increment of production, then cf is their difference. 
The difference between the marginal increment of consumption and 
the marginal increment of production yields a surplus revenue which is 
divided into two parts-surplus value and differential gains. If we 
postulate ~ as the minimum cost of the marginal increment, then the 
maximum surplus value can be the area ghcd. The minimum surplus value 
can be the area kfcd. In effect, then, the line which separates surplus 
value from differential gains' is not ~' but gh. The differential gains 
are fixed by the difference in cost between previous increments of pro-
duction and the last.l 
The areas representing consumer's surplus, differential gains, and 
cost are outside the regulating power of the market and objective values. 
~his is analogous to Ricardian rent. 
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Changes in objective values can affect only the distribution of the 
surplus value. Whether or not a factor receives a relatively large or 
relatively small share of the surplus value will depend on its relative 
rate of frowth. The factor which has the slowest rate of growth could 
absorb all the surplus value, the most rapid would obtain none, although 
each would get its share of the differential gains. 
In this presentation, consumer's surplus takes the central place 
which rent occupied in the classical theory of distribution. To recap-
itulate, cost is distinguished from surplus; the pain of production from 
the excess of satisfactions obtained by society in the consumption of 
economic goods above the cost of producing them. These are measured sub-
jectively and are sums. There are three divisions -- surplus-free goods, 
consumer's surplus, and surplus revenue. The last of these is further 
divided into two parts--surplus value and differential gains . When once 
we know the marginal increment of consumption, we may draw the line be-
tween consumer's surplus and surplus revenue, for the marginal increment 
yields no consumer's surplus. The consumer's surplus is thus a definite 
fund whose whole amount is determined by the marginal increment of con-
sumption. It is cut off from the rest of the surplus and is given to 
the consumers without any outlay on their part. As between the two di vi-
sions of the surplus revenue, objective values determine their distribu-
tion and this is the only part of the whole of the surplus which is so 
determined. All the other parts of the surplus are fixed by the institu-
tional character of the economy and by nature. 
Three separate laws of distribution must be used to explain the 
distribution of parts of the social surplus. The first relating to the 
marginal increment of consumption1 sets off the consumer's surplus. The 
second and third laws concern the surplus revenue, the former describing 
the ways in which differential gains are deten~ed, and the latter hav-
ing reference to the rate of increase of the various classes of producers 
and thus to the distribution of the surplus value. In this theory, we 
cannot begin our analysis until we know that increment of consumption 
which yields no consumer's surplus. The no-consumer's surplus incre-
ment takes the place of the no-rent land in the classical analysis. The 
theory involves differences in men as well as difference in the value of 
their products. 
Patten's complex reasoning was rejected by Marshall as an unwarranted 
extension of the concept of the surplus.2 It set him apart from his 
fellow members of the fledgling American Economic Association. It made 
him a supporter of protectionism and of government intervention in the 
economy, a decrier of the over exercise of thrift, but it also seemed to 
make his analysis much more germane to the issues of the America of the 
first quarter of the twentieth century~ 
1Not including free goods which have their own "law of distributio~." 
2cf. Marshall, Principles, n. 1 to p. 131. 
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It has been pointed out that whereas Smith and the economists in 
the English classical tradition worked on what has been called the 
physical producti on level of welfare, neo-classical economics represented 
a shift to the utility level of welfare analysis.1 Effectively, what 
Marshall and Pigou did was to shift the economic spotlight from the pro-
ducer to the consumer. Insofar as a clear dichotomy could be made be-
tween the economic man as a consumer and as a producer, such an approach 
was fruitful of interesting results. Thus it was possible to set up a 
maximizing device--the consumer's surplus--by which to judge the economic 
rationality of the consumer and the gain to him from exchange. Pigou, 
somewhat less sanguine about the possibilities of measuring satisfactions 
in terms of a consumer's surplus, presented his welfare economics on the 
more objective level of money income, but behind his objectivity lay the 
subjective assumptions of marginal utility and marginal disutility. 
It is significant that at about the same time that Pigou published 
his Wealth and Welfare (which in a revised form became the Economics of 
Welfare) John A. Hobson, a much less well known English economist, pub-
lished his Work and ealth2 (1914). Significant because of a distinctive 
approach to the same problems to which Marshall and Pigou devoted attention 
lcf. Hla Myint, Theories of Welfare Economics, Esp. Ch. 1. 
2John A. Hobson, ~~ Wealth (New York, Macmillan, 1914). 
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and because by the use of a technique and technical language deceptively 
similar to that of the neo-classicists decidedly different conclusions 
are reached, John A. Hobson's welfare economics cannot be overlooked in 
such a study as that presently being made. Hobson's economics represents 
a return to the Smithian level of welfare analysis. Unlike Smith, how-
ever, this modern economic hereticl did not find the social economy a 
fairly simple mechanism capable of being descrived in terms of the oper-
ation of relatively few general principles which when understood yield 
an all-inclusive formula of motion. For Hobson, modern industrial 
society was a complex mechanism which in the final analysis knows no law 
of motion, except of "superior force." 
Just as the American economist Patten postulated that increasing 
consumer's surplus was not a measure of the increasing benefits of 
. society, but of its failure to progress, and that therefore, the consumers 
as producers gain chieflY "through their power as producers to compel so-
ciety to give them a larger share in distribution,n2 so Hobson was to in-
sist that "not until we realize that the consumer, as such, has no claim 
to figure at all in the problem of distribution of income, can we clear 
lrhis implies, what is sometimes forgotten, that Smith was in fact 
a heretic from the viewpoint of many of his fellows. The rapid conver-
sion of Englishmen to his doctrines and the subsequent sanctification 
of Smith have made us forget his radical past. 
2s. N. Patten, "The Theory of Dynamic Economics," Essays in 
Economic Theory (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1924) p. 78. 
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our minds for a right statement of the problem."l The right statement 
of the problem--the presentation of Robson's analytical view of the 
social economy--is the purpose of this section, but it cannot begin 
until we have set forth the underlying point of view of the man, for 
as we have already intimated, it was not in technique or language that 
the difference between Hobson's welfare economics and that of Marshall 
and Pigou consists. 
A very careful student of Hobson insists that "Hobson's economics 
has for its purpose to promote the attainment of harmony in social rela-
tions and to increase the maximum of welfare."2 The emphasis upon harmony 
caused Hobson to see the friction in social relations more clearly than 
did his contemporaries. The marginal productivity doctrine, especially 
as it implied that a true and correct payment to the factors of produc-
tion including labor resulted from perfect competition, did not have 
Hobson as one of its adherents. In fact, the basic emphasis on the 
scarcity problem inherent in most neo-classical writing was not present 
in Hobson's view of the economic problem. Given scarce resources to 
allocate among competing ends when the objective of the allocation is to 
make as large as possible the satisfaction involved in those ends, the 
neo-classical economists saw the economic problem to consist in the 
lJ. • Hobson, Wealth and Life (London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 
1929) p. XVII. 
2William Tien-Chen Liu, A Study of Hobson's Welfare Economics 
( Peiping, Kwang Yuen Press, 1~34}'P":' 1.4. 
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definition of three elements: scarce resources, scarce means, and the 
notion of a maxinrum; and the working out of a functional relationship. 1 
If the neo-classical economists started from a basic assumption of 
a given quantity of resources and were mainly "concerned with the maxi-
mization of consumers t wants as e:xpressed by their market demands for 
different commodities, 112 it must follow that they measured the efficiency 
of the economic system by tre efficiency with which the scarce resources 
could be made to increase consumers' satisfactions. It is not so much 
that Hobson denied the correctness of this measure of efficiency in in-
creasing welfare but that he denied its relevancy. The maximum of wel-
fare was thus not to be conceived against the background of a static 
equilibrium or "stationary state" but in view of the operation of a 
machine economy which constantly is increasi~ the size of the wrplus 
above social costs. The object of Hobson's analysis was to determine who 
obtained this surplus, to examine the general oonsequences and the effects 
of the distribution of the surplus, and thus to understand "the source 
of every economic and eo cial discord in modern life."3 From the analysis 
of the surplus proceeds a program for oocial reform mich has become a 
part of the neo-classical tradition through the writings of John Maynard 
Ke~es.4 
1cf. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price (New York, The Mac-
millan Company, 1946) Esp. Ch. 1. 
2yyint, .2£• cit., pp. 1, 2. 
3Liu, £2• cit., p. 71. 
4cf. John Maynard Keynes, The General T~9or) of Employment, Interest 
and Money (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 35 "(Continued) 
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Hobson thus conceived of modern western society in a strikingly 
diff erent way from his academic contemporaries and the reality of his 
conception is attested to by the popular reception which his many books 
received. The economy of modern western society receives a flow of income 
from the application of its human resources to the physical environment 
which more than covers the cost of production of that income. Hobson 
regarded as a cost of production the maintenance of the population at a 
subsistence level. These maintenance costs included a minimum wage for 
the various non-competing labor groups "necessary to support and evoke 
their continuous output at the present standard of efficiency,nl the wear 
and tear on the machinery and other fixed assets of the economy, a mini -
mum interest rate structure which would be necessary "to support the sav-
ing involved in the production and maintenance of the existing fabric of 
capital,"2 as well as the wear and tear on the land and other natural 
resources. That income flow above the cost of production was a surplus 
which was of two parts: productive and unproductive. 
Productive surplus is the cost of growth of a progressive society. 
Thus it includes the payment of wages to labor's noncompeting groups 
which encourages progressive increases in efficiency as well as in the 
(continued from previous page) Esp. pp. 364-371; L. R. Klein, The 
Keynesian Revolution (New York, Macmillan Co., 1947) pp. 135-138. 
1John A. Hobson, The Industrial System (London, Longmans, Green & 
Co., 1909) p. 80. 
2 
toe. cit. 
quality of the differing grades of labor offered in the narket. Like-
wise a provision would naturally be made for the payment of a rate of 
interest above that consistent with maintenance cost in order to induce 
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an increase in the saving 'Which -wuld be required for industrial progress. 
All those payments micb cb not evoke an increase in product and 
are above the basic maintenance cost of income flow are non-productive. 
Under this beading Hobson placed land rent, quasi-rent (insofar as it 
did not induce increased production), excessive salaries and profits, 
all interest payments beyond those consistent ~tb maintenance costs and 
productive surplus, as well as all payments for ability or labor vb.ich 
is in excess of that economically necessary 11to evoke sufficient we of 
such a factor of production.n1 
It is necessary to have in mind that Hobson does not use the vord 
surplus in any normative or impliedly critical sense. The surplus was~ 
in fact, the glory of the modern economy which oontinually tends to in-
crease the size of this surplus. "Unproductive surplus 11 like Smith • s 
unproductive labor does not signify waste, inequity or irrationality 
per se. It is in the distribution of this surplus among the producers 
in society that "we approach an ethical estimate of the w:>rking of the 
economic system."2 It is against the "notion that the gains of indus-
trial progress do and must by an inevitable process, in spite of friction, 
~oc. cit. 
2wealtb ~ Life, p. XVII. 
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and the exactions of monopolists and landlords, pass to tlla consumern1 
that the full force of tlla distinction between productive and unproduc-
tive surplus is directed. And it is an analytical device with consider-
able utility. 
Hobson alleged that the neo-classical economist did in fact recog-
nize the existence of the unproductive surplus, 2 but in subservience to 
the creed of perfect competition, had avoided the implications of this 
type of au'Plus, while setting out a oonceptually difficult relative sur-
plus which was ultimately measurable only in terms of quantified consumer 
satisfactions. As we have sho~ elsewhere this criticism was in a meas-
ure unjust, for Marshall, for example, did not insist that the rrarginal 
economic equilibrium was indicative of maximization of satisfaction (or 
distributive justice). It did, however, strike at the eoonomist 's creed 
as it was understood popularly. 
It will perhaps help to avoid misunderstanding if we now indicate 
the distinction mich Hobson makes between costs and expenses of pro-
duct ion. Whereas cost, or better, maintenance cost, includes the ~ents 
necessary to the maintenance of the static equilibrium; e.xpense of pro-
duction includes all those payments to factors of production vbich are 
made under the actual conditions of the narket for the supply of those 
1 Loc . cit. 
2cf. Wealth ~ Life, Ch. 1-5. 
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factors and is synonomous with the accountant's concept of cost. 
Expense thus inheres costs and any productive or unproductive surplus 
which accrues to the owner of a factor of production through natural or 
contrived scarcity. Equilibrium price may thus exactly equate expense 
but more than cover cost. 
The "vital distinction'' between those payments which are necessary 
for the maintenance and efficient functioning of the economy and the 
surplus over and above these "personal incomes" is essential to Hobson's 
absolute concept of surplus. What is the role of the relative surplus 
in Hobson's scheme? While he did insist that the problem of distribution 
"is exclusively confined to the terms of apportionment of the income be-
tween the various contributors"1 and that "no law for the apportionment 
(of unproductive surplus) exists except by the law of superior force," 2 
some considerable space in his Economics of Distribution3 is devoted to 
such topics as market price, consumer's and producer's rents, marginal 
and differential payments, as well as the determination of long-period 
prices and of value. All these involve the relative surplus concept 
(and consumer's surplus). 
Reasoning that Marshall and, in fact both classical and neo-classical 
lwealth ~ Lile, p. xvii. 
2rndustrial System, p. 80. 
3John A. Hobson, Economics of Distribution (New York, The Macmillan 
Co., 1900). 
211 
economists, do not tell us what is the determination of the market 
price, Hobson examines critically the circumstances under which exchange 
takes place and various economists• description of them. A brief investi-
gation of the economic conditions of market price determination leads him 
to the following conclusions :1 
(1) Every economic buyer and seller in a market (i.e. every-
one guided by self interest who knows what he is doing) 
makes some gain from his bargain. The notion supported 
by thinkers of such diverse characters as Bacon and 
Ruskin, that in a trading bargain 'what one man gains 
another loses,• receives no warrant from our analysis. 
It must, however, be admitted that in every series of 
bargains at a market price, one of the buyers or sellers 
will make his bargain on such terms as will secure to 
him a bare minimum gain. 
(2) There is nothing in the economic nature of a Market to 
secure equality of gain for any two bargainers. 
( 3) The amount of gain which comes to each will depend on 
three conditions: (i) the strength or skill of one final 
bargainer; (ii) the ability of competition between buyers 
and sellers to fix the limits w.i thin which this strength 
or skill may operate; (iii)' the difference between the 
reserve price of each buyer and seller and the actual 
price attained. 
(4) Where the market area is of wide space and time, differen-
tial estimates and power of bargaining will be of relative-
ly small importance; where the market area is narrow, they 
will be of relatively large importance.2 
It is obvious that such conclusions must lead to a consideration of 
the differential or relative surplus. Whereas Marshall presented his 
lEconomics £! Distribution, p. 33, 34. 
2Here again it may be said that Marshall had admitted most of the 
above but had done so in sections of his Principles which were not 
likely to be widely read. 
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consumer's surplus in terms of a special conception of the consumer's 
budget which ruled out the problem of saving, Hobson finds that in the 
final analysis saving is the only true consumer 1 s surplus. It is easy 
to overemphasize this difference between the two presentations of con-
sumer's surplus unless it be recognized that in the eyes of the neo-
classical economist Say's law operated. Such saving as might occur out 
of the consumer's income did from Marshall's viewpoint involve a demand 
for investment goods. It is perhaps because Hobson was a proponent of 
what is popularly called the oversaving school that he fails to under-
stand Marshall correctly, and insists that "if I spend~ income literally 
as fast as I receive it, no consumer's rent emerges."l 
However, even if we place the Marshallian and Hobsonian concept of 
consumer's surplus on the same ground, a significant divergence between 
the two appears. Even though both men recognize that "the excess of the 
price which (the consumer) would be willing to pay rather than go with-
out (a particular good), over that which he actually does pay"2 is an 
imperfect and inexact measure of the surplus pleasure obtained by the 
consumer in a particular exchange situation, Marshall in his mathematical 
appendix and in his geometry goes on to give more definitive form to the 
concept, whole Hobson finds himself forced to consider whether the 
lop. cit • , p. 4 7 • 
2A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, 2d Ed. (London, Macmillan 
& Co., Ltd., 1890) Book III, Ch. VI, p. 1. 
illusory nature of the attempt to measure total utility by price "does 
not invalidate the utility of consumer's rent altogether.nl 
Hobson does not however reject the idea of a consumer's surplus. 
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He does hedge it about with restrictive conditions. 11 In order to measure 
it,n2 he insisted, "we need to take a related group of purchases, and if 
we are dealing with (surplus) derived from the expenditure supposed to 
cover a period of time, the group must consist of the whole number of 
purchases within that time." But he then noted that "if I do not spend, 
but save a portion of my income, that saving rightly appears as consumer's 
(surplus),tt3 this even when the total amount purchased is balanced against 
the total income received. He suggested, therefore, "that saving may be 
the only legitimate consumer's (surplus), when we take an organically 
related group of purchases measured over a period of time and compare 
them with the income received during that time.n4 To support this con-
elusion, he pointed out that "I would have sacrificed the whole of this 
saving rather than have dispensed with a necessary, and some of it rather 
than go without a convenience."' The necessary consequence of such 
1Economics of Distribution, p. 47. 
2QE. cit., p. 46. 
3Qp_. ill·J P• 47. 
4op. cit., P• 48. 
5op. cit., p. 47. 
thinking is to develop a surplus concept which l'till be measured "not 
on the individual transaction, but upon the total expenditure over a 
period of time, and will be equivalent to that portion of the income 
which is either spent on other things than necessaries, or is saved. nl 
But this is none other than the somewhat anomalous "saving" of Marshall 
which Keynes was to give careful attention to and to fit into the class-
ical and neo-classical nexus. 
Hobson does notice another instance in which a consumer's surplus 
may arise, that of a fall in price of a consumer's good when consumer 
incomes are stable. The reduction in price does yield a surplus between 
what the consumer would have been willing to pay (as measured by the old 
price) and what he does pay (the new price). But this instance involves 
ttan assumption of the stability of money incomes of' consumers112 which is 
not tenable. Thus, "though it may be true that a !'all in money prices 
does commonly increase the purchasing power of consumers and so raises 
their consumer's (surplus),n3 it may be that the fall in price also 
results in a fall in income, for "the fixity of' money income is not 
rightly assumed in a community where incomes are ultimately paid out of 
the prices received for sale of commodities.n4 
1 
cit., 49. Op. P• 
2op. cit., P• 52. 
3Ibid. 
--
4Ibid. 
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The true consumer's surplus must represent a "differential economy 
of consumption, expressed in the money value of that portion of consump-
tion and saving which takes place during a given period, over and above 
the necessary margin of subsistence,nl and is measured "from a marginal 
expense of consumption (the smallest sum necessary to maintain the con-
sumer's life under the least favorable circumstances).n2 
If we recognize that monopolists, landlords, and governments (by 
high taxes which fall upon consumption goods) may commonly eliminate 
consumer's surplus;) and that, in the final ana~sis, "economic force, 
whether rooted in natural or contrived scarcity, in fortuitous circum-
stances, or in power of •holding out• is nonn.ally operative in all mar-
kets for the sale of goods or services, as a determinant of the distri-
bution of the gains of buying and selling,n4 then we must admit that real 
value of the concept of consumer's surplus is negligible, not because 
consumer's surplus does not refer to reality or is immeasurable, but 
because the absolute surplus, especially the unproductive portion of it, ~ 
obeys no law "except that of superior force." Contrary to what had been 
supposed by the welfare economists of the neo-classical school, consumer's 
lop. cit., p. 51. 
2 Op. cit., p. 52. 
3cf. J. A. Hobson, The Evolution of Modern Capitalism (London, 
The Walter Scott Publish~g Co., 1907)~sp. Ch. IX. 
4wealth ~ Life, p. xvii. 
surplus and its increase or decrease cannot give us "the clear dis-
tinction between those elements of income which are distributed equi-
tably, rationa~, and economically, and those which represent inequity, 
unreason, and waste.nl 
While Marshall regarded the consumer's surplus as indicative of 
the advantages of capitalism, Patten saw in this surplus concept a con-
crete measure of the power of large incomes and Hobson relegated it to 
an unimportant place among his tools of analysis. These three men living 
at about the same time saw the modern western world in a way that was 
basically alike but because they differed sharply on the nature of the 
equilibrium adjustment thus found separate uses for a concept which each 
accepted. 
1Ibid. 
CHAPI'ER SIX 
THE 
REHABILITATION OF CONSUMER'S SURPLUS 
21.7 
This chapter seeks to show why a rehabilitation of the consumer's sur-
plus was necessary and how it was effected. This rehabilitation has enabled 
wel!are economics to put Marshall's tool to work in the narmer he antici-
pated that it would be used. Section I examines the significance in the 
exchange equilibrium of the equality of utilities while Section II seeks 
to outline the meaning of tm exchange equilibrium itself. Section III 
presents John R. Hicks' recent analysis of the consum3r's surplus. A re-
capitulation of the impact upon welfare analysis of tre Hicksian rehabili-
tation in Section IV closes the chapter. 
I 
Though it is evident that Marshall regarded his development and treat-
ment of consumer's surplus as one of the more important parts of his Prin-
ciples, his followers were not ready to follow him in this regard. Subse-
quent texts either included a very brief and at times even inaccurate pre-
sentation of the cbctrine or explanations that indicated little confidence 
in its application to the "real world." Pigou, heir to Marshall's chair, 
was reluctant to use the phrase "consumer's surplus" in his development 
of welfare economics though Marshall's treatment of "social surplus" had 
laid the foundation for Pigovian research. For about four decades the con-
cept remained an example of Marshall's social conscience at work--the re-
sult of philosophic training--, but having no place in economics proper. 
It was perhaps to be expected that some younger economist of the 
Cambridge school should at length attempt a rehabalitation of Marshall 's 
concept. Thus, the man who wrote: trmy own experience has been that further 
investigation has only increased rolf admiration for Marshall's theory111 was 
he who attempted such a rehabilitation of consumer's surplus. John R. Hicks 
in Part I of hie Value and Capital restates the neoclassical theory of demand 
and supply--the theory of value so-called--ru1d there reconciles the loose 
ends of partial equilibrium analysis and Paretian general equilibrium elements 
which had lain unassociated in the body of economic principles. Assuming 
the eclectic mantle of the master, Hicks combines those elements of both 
schools which wnen fitted together give a nicely rounded picture of what 
Hicks regarded as the reality of the modern economy. 
Marshall had said, ina passage comparing the various surpluses with 
which he treats, that the consumer's surplus consists "of the excess of the 
total utility to him (i.e. the consumer) of the commodity over the real value 
to him of what he has paid for it.n2 Thus, 
••• those parts of his purchases for which he would gladly 
have paid a higher price rather than go without them yield him 
a surplus of satisfaction: a true net benefit which he, as consumer, 
derives from the facilities offered to him by his surroundings 
1J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital, 2nd Edition, (Oxford University 
Press, 1946), note ~page 11. 
2A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th Edition (London, Macmillan 
and Co., Ltd., 1920) p. BJl. 
or conjuncture. He w:>uld lose this surplus, :if his surroundings 
were so altered as to prevent him from obtaining any supplies of 
that commodity, and to rompel him to divert the means which he 
spends on that, to other co.rrmodities (one of which might be in-
creased leisure) of which at present he does not care to have 
further supplies at their respective prices.l 
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As a corollary to the paradox of val.ue, there had existed the problem 
of accounting for the act of exchange. For the first generation of margi-
nal utility economists, exchange by implication meant the equivalence of 
the objects exchanged. How, then, could this exchange of equivalent items 
yield gain to both parties to the exchange sufficient to cause them to ex-
change?2 Marginal utility analysis focused attention on the marginal unit 
of . utility rather than on the total utility of the objects exchanged) 
Since inter-personal comparisons of utility were out of the question, lilat 
was involved in the act of exchange was the equalization of the marginal 
units of utility that two or more goods add to the total utility of the 
commodity already in store. The marginal utility of these goods, the one 
given up and the other received, was assumed equal subjectively {i.e. in 
the mind of the same person.) In fact, the basic assumption of exchange 
was that each good in the exchange had utility and th:l.t this utility 
2A very charming essay published in S. Colvin & J . A. Ewing, editors, 
~, Literary, Scientific, Etc. & the late Fleeming Jenkin, Vol. II, 
(London, Longmans, Green & Co . , 1887) outlines Jenkin's significant argu-
ment that one man's gain is not another man's loss in society. 
3This short discussion of marginal utility is based upon M. Charles 
Gide 1s analysis in Charles Gide and Charles Rist, History~ EOlZ>nomic ~­
trines, 2d Eng. Ed. , tr. by R. Richards and E . F. Row, (Boston, D. C. 
Heath Co. , 1948), pp. 492-514. 
depended upon the intensity of the need Ybich the good was destined to 
satisfy. That the intensity of the need itself depended on the stock of 
the good alreacy in hand was obvious and thus utility was seen to depend 
upon the scarcity of the good in the act of exchange. 
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If two persons began to exchange units of co.IIllJX)dities which they 
possessed and vnich each desired, the rate at which the exchange will pro-
ceed could not be known in advance. A process of bargaining based upon 
some subjective limit existent in the minds of ooth exchangers ~uld de-
termine the rate at vbich the exchange will occur. The very fact that 
exchange does occur evidenced the fact tm t each had gotten more from the 
act of exchange than his lowest acceptable bid had called for or at least 
as much. 
Stanley Jevons had pointed out that if two objects fulfill very dif-
ferent needs but yet can be exchanged, they could not have very different 
values. This Law of Indifference or Law of Substitution was basic to the 
rule of marginal utility and equivalence of value in exchange. If there 
were a series of interchangeable goods, each of which was in some way 
equivalent to every other, no one of them could have a much greater value 
than any other. Now if it be assumed that the consumer in his act of ex-
change attempted to gain the greatest possible satisfaction, he ~uld 
spend his income in such a way that the marginal utilities of the articles 
acquired in the same market at the same time "WOuld be the same. 
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However, since there was only one price in the market, immediatelY 
a dilemma in reasoning arose. Surely not every exchanger in the market 
received the same marginal utility from a given article. It must have 
been incorrect to insist that because prices were equal that the satis-
faction given to different individuals was equal. This one price at 
which the exchange occurred and without which it would not have occurred 
was such as to clear the market and to make demand equal to supply. But 
the equation of demand and supply did not explain the paradox of value 
although it did account for the act of exchange. 
The equilibrium price would in the normalit,r of cases be above the 
reservation price. It could be equal to it, but it could never go below 
it, else exchange would not have occurred. The amount by which equili-
brium price exceeded the reservation price was a surplus obtained by 
reason of differential advantages of consumers or producers. 
Having defined utility rather more carefully than did the Classi-
cists with their 11use-value 1~ the marginal utility school was concerned 
with the utility not of a particular commodity as compared with any 
other commodity. To the contr~ their interest was in respect of some 
unit of that commodity relative to the demand for it. Thus, the econ-
omist did not interest himself in the utility of water or diamonds but 
in the utility of that amount of these two commodities desired by 
specific persons. Utilit,r could not be conceived apart from scarcity 
and scarcity was the element which makes any good an economic good. 
If exchange of utilities resulted in an equivalence in values 
exchanged, then one price prevailed throughout the market. The preva-
lence of one price through the market was the basic condition of 
equilibrium in the market for a good, one price which would equate the 
amount supplied to the amount demanded. It now became possible to ex-
amine the formulation of equilibrium in the consumer's market. nbat 
can be said about this equilibrium from the viewpoint of the second 
generation of utility economists? 
II 
If free competition is assumed, the determination of the meaning 
of the exchange equilibrium is seen to depend upon the answers to the 
following questions.1 Given an econo~ at a certain level of produc-
tivit,y which closely approximates full use of existing resources in 
accordance with the present stage of technical information, and given 
consumer tastes and preferences along with developed inclinations to-
ward exchan e: (1) How are the equilibrium prices of the commodities 
brought to the market established? (2) How are the quantities of the 
commodities to be purchased determined? (3) Exactly how can we show 
that the equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities determined under 
free competition actually affect the satisfactions of the consumers who 
compose the buying side of the market? 
laf. lUa Myint, Theories of 'felfare Economics (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1948) PP• 96=99. 
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While it is possible to approach the answer to the first question 
from the point of view of society as a whole, Marshall concentrated on 
a particular market at a particular place during a particular period of 
time. He sought to show that in that market since each individual could 
be assumed to spend but a small proportion of his income on any one com-
modi ty, the marginal utility of income as an important variable could be 
disregarded. Thus, one need have regard only to the equivalence of 
marginal utilities and marginal disutilities in a general uncomplex 
manner without specific emphasis on individual gains and losses. 
The second question must be answered in such a way as to explicitly 
consider the principle of diminishing marginal utilit.y. Marshall (and 
in fact, all the marginal utility economists as well) assumed that each 
individual tried to make his marginal utilities proportional to the 
given prices. From the point of view of individual buyers, prices were 
a datum. Given his tastes and preferences, each consumer is assumed to 
acquire units of a given good up to the point at which the marginal 
utility obtained from its acquisition is just equal to the market offer 
price. In order that this principle should work With greatest efficiency 
(in utility terms), it will be necessary, as Marshall has shown, to 
assume the full working of the Principle of Substitution.l 
1rt is sometimes (erroneously) thought that the Principle of Sub-
stitution applies on~ to the field of production. It needs to be re-
called that Marshall regarded consumption as a sort of negative pro-
duction, and that he saw a close affinity between the diminishing utility 
and diminishing marginal productivity concepts. Cf. Marshall, op. cit., 
esp. 356, 404-406. - --
The answer to the third question has already been suggested in 
the introductory chapter, but we need to reconsider it to see why Hicks 
should :reel that there was some need to rehabilitate the "notion of a 
consumer• s surplus. tt Ma,rshallian partial equilibri\Ull analysis 'With its 
look at one market at a time leaves open the possibility that while 
satis.fa.ctions may be maximized in ~me market limited sense, a change 
in one of the conditions which had been placed in the ceteris paribus 
pound might in fact increase satisfactions. This was expressed earlier 
in this paper by saying that though the intersection of the supply and 
demand curves of a particular commodity might determine the marginal 
conditions for maximum satisfaction, when once we have added the question 
of income distribution to our analysis, it becomes possible to show that 
some redistribution of incone might increase satisfaction. The stablity 
and total conditions far maximum satisfaction which were subsequently 
postulated are interpretable in terms of income distribution or by in-
sisting that ever"'J exchanger must in the final analysis receive the same 
marginal utility from the same good. It was not possible to say exactl;y 
which type of income distribution would lead to such a maximwn of satis-
faction, but s:> me "ethically desirable distribution of income was indica-
ted." 
If we admit with Marshall that 11there is prima facie reason for 
believing that the aggregate satisfaction, so far from being already a 
1 See Ch. One. Ch. Seven contains a discussion of the possible equi-
table distribution of income. 
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maximum, could be much increased,"1 it becomes necess~ to examine 
means by which economic policy for the increase of satisfactions can be 
devised. It was the conclusion of Hicks that consumer's surplus is 
"the thin end of the wedge through which welfare analysis can influence 
practical economic policy. u2 As Hobson and Patten among others have 
shown, consumer's surplus (as well as other relative surplus concepts) 
are no:t only ularger and more important than the economists' usual mar-
ginal products, they are also large enough magnitudes for the adminis-
trative machinery to come to grips with and large enough magnitudes to 
outweigh even the very large margin of errors we must allow for the 
calculation of gains and losses in practice.rr3 The marginal utility 
economists simply assumed away the paradox of value, through their very 
unreal general equilibrium analysis. Marshall had offered a tool in the 
form of the consumer's surplus to be used in getting at the paradox of 
value. The paradox of value involved a measure of consumer gain and 
implied a type of disequilibrium in the consumer market which needed to 
be understood in order to set total conditions for a market equilibrium. 
nr 
When it is recognized that the consumer's ~~plus has its most 
direct use in policy applications, it becomes necessary to generalize 
l Marshall, op. cit., p. 502. 
2MYint, op. cit., P• 198. 
3Loc. cit. 
the concept in order, if possible, to overcome the methodological 
objections1 to arshall's original formulation. What follows shows 
how Hicks has gone about to rehabilitate consumer's surplus.2 
The attempts of Hicks to give generality to the concept of con-
sumer' s surplus are predicated upon ordinal utility. Formally this 
means that he used the indifference curve technique to point up the 
usefulness of the concept when all cardinal assumptions of utility were 
removed.J The indifference map is well designed to handle such concep-
tions of measurement and what follows will employ that device. It will 
lrhe methodological objections to the partial surplus analysis of 
Marshall have largely centered about the ps,ychological presumptions 
involved in "utility" and the technical difficulties inherent in an 
attempt to make a simple diagram represent the state of mind of many 
individuals. 
2The following is based upon notes taken in J. R. Hicks' course 
in Economic Analysis at Columbia University during the summer of 1949. 
Cf. also J. R. Hicks, "The Rehabilitation of Consumer's Surplus," 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. VIII, pp. 108ff; "The Four Consumer's 
Surpluses," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XI, pp. 3lff. It should 
be remarked that though Hicks • verbal presentation in general accords 
with that contained in these articles, there are certain points at 
.hich he has obviously shifted ground. It will be pointed out in what 
follows that as regards his identification of the Marshallian measure, 
there has been some confusion. 
JLest it be thought that Hicks was alone in this accomplishment, 
cf. W. E. Johnson, "The Pure Theory of Utility Curves," Economic 
Journal, Vol. XXIII, PP• 490ff; Adolf Kozlik, "A Note on Consumer 1 s 
Surplus, 11 Journal of Political Economy, Vol. XLIX, pp. 754ff; H. 
Hotelling, "The General · elfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation 
and of Railway and Utility Rates, n Econometrica, Vol. VI, pp. 242ff; 
J. N. Morgan, "The Measurement of Gains and Losses, 11 Quarterl.y Journal 
of Economics, Vol. LXII, pp. 287ff. (a summary article). 
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be necessary, first, to examine Hicks' strictures about the demand 
curve. Then we m~ consider his presentation of the consumer's sur-
plus as well as certain applications which he makes of his analysis. 
Hicks has pointed out in his ~ ~ Capital that the convex 
indifference curve involves the counterpart of the Marshallian prin-
ciple of diminishing marginal utility.l It will be useful to look at 
the indifference curve with this reminder in the back of our thoughts. 
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This will give us a somewhat different picture of the indifference curve 
than is common and one which lllegi~ to approach the usual demand curve 
analysis. 
In Diagram 22 let Al, drawn from! on the money (or general pur-
chasing power) line, be an indifference curve of a certain consumer 
between money and coffee. The fact that this indifference curve touches 
the money axis in ! indicates that there is some amount of money as 
purchasing power for all other commodities (in the consumer budget) 
which the consumer will want without wanting any amount of coffee.2 
From !' on the money line, a line is drawn parallel to the coffee axis, 
so that by its use, we can show the diminishing utility assumptions 
that are implicit in this indifference curve. 
At P on indifference curve AI the consumer has OL units of coffee 
and LP units of money. He had started with no units of coffee and AO 
1Hicks, ~· cit., Ch. 1. 
2cf. A. G. Hart, "Peculiarities of Indifference Maps Involving 
Money, 11 Review of Economic studies, Vol. VIII, pp. 126f£. 
229 
units of money. Thus, he gave up AW units of money (: ~) to obtain 
the OL units of coffee which he possesses at ~· To increase his holding 
of coffee by~ units he must give up ~further units of money. By" 
definition, OL times g equals QM times MQ. AW and RP are the maximum 
amounts of money which the consumer is willing to give up for OL and LM 
units of coffee respectively without a change in total utility. It will 
be noticed that in using one indifference curve rather than a set of them, 
we have assumed away the problem vlhich Hicks dis.cusses under the heading 
"income effect" and caused the principle of diminishing marginal utility 
to emerge. 
If, now, we attempt to draw an indifference curve showing the amounts 
of money (income) which vdll be given up for various amounts of coffee, 
we can obtain some such curve as !!o• In Diagram 23 what, in effect, we 
have done is to invert the indifference curve and make it begin at !, 
the point at which exchange begins. AI0 , it will be well to repeat, is 
drawn up under the assumption that each amount of money given up is a 
maximum. It must also be assumed that the consumer receives no negative 
gains in the exchange process. 
Exchange begins at ! where the consumer has no coffee and so much 
money. In the second diagram, this situation is portrayed. If the con-
sumer wishes to obtain AA' units of coffee, he must give up A'P units c£ 
money. If he wishes to obtain~·· units of coffee, he must give up 
A' •Q units of money. The additional amount of money which he must give 
up in order to obtain ~ additional units of coffee is KQ (equal to ~ 
in Diagram 22). 
Units 
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It will be obvious to those familiar with the derivation of the 
total product curve, that this indifference curve we have traced is 
analogous with a total product curve.l If, in the use of the concept 
of an increasing total product, it has been found useful to use the 
slope of the tot~ curve or the marginal product curve, it would seem 
that it might be more convenient to use a marginal indifference curve2 
which will show the extra amounts of coffee. In the third diagram, 
we draw such a marginal indifference curve. On the vertical axis, we 
trace out units of marginal valuation and along the horizontal units of 
the commodity acquired. ~ is a maximum price for the first amount 
acquired and each successive price is a maximum. Thus, the consumer is 
confronted qy a grasping monopolist who can prevent the consumer from 
getting the commodity (coffee) from any other source. MI is Mrs . 
Robinson 's perfectly discriminating monopolist's demand curve and 
corresponds to ·vrhat we shall later call Demand Curve II. 
This marginal indifference curve is built up on the assumption 
that the consumer pays the maximum amount of money he feels he can for 
1Hicks, Value and Capital, Ch. 6 outlines the comparison between 
the theory of production and the theory of consumption. Kuznets would 
deny the reality of such a comparison. Cf. S. Kuznets, 110n the 
Valuation of Social Income-Reflections on Prof. Hicks' Article, 11 
Part II, Economica (New Series) Vol. XV, pp. ll6ff. But cf. also 
Marshall, ~· cit., P• 64. 
2Kozlik calls this 11a marginal surplus curve.tt Cf. Kozlik, ~· 
cit. A recent article asserts, as we have attempted to show else-
Wh'ere, that this curve is the Marshallian demand curve. Cf. YJ.lton 
Friedman, "The llarshallian Demand Curve, 11 The Journal of Political 
Econom[, Vol. LVII, pp. 463ff, (1949). 
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each successive unit of the good acquired. It thus shows the marginal 
valuation of the successive units at the same level of utilit,r (i.e. the 
same indifference curve) . The consumer is never bettered qy his exchange 
and is thus always only just willing to exchange . In Diagram 24, the 
area PONA shows the maximum amount of money which the consumer could be 
induced to pay for the quantity ON. No assumption need be made about the 
concavity or convexity of this marginal indifference curve except a 
stabilit,y condition that it shall be downward sloping. 
It will be instructive to examine several forms of this marginal 
indifference curve . Suppose that the consumer has paid a given amount 
for the first unit of a commodit,y he has not previously consumed. What 
is he prepared to pay for the second, third, • •• unit? The var,ying an-
swers to this question will yield varying types of marginal indifference 
curves. We have already presented one form of this curve in which it 
was assumed that for each unit o~ the commodity acquired the consumer 
paid the maximum price. On Diagram 25, this will be shown by MI0 • MI1 
traces the marginal indifference curve between money and a superior good 
which results when the price paid for the first unit acquired involved 
a surplus . Price OA was not the maximum price the consumer could have 
been induced to pay. Thus, the consumer has a surplus left over from 
the acquisition of the first unit which enables him to pay more (than he 
would along MI0 ) for the second unit acquired without paying as much as 
he could be induced to pay for the second unit . What is true for the 
acquisition of the second unit will apply to each successive unit fol-
lowing it. MI2 traces the case of an inferior good, where it cannot be 
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assumed that the consumer will use the surplus acquired with the first 
unit to obtain more of the commodity in question, but rather more of 
some other conmodity (or commodities). Q.Q, OB, OC respectively are the 
amounts Ytlich will be purchased at the price .Q!!, when the good is in-
ferior, when there is a discriminating monopolist, and when the good is 
1 
superior. 
Now we are ready to examine the relation between tm marginal in-
difference curve and the Yarshallian demand curve. On Diagram 26, let 
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us suppose that along ~ ( a Marshallian demand curve) each price prior 
to OH was a favorable one (i.e., involved a consumer's surplus), but that 
.Q!! involved no surplus. If we could begin at Q!! and ilX!llire mat amounts 
the consumer would purchase if he could be induced to pey the maximum 
price possible for each unit, we vould obtain MI' tracing the path of a 
discriminating monopolistic seller beyond HP units (= ON units) acquired. 
Thus, at price Oh along Ml' the consulD3r vould acquire .!!£units (equal 
to OA units) rather than .h9. (equal to OB units). If the consumer has 
obtained a favorable price from ON units, he will then be ready to pur-
chase Q§ at the price Oh. Monopolistic discrimination decreases his pos-
sible amount purchased by .E9. (equal to ~). 
The drop in price from OH to Oh yields an increase in income ~ 
along MI r but the increase in income is offset by the fact that by 
definition the consUIIBr is no better off with OA units than he was with 
\oz1ik works out a similar analysis. Cf. A. Kozlik, .2£• cit. 
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ON units. The increase in his consumption NA placed him on the same 
indifference level as before. In Hicks' tenns the increase in consump-
tion NA represents the substitution effect of the fall in price from Q!! 
to Oh. Along DD 1 the drop in price from OH to Oh (assuming OH was a 
- - -
favorable price) causes an increase in income HPgh. The increase AB 
represents Hicks' income effect. To repeat what is now generally known, 
the effect of a fall in price can be divided into two parts: a substi-
tution effect (B£) and an income effect (£g). The substitution effect 
leaves the consumer on the same level of indifference, ltlile the income 
effect raises him to a higher level. 
It will be observed that Marshall's marginal utility demand curve 
is thus a special case of the mrginal indifference curve, om \'ii.thout 
an income effect. Marshall's a~sumption that the mrginal utility of 
money (all other goods composing the consumer budget) could be generally 
regarded as constant ruled out the income effect. Thus, in Diagram 26, 
DHP is the consumer's a1rplus on all units of the conmodity acquired up 
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to the ONth unit. The drop in price from OH to Oh increased the consumer's 
surplus by HPqh and increased the amount purchased by .ill! vtl.ich on the 
special assumption that income effects are negligible is the substitution 
effect of the fall in price. If the inco~ effect is taken into considera-
tion, the measurement of consumer's surplus at. once becomes more difficult. 
Hicks says the consumer's surplus is a measure of the gain, or profit, 
to the conswmer which arises from a fall from one price for a given 
commodity to another price and seeks to show that there are four geo-
metrical measures of this gain. One of these measures has already been 
set forth. HPph is the increase in income (or increment in consumer's 
surplus), which r~sulted from a fall in price from~ to Oh along the 
marginal indifference curve MI1 • This measure, which Hicks calls the 
"price compensating variation, 11 measures the amount of income (general 
purchasing power or "all other commodities than the subject commodity") 
which the consumer would have to give up in order to offset the gain in 
his income due to the fall in price. 
The 11 quantity compensating variation11 is set forth as follows. If 
the consumer moving along MI 1 wishes to acquire OB units of the connnod-
i ty, he will have to pay an amount equal to the almost triangular area 
pWq more than he would have had to pay if he had been moving along DD'. 
As compared with .9: on P!!_', he has lost an amount of income equal to 
HPph minus pWq. This area measures the extra price which the consumer 
would be willing to pay for extra units of the commodity which he gets 
when the price falls to Oh and his income remains unchanged. 
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If, instead of observing the effect of a fall in price, we now 
attempt ~ observe the effect of a rise in price, we may begin at price 
Oh and amount purchased OB. MI 2 will trace the mininru.m prices obtained 
for a diminution in income (or consumption). At g on MI2 he will be 
exactly as well off as at g, but since the valuation of the marginal unit 
retained is Oh, the consumer will thus have acquired HQ units (equal to 
OC units) for a lower cost than if he had paid Q!i for each unit. HQqh-
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the "price equivalent variation"--is a measure of the gain in i ncome ··hl ch, 
if experienced without the price f alling, would make the consumer as much 
better off as he is made qy the fall in price without the money income 
changing . 
At ! on MI2 the consumer is as well off as at g, although he has no 
more units of the commodity than at l:• But as compared • ith l:' he has gained 
an amount of money (income or generalized purchasing power) equal to HQqh 
plus XPQ. This "quantity equivalent variation" measures the gain in i ncome 
at the original level of consum:>tion which is equivalent to the fal l in 
price from Oil to Oh. 
There has been some confusion as to which of these concepts most 
closely approximates Marshall's triangular area consumer 1 s surplus measure. 
T11e author of this paper has heard Hicks call the price compensating 
variation the counterpart of the Marshallian measure when the income eff ect 
is not taken into account. In his article "The Four Consumer's Surpluses", 
which appeared in the Review of Economic Studies, Hicks pointed to the 
quantity compensating variation as that uppermost in Marshall's mind. 
Morgan thinks the matter t o be cleared up in a private letter which he re-
ceived from Hicks in which Hicks said:l 
I think I would now agree vii th Henderson that the quantity-
variation is the strict meaning of Marshall's concept of con-
sumer's surplus. But when I talAed about the Mar shall measure, I 
meant the approximation wnich Marshall gave to this concept, 
name~, the triangle under the demand curve. The price-variation 
is, I now think, quite foreign to Marshall's theory, but it is 
a concept which one naturally drops into when trying to generalize 
1Quoted in J. N. Morgan, op. cit. 
and it is important as providing a link between consumer's 
surplus and index number theory. 
The setting out of these four measures of the consumer's surplus has 
led a number of carefully written critical articles which have tended to 
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show that there are more measures t an Hicks 'has given us.l Morgan in his 
"Measurements of Gains and Losses," which is largely classificatory in 
nature, has attempted to tie together all that has been written since the 
pioneer Hicks article in 1943. ~e shall reproduce his list. 
1. The quantity compensating variation for a fall in price. 
2. The quantity compensating variation for a rise in price. 
3. The price compensating variation for a fall in price. 
4. The price compensating variation for a rise in price. 
5. The quantity equivalent variation for a fall in price . 
6 . The quantity equivalent variation for a rise in price . 
7. The price equivalent variation for a fall in price . 
a. The price equivalent variation for a rise in price. 
9. Marshall 's measure. 
10. The change in price times the larger of the two quantities. 
11. The change in price times the smaller of the t•~ quantities . 
1 and 2 are called by Samuelson 11bEab, 11 by Bishop 11 I 11 , by Kozlik 
"post variation, n by H. '{. Robinson "ex-ante consumer 1 s surplus" and/or ex-
post taxation , " an by Boulding 11buyer' s surplus. 11 Samuelson's definition 
of the concepts is the most exact: •the amount by which the expenditure 
1
cf. A. Henderson, "Consumer's Surplus and the Compensating Varia tim , 11 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. VIII, pp. 117ff; K. E. Boulding, "The 
Concept of Economic Surplus, 11 American Economic Review, Vol. XXXV, pp. 
85lff. Also P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1947) pp. 195- 202; H.---v'. Robinson, "Consumer's 
SUrplus and Taxation: Ex Ante or Ex Post?" South African Journal of 
Economics, Vol. VII, pp. 270ff; R. L. Bishop, "Consumer's SUrplus and 
Cardinal Utility, 11 Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LVII, pp. 42lff . 
on the (commodity) in the ne~ situation is exceeded by the maximum amount 
of money which t he consumer wo~ld be willing to pay for (the new equilibrium 
amount of t e commodity) in preference to trading at t he old set of prices." 
3 and 4 have been called 11 bLlicab'' by Samuelson and VI by Bishop. It is 
carefully defined as "the change in income which will make trading at the 
ne set of prices as attractive as trading at the old set of prices ith 
the initial income." 
5 and 6 have been designated by Samuelson as 11aEab11 and defined as 
follows: "The amount of extra income hich the consumer would insist upon 
if he is to be as ell off as in the ne ~ situation while consuming the old 
amount of the (commodity)." It has also been called the "analogue to I" 
by Bishop. 
7 and 8, Samuelson's "a.Lll•\:,", nthe change in income which d.ll make 
trading at the old set of prices as attractive as trading at the new set of 
prices with the initial income," is similar to Bishop's "V". It is well to 
note Morgan's stricture with regard to the first eight of these measures: 
11 there are only four magnitudes represented, since a compensating variation 
for a price rise is identical with an equivalent variation for a price fall 
and vice versa." 9 has been examined at some length in the section on 
Marshall, while 10 and ll are crude measures often used in empirical studies. 
IV 
No , that the machinery of anal ysis a11.d the tools used in tne working 
of t hat machinery have been examined at some length, it is necessary to see 
what has been accomplished with the new more generalized concept of consumer's 
surplus. While it is possible to work with an absolute concept of utility 
surplus as we have shown elsewhere in this paper, such absolute measures of 
surplus are concerned "with the economic welfare of the community as it 
stands in a given situation, nl and involve the "formidable difficulties of 
measuring the Aggregate Surplus for the community. 112 The consumer's 
surplus was however "concerned with the net changes in economic welfare due 
to given changes in particular sectors of the economic system, the rest 
of the system being assumed to be constant. 11 Hicks insists that the user 
of the concept remind himself that "consumer's surplus is relative not 
absolute. 113 Thus, he continues 11we are always considering the movement 
from one defined situation to another defined situation; we are asking what 
is the gain (or loss) of money income which would measure t he gain (or loss) 
of economic welfare resulting from the movement.u4 He concludes, "this gain 
or loss must itself refer to one or other of the two situations; otherwise 
it is meaningless."5 
The relativity of the concept had been overlooked because it was often 
forgotten that Marshall had said: 
~zy-int, op. cit., p. 147. 
2Myint, op. cit ., p . 148 . 
3Hicks, "The Four Consumer's Surpluses, 11 p . 41. 
4Loc. cit. 
5Loc. cit. 
The chief applications of tm cbctrine of oonsumer•s 
surplus are concerned with such changes in it as vould 
accompany changes in the price of tm commodity in ques-
tion in the neighborhood of the customary price.l 
It was as a relative concept that he used it and his treatnent of taxation 
problems and of the consumer's surplus curve amply demonstrate its utility. 
Because Marshall had regarded income effects as generally "of the 
second order of smalls" and had deliberately ignored them, he did not set 
forth the many variations of the consumer's surplus which we have examined. 
In practical applications, as well as in the extensive investigations made 
of the concept, it has been ooncl.uded that "only Marshall's measure (and 
numbers 10 arxi 11) are likely to lend themselves to even rough empirical 
estimation.n2 It is perhaps wisest to conclude with lryint, that Marshall's 
judgment has been confinned, for while "these distinctions are interesting 
from a theoretical point of view, they are not likely to be of much prac-
tical significance. u3 
The significant step forward taken by Hicks has been tm develo}Eent 
of the compensation principle Ybich, doing away with both interpersonal 
comparisons of utility and the assumption that quanti ties of money are 
proportionate to quantities of satisfaction, brings Ma.rshallian analysis 
1 
Marshall, 22• cit., p. 133. 
2 
J. N. Morgan, 22• cit., p. 303. 
3H. Myint, .2£• c:it., p. 157. 
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in line ldth the Paretian General Theory of Optinmm. Whereas the general 
theory of optimum postulates a basic condition that if the proportionality 
of marginal utilities to narginal oosts is not attained, some individuals 
can be made better off without making others l'l>rse off, the distinct accom-
plishment of Hicks is that now it is possible "in tm surplus analysis, by 
concentrating on the danand and cost curves of particular commodities, (to) 
••• know vtlich groups of individuals will be affected by the proposed reor-
ganization and by how much.n1 
1 
Ibid., p. 158. 
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CHAPl'ER SEVEN 
APPLICATIONS 
Most of the foregoing has been dewted to an historical and tech-
nical analysis of the concept of the consumer's surplus. We have traced 
its beginnings in the so-called paradox of value, its development at the 
hand of utility theorists and its definition against the background of 
modern industrial society. It remains now to examine ways in which this 
concept can be applied to problems of economic analysis. 
It is the thesis of this paper that consumer's surplus is a tool of 
great utility. It was necessary to set forth the meaning and develop-
ment of the concept so that we might discover or rather rediscover its 
application. 
In this chapter we shall apply the consuner's surplus to tm broad 
ranges of problems: (1) those of collective choice and (2) those of 
monopolistic competition. 
I 
It is general to assume that the output of economic goods is deter-
mined by a functional relation between costs (however determined and 
measured) and market prices. Welfare economists have shom the welfare 
significance of the pricing rules under pure competition.1 These 
1cf. A. P. Lerner, The Economics of Control (New York, The Mac-
millan Company, 1947) Esp:-Ch. 6. --
rules :1 (1) that a unii'orm price must be placed on all units of each 
factor of production, (2) that the price of each good must equal its 
average cost of production, (3) that in the production of each product, 
the factors of production must be organized in the least costly manner, 
and (4) that the price of each factor of production should be set so 
that the demand for it is equal to tle available supply; imply not only 
a pricing process in which the moat economical use is made of the fac-
tors of production, but also an allocation of these factors among the 
many alternative uses for them in a given society in the most economi-
cal manner in relation to the valuations of the consumers. Every sin-
gle price and every price taken together depends in the final analysis 
upon the marginal satisfactions to each J:Srson who composes the econo.my 
!ram the consumption of the produced commodities. 2 
Such analyses depend for their strength on the basic assumption 
that the allocation of their incomes by the consumrs reflect their 
choices as to the goods ltlich shall be produced. No one Yd.ll receive 
a good unless he has paid the price for it which has been established 
1 Cf. Howard R. Bowen, Toward Social Economy (New York, Rinehart & 
Company, 1948) Esp. Chapters 15, 16. 
2
"The positive theory of economics exhibits a system in which peo-
ple co-operate with one another in order to satisfy their wants. We 
assume each individual (each free economic unit) to have a certain scale 
of preferences and to regulate his activities in such a way as best to 
satisfy these preferences." J. R. Hicks, ·"Foundations of Welfare Eco-
nomics, 11 Economic Journal, Vol. XLIX, p. 698. 
in the market. If he does not pay or cannot pay, he does not receive the 
good. Betvreen the consumer and the good stands the obstacle of price.l 
The consumer must regard the good as mrth the price in tenns of sa.tisfac-
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tions to be obtained from it before he gives up a. portion of his inco.n:e for 
its purchase. There are, however, a fairly significant class of economic 
goods for vbich such pricing rules and the basic assumption that underlies 
them cannot apply. 
A modern economy produces a considerable cpantity of mat Bowen2 ha.s 
called social goods because 11they cannot be divided up into units of mich 
any single individual can be given exclusive possession. 113 Thus social 
goods are indivisible from a physical viewpoint. "Such goods have the 
characteristic that they become part of the general environment--available 
to all individuals who live within that environment. They are, in that 
sense, social rather than individual goods.n4 These would include education, 
.
1It will be recalled that Pareto saw the economic problem as consisting 
of an opposition of 11tastes 11 and "obstacles." Each individual sought to 
satisfy his tastes insofar as the obstacles to satisfaction would permit h~ 
Cf. V. Pareto, Manuel d 'Economie Politique, translated from the Italian by 
Alfred Bonnet, (Paris, V. Giard & E. Brieri, 1909). 
~t follows is based upon Bowen's treatment in his Toward Social 
Economy, but a.t certain points we shall have occasion to amend, change, or 
avoid Bowen • s conclnsions. At no place in this little masterpiece on wel-
fare economics does Bowen use explicitly the concept of consumer's surplus, 
but because of its direct application to the following problems we ha.ve in-
serted it where necessary to give force to the analysis. 
3Bowen, £2• cit., p. 172, 173. 
4 Bowen, loc. cit. 
the winning of a war, the services of a flood control dam, the cleaning of 
a malarial swamp, slum clearance. In fact, the wide and increasing range 
of government services all fit into Bowen's classification. 
It is obvious that social goods must be selected by some process of 
collective choice, though it need not follow that production must be organ-
ized and carried on in a collective manner. The process of collective 
choice in a democracy is political and involves voting on the part of a 
relatively large group of individuals. Such decisions as are reached by 
the process of voting cannot possibly (except in the rarest of circum-
stances) result in the equation of marginal satisfactions for all persons, 
yet it is likely that the decision reached will tend to approxi.ma.te closely 
some ideal max:i nntm of aggregate satisfactions. 
It may be objected that aggregate satisfactions is a concept fraught 
with too many difficulties of interpretation, that it involves the untenable 
assumption of the addivity of individual satisfactions, and that it implies 
that satisfactions are all essentially positive in character. Although com-
pa.risons interpersonally of satisfactions may be criticized, it must be in-
sisted that such comparisons do in fact occur, that they play a significant 
role in our economy, and that the economist has to take the bull by the 
horns, as it were, and attempt to give as scientific a statement of the con-
ditions of such. comparison as can be made.1 It will be assumed in what 
1
nTo a strictly logical mind any discussion of utility to more than 
one individual is repugnant. It is not really justifiable to talk about 
maximum satisfaction to a whole population. (Continued on following page) 
'&9 
follows that some such concept, as consumers' surplus can measure a real 
flow of consumer satisfactions and is directly applicable to such problems 
as are inherent in collective choice. 
It will be necessary, before proceeding further, to set forth a possi-
ble method by which an ideal output of social goods is determinable. The 
term ideal output does admittedly imply the existence of sane standard 
meaningful unit of quantification of social goods. Such a unit we do not 
have. What, for example, is a quantity of education, a unit of victory in 
war, a measure of the gain from the cleaning of a malarial swamp? This, 
' however, should not pose too great a problem, for the average citizen is 
~nt to make his mind up about these things (insofar as he does so in an 
"economic" manner) in terms of the number of school buildings, the number 
of teachers, the size of the army, the number of men necessary to clean the 
swamp, etc. Though these are not accurate measures of social goods, they 
are tangible and readily available. Also, the increasing emphasis on the 
tax burden may cause the citizen to measure a given quantity of social 
goods in terms of their cost in money.1 Such an approach may be based, as 
(Continued from previous p9.ge) But conmon sense protests that if we 
treat all individuals as being exactly alike, it is then permissabl.e to 
sum their satisfactions, and that human beings, in their economic needs, 
are sufficiently alike to make the discussion of aggregate satisfaction 
interesting. Upon this basis we may say that if any tw:> individuals have 
the same real income they derive the same satisfaction from it. We may 
further say that if one individual has a larger real income than another, 
the marginal utility of income to him is less." Joan Robinson, Economics 
of Imperfect Competition (London, Macmillan & Company, Ltd., 1933) p. 318. 
~ the town of Lancaster, Massachusetts in a recent to~ meeting the 
entire issue of a new high school was decided upon the basis of the possible 
increase in the tax· rate. It is not unlikely that this is COillJWn. 
250 
Bowen points out, on the "principle that any decision to change the quan-
tity of a complex social good may be resolved into tvo distinguishable 
parts: (1) a decision as to t~ relative priorities of various particular 
component services, and (2) a decision as to the amount of tm over-all in-
1 
crease or decrease." 
Let us examine two possible situations under which the output of a 
social good may be determined. The first involves the task facing a com-
munity when it decides how much public education it should make available-
a choice which vd.ll involve the range from no public education to a very 
highly developed system including oollege training. The second involves 
the task facing a community when :it has to decide, not on how much educe.-
tion, but on how much more education to provide. It thus involves an incre-
ment or decrement to the quantity of social goods. 
In the first situation the ideal output will be determined as follows. 
In Diagram 27, DD' is the social demand curve for education--a dEmand curve 
built up out af the mrginal indifference curve or a curve of tha narginal 
rate of substitution of the conmunity between money and education. 2 SS' 
is supply curve of education tracing the average cost of education as more 
and more units of it are supplied. It is reasonable to e~ect that average 
~wen, ~· cit., P• 175. 
2rn other words, we shall adopt what we have seen to be Marshall's 
demand concept. 
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cost will be very high at some low amount supplied and that average cost 
will decline to some minimum point and then rise. Behind such a cost curve 
must lie the assumption that the amount of education involves a given size 
of plant, a given number of students, teachers, etc. and a changing inter-
relation between them. 
Since the average cost-supply curve intersects the danand curve at two 
points, there are at least tvo possible amounts of education which the com-
munity .may choose, OA and Oc.1 At both of these out.puts of education, the 
marginal rate of substitution of the comnunity equals tba cost of producing 
I 
that output. It might also be noted that the co.!lliiilility has the alternative 
of selecting an output of education equal to ~ at which output the demand 
for education (if it could be translated into willingness to pay taxes) ex-
ceeds the cost of providing that education by an amount which wi.ll yield a 
maximum net revenue to the government of the collliDWlity. There is, however, 
no valid reason to suppose that the citizens will wish to maximize their 
community's revenues at their ov.n expense, On vbat basis will they decide 
what amount of education to vote for? 
The social demand curve traces tha increments of community satisfactions 
loA represents the famous case of unstable equilibrium vhere supply 
curve cuts demand curve from above and corresponds to Hicks' first type of 
market instability. "In the .o:e.rket for products, a fall in price will .make 
consumers better off, entrepreneurs worse off; there is thus an income ef-
fect on both sides, Vlb.ich w:> rks just like that in exchange theory, and which 
is only likely to make for instability if the product is inferior, or if it 
is consumed to an important degree by the entrepreneurs who produce it." 
J. R. Hicks, Value~ Capital, 2d Edition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1946) P• 103. 
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from increasing increments of education, as we have inferred. At output 
OA total satisfactions exceed total cost by the triangular area DFP (the 
consumers' surplus), whereas at output OC total satisfactions exceed total 
cost by the triangular area .!!ill• Consumers r surplus will be maximized1 at 
out put OC ( mich will be equal to t ha. t which 'WOuld obtain if tm out put bad 
been determined in a purely competitive market). It is obvious that the 
ideal output, 2 of education should be OC rather than OA (or Q!!). 
Now that the ideal output is known, it is necessary to examine the 
machinery by vhich the actual output wi.ll be detennined. It has already 
been pointed out that there can be no free exercise of individual consumer 
choice in the case of social goods. Bowen suggests that the closest sub-
stitute for the exercise of such consumer choice is voting,3 and examines 
1 
Prof. R. L. Bishop objects to the idea of maximization of consumer's 
surplus, insisting that it is more logical to conceive of maximization of 
total utility. (In a private conversation with him Jan. 19, 1950). It is 
interesting that J. R. Hicks finds Pigou to have sane such maximization 
device at the back of his mind in setting forth his postulate that the aim 
of economic policy is to maximize the real value of the social income. Cf. 
J. R. Hicks, 11Foundations of Wel.fare Economics, 11 .2.E.• cit., p. 697. 
2Ideal is used in the Pig~vian sense. "Disregarding the possibility of 
multiple maxj nDlm positions, I propose, for convenience, to call tm invest-
ment that vould then be made in the industry the ideal investment and the 
output that vould be obtained the ideal output. Under conditions of simple 
competition, if in any industry the value of the marginal social net product 
of investment is greater than the value of the n:e.rgi.nal private net procllct, 
this implies that the output obtained is less than the ideal output: if the 
value of the marginal social net product is less than the value of the mar-
ginal private net product, this implies that the output obtained is greater 
than the ideal output. 11 A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (London, Mac-
millan & Co., Ltd., 1932) 4th Ed., p. 224. -
3of course it is quite possible that in a complex society 1 it vdll not 
always be expedient to call an election to (Continued on .f'olloWl.ng page) 
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in a very original manner the possible operation of this political pro-
1 
cess. He begins with the necessary supposition that the community, faced 
with the problem of determining the precise quantity of education to pro-
vide, does so by allowing each citizen to indicate with his vote the amount 
of education lbich he prefers that the community should provide. It is 
likewise necessary to suppose that each indivichal 's preference will depend 
upon tt(l) the relative amounts of satisfaction he eJq>ects to derive from 
different amounts of education--as indicated by his curve of marginal sub-
stitution, and (2) the cost to him of differing amounts of education. n2 
Bowen's presentation involves four assumptions:3 
First, it is assumed that all iaiividuals in the community 
actually vote and that each expresses a preference Which is 
appropriate to his individual interest. Second, it is assumed 
that the cost to the conmunity of providing various possible 
quantities of education is known... Third, it is assumed that 
the cost of matever amount of education is '00 be promced will 
be divided equally among all tts citizens ••• Fourth, it is 
assumed that the several curves of individual n:arginal substi-
tution are distributed accordirg to the normal law of error. 
Out of these assumptions cones Diagram 28 in which the determination of the 
equilibrium am:>unt of education is examined as it involves the individual 
(Continued from previous page) decide on the output of a specific 
E~Uantity of social goods. It is quite common that elected officials have 
a "mandate" or implied powers to make some of the decisions. If it is de-
sired to know the public's reaction without resort to election, perhaps 
some use of a public opinion poll is indicated. 
~owen, 
.2£· cit., PP• 179-189. 
~owen, 
.2E• cit., p. 180. 
3 Bowen, loc. eit. 
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citizen's vote. 
1m.!. is the total narginal rate of substitution curve divided by the 
number of citizens in such a way as to yield an average ne.rginal rate of 
substitution or modal social demand curve. The modal oocial demand curve 
involves implicitly the fourth of Bowen's assumptions. If a line parallel 
to the money axis be drawn from! on the quantity axis, by the normal law 
of error the range from .& (the point at which Line zy intersects the low-
est individual marginal rate of substitution curve) to ~ (the point at 
Which Line ZY intersects the highest marginal rate of substitution curve) 
is distributed symmetrically about a modal curve. Most of ttE intersect-
ing, then, should occur in the neighborhood of the modal social demand 
curve vbich coincides with the average curve of all the individual marginal 
rates of substitution. The modal group whose preferences the modal s:>cial 
demand curve represents will be of such a composition that it may be sup-
posed that their vote tends to coincide with that of the majority.1 
SS' is the average cost curve for education and is in every way simi-
lar to the average cost curve we considered in the ideal output determina-
tion. Thus, the modal voter will have to choose between an output of edu-
cation equal to OA or one equal to OB and between consumer's surplus DFP 
and consumer's surplus OOR. It is to be e.xpected that. he w.i.ll select that 
amount of education at which consumer's surPlus will be maximized, or OB. 
1It must be conceded that it is entirely possible that they do not. 
To the extent that they do not, the technique set forth is inexact. 
If more persons vote for that amount than any other, it will be the one 
selected. In any case, it can be presumed that the amount selected will 
involve maximization of consumer's surplus. 
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The second situation in which the determination of the output of 
social goods can be set out involves tba instance in which citizens of a 
comnunity are asked, for example, to vote on a bond issue for the purpose 
of constructing a new town high school. Here the problem of decision is 
not how much, but how much more or less. Let us suppose that Diagram 29 
represents the demand curves of each of the seven citizens (a small number 
for the convenience of graphical presentation) distributed accordirg to 
the operation of the law of normal error, wi. th 1m.!. as the modal curve. SS' 
is the average cost (and .narginal cost) of providing education. At the 
present time, the amount of education being provided is Q! and the oonnnunity 
has to decide how much this amount should be increased. 
It is likely that if the proposed bond issue provided for an increase 
in the amount of education from OA to 5m, the vote YOuld be five in favor 
and tl'«> opposed. Those whose demand curves lie al::ove the cost curve will 
be in favor, while those whose demand curves lie below the cost curve will 
be opposed. It is likely that an increase from OA to OC 'Will depend on 
the vote of the modal citizen, for without him, there will be three in 
favor and three opposed. It can be anticipated that he 'Will vote for the 
increase since it .ma.ximi.zes his consumer's surplus. An :increase from OA 
to OD will probably be defeated by a vote of six to one. 
Such an analysis as the foregoing while enlightening is subject to a 
Marginal 
Utility 
0 
Diagram 29 
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number of strictures. All of this sort of reasoning involves that suffi-
cient trial and error procedures will be used to determine the price (or 
tax) which i.n:iividus.l. citizens would be willing to pay at various possi-
ble outputs. Only when this is known can a cost curve be worked out. At 
best this is a wearisome process and at worst it is not likely to be used. 
More realistic examinations of tre determination of the output of social 
goods 1'Culd have to take into account the fact that costs cannot be known 
ex ante and that anticipations regarding cost situations play a. very im-
portant role. 1 
It has also been assumed that all individual members of tre community 
are in a position equally to benefit from the social good. This is not 
likely always to be the case. Some families will have no children, some 
will wish to give their children an education in non-public schools, while 
others may feel education of children to be of no real value. TM majority 
will, of course, favor public education in sone amount. In such a case, 
the situation may be pictured by Diagram 30 which follows. 
It is assumed, for the sake of this presentation, that there are two 
classes of citizens according as they obtain great or little benefit from 
public education. DD' is the modal social demand curve for Class I (those 
whose benefit or consumer's surplus is great) and dd 1 is the m::>dal social 
1It is very likely, however, that much can be known in advance about 
possible costs. T.own officials can, for example, procure the services of 
technical consultants lilo can work a possible cost schedule with suggested 
tax rates to cover costs and these can be known before an election. 
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demand curve for Class II (whose consumer's surplus is small). Given the 
marginal cost of education, how can the amount lb ich will maximize com-
nrunity consumers' surplus be determined? 
If :U:C is the marginal cost of education (subject to constant rost), 
Class I will desire the comnunity to provide OB units of education, vbile 
Class II will desire the community to provide OA units of education. OB 
units of education yield Class I consumers' surplus eqaal. to ~· If some 
means could be devised whereby the tax now being paid by Class I could be 
raised while that of Class II could be lowered so the consumers' surplus 
one class obtained was equal to that obtained by the other, rome output 
of education between OA and OB (say OC) would be determined. In effect, 
such differential. taxing ~uld raise the marginal cost of education to 
Class I to MC and lower the marginal cost of education to Class II to MC • 
- -ri 
The intersection of MC and MC with DD' and dd 1 respectively is ruch that 
---r -u - -
DFP is equal to dET, and amount of education OC is produced. It must also 
be assumed that such a procedure actually covers the full cost of the educa-
tion. 
Still another intrinsic assumption involved in such analyses is that 
the distribution of income is 11correct. 111 Included in this assumption is 
l.rhis assumption is made in all economic discussions regarding the 
benefits of pure oompetition, ssentially, this am:>unts to SB\V"ing that 
some one demand curve {or curve of the marginal rate of wbstitution be-
tween any two commodities) is the correct one in that it describes a mar-
ket situation in which all ronsumers receive the same amount of consumer's 
surplus. Another way of saying this is to point out that we have assumed 
that the ratio of marginal utilities of the two commodities is the same 
for all individuals in the econoiey". (Continued on following page) 
generally found an inference that i1' incomes are correct, consumer will 
make the 11right 11 choices.1 It is possible to examine this assumption in 
much the same manner as we have examined the whole problem of collective 
choice. 
2 In Marshallian terms, Bowen postulates that 11the most economical 
distribution of income w:>uld be attained only if income were distributed 
among individuals so that the ne.rginal satisfaction from income w:>uld be 
equal for all persons.3 Translated into the language of consumer's sur-
plus, this would mean that the consumer's surplus obtained by any one 
person from his purchases YDuld equal the consumer's surplus obtained from 
his purchase by any other person in the economy. It w:>uld. then be possi-
ble in a given economy with non-equal distribution of incomes to take (say, 
by taxation) from those whose consumer's surplus is large and give to those 
(Continued from previous page) This is one of Hicks' marginal condi-
tions for maximum welfare. Cf. M. W. Reder, Studies in the Theory of Wel-
fare Economics (New York, Columbia University Press, 194~Esp. Ch. II. 
1
sa.muelson insists that "utility analysis rests upon the fundamental 
assumption that the individual confronted with given prices and confined 
to a given total expenditure selects that combination of goods lilich is 
highest on his preference scale. This does not require (a) that the in-
dividual behave rationally in any other sense; (b) that he be deliberate 
and self-conscious in his purchasing; (c) that there exist any intensive 
magnitude which he feels or consults." P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of 
Economic Analysis (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1947) pp. 97 ,98. 
2cr. Marshall, Principles of Economics, P• 471. 
3 . 
Bowen, .2£• ~·, p. 199. 
whose consumer's surplus is low until cons~r's surpluses were equalized 
all around. 
Such reasoning runs entirely counter to all that has been said and 
can be said about lack of meaning of interpersonal comparisons of satis-
factions. But, it must be insisted that the problem of inequality of in-
' 
comes exists apart from the problem of measuring satisfaction and is a 
fact attested to by most economists. It will then be useful 1;.o see what 
can be said about an ideal distribution of income when the capacities1 of 
individuals to enjoy their incomes have been taken into account. 
In Diagram 31, it is assumed that we can present tm curves of mar-
ginal utility (or satisfaction) of the individuals who compose a society 
distributed in accordance with the normal law of error. "Just as indi-
vidual differences in height, weight, or •intelligence' may be expressed 
in tenns of a frequency distribution w.!.th a great majority of the cases 
lying near the mode, so (it is assumed) differences in capacities to enjoy 
income are similarly distributed about. the mode of a .frequency distribu-
tion. 112 On the vertical axis marginal utility units are calibrated while 
on the horizontal axis units of real income are traced. 
For each individual in the given society, a curve of marginal utility 
is traced which indicates his marginal utility (or satisfaction .from real 
1 ncapacity to enjoy income" is admittedly a tenuous concept. Cf. 
J. J. Spengler, "Sociological Presuppositions in Economic Theory," 
Southern Economic J oumal (Oct., 1940) pp. 1.42f.f. 
2Bowen, .2£• cit., pp. 201, 202. 
0 Units of Real Income 
Diagram 31 
income for each unit of that income. If, from the point l on the hori-
zontal axis, a line ZA perpendicular to it and parallel to the fiBrginal. 
utility axis be drawn, the range of intersection points (with the mar-
ginal utility curves) from.! to & will be distributed along it after the 
fashion of a normal fre~ency distribution. 
With the curves of marginal utility known, it muld be possible to 
approach a distribution of real incomes such that the consumer •s surplus 
each obtained from his (real) income was in some sense equal. Let YB 
be drawn from the marginal utility axis JBrallel to the real income axis 
to intersect the marginal utility curves at a level vbich conformed with 
the total a.m:>unt of income l'ilich have t.o be distributed. The intersection 
of YB with the modal marginal utility curve will determine a level of in-
come such that the consumer's surplus received by the modal individual will 
be greater than that received by half of the remaining individuals but less 
than that received by the other half. The more closely such an arbitrary 
distribution approximated the normal law of eiTor, the more equal such a 
distribution muld be. The most that can be said in defense of the tech-
nique suggested here is that it would involve less inequality than any 
other method of distribution.1 
~owever, another presentation of this IIBthod may be suggested. 
A. P. Lerner asserts that 11it is •••• possible so to divide income as to 
maximize the probable total satisfaction, making this greater than the 
probable total satisfaction that would result from any other distribution 
of income." His method would involve the comparison of the satisfactions 
to be obtained from income if the marginal utilities curves are known. 
If, in Diagram 30, AA' and BB 1 represent the marginal utilities (measured 
vertically) of different amounts of income (Continued on follovd.~ F8ge) 
Units of ~ 
Marginal 
Utilipy 
0 Units of Ineorne 
Diagram 32 
I 
~6 
Units of 
Marginal 
Utility 
> 
The question of right choices on the part of consumers is not amena-
bl.e to the techniques which we have been using. It may be suggested, 
however, that insofar as consumers seek rational ends, insofar as they 
possess adequate knowledge of the alternatives Which are theirs, insofar 
as they choose from alternatives within the given cultural context, the 
maximization of consumer's surplus may be obtained through free choice. 
There is very little reason, holrever, to expect this to be the case. 1 
(Continued f.rom previous page. ) (Measured horizontally from either 
end) enjoyed by two different individuals, A and B, and 'an income of a 
given aroount be divided equally a.roong them,-the marginal utilities of 
income to them will be represented by the height of ~l and~ respective-
ly. If AA' is drawn higher up, then A is represented as having a greater 
capacity for enjoyment of his income than ~~ so q1 is greater than .9:2 , 
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with the result that a small diversion of income from B to A l«)uld in-
crease the total of satisfactions. In fact, it Y«:>uld pay to keep increas-
ing A's income at the expense of B 's income until AA' intersected BB' at 
s. The total gain (or consumer's surplus) fran such a procedure l«)Uld be 
the triangular area q1 sq2• However, since it is not possible to know how 
high the marginal utility curv-es of individuals are in comparison with 
other individuals, it is quite possible that a blind shift in income is 
as likely to result in a decrease in tota1 satisfaction as in an increase. 
On this principle, it is concluded that "if it is desired to maximize 
total satisfactions in a society, the rational procedure is to divide in-
come on an equilitarian basis." Cf. A. P. Lerner, 2E• cit., pp. 29-32. 
Cf. also W. s. Jevons, Theory of Political Econom,y (London, Macmillan & 
Co., Ltd., 1871) p. 90. It will be noticed that Jevons' diagrammatical 
presentation is quite similar to that of Lerner. 
1 Cf. however Samuelson, 2£• cit., pp. 97, 98. 
II 
We have established that consumer's surplus is a useful measure of 
the gains of the buyer in the process of exchange. It is useful not only 
where t he marginal utility of money (or income or the composite commodity) 
is constant, but also where income effects are small or negative. We have 
shown that though recent theoretical discussion has brought to light many 
concepts of consumer's surplus, only "Marshall's measure •••• (is) likely to 
lend (itself) to empirical determination. 111 Using Marshall's measure/ 
it will be enlightening to examine the welfare connotations of doctrines 
of monopolistic competition. Chamberlin has insisted that competitive 
theory cannot be applied where monopol y elements are present "without 
introducing into the conclusions definite errors."3 Comparisons of monop-
oly production and competitive product ion will show that monopoly prices 
are higher, monopoly costs of production are higher, monopoly scales of 
production are lower, and the component firms of a monopolized industry 
are too many. While qualifying her comparisons because of the nature of 
the productive firms which are likely to be monopolized, Mrs. Robinson 
has also pointed out that monopolized firms produce above the minimum 
1 J. N. Morgan, "The Measurement of Gains and Losses," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, LXII:29S (1948). 
2That is, the triangular area above .the rectangle which measures 
total expenditure and below the demand curve. 
3E. H. Chamberlin, The 4~)ory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 19 Sixth Edition, p. 116. 
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1 
average cost point an output which does not satisfy competitive demand. 
For the purpose of our analysis, we will (1) examine Chamberlinian 
and Robinsonian postulates of monopolistic competition equilibrium, (2) 
re-examine the type of demand curve used by the monopolistic competition 
school, (3) introduce consumer's surplus as a measure of comparison be-
tween monopolistically competitive output and competitive output, and 
(4) apply this measure to various issues currently under discussion among 
monopolistic competition theorists. 
The elemental law of equilibrium of the consumer or the producer is 
the equality of marginal gain to marginal loss. It will be instructive 
to regard both production and consumption as types of exchange. The 
buyer will equate the marginal cost (or loss) to him with the marginal 
utility (or gain) to him in the obtaining of particular commodity. The 
seller-producer will equate marginal cost-of-production to him with the 
marginal revenue (or gain) to him in the selling of a particular commodity. 
In perfect (or, if you will, pure competition) competition for the seller, 
the fact that there are many buyers ("an indefinite large number") will 
mean that for the seller, the marginal revenue curve will be colinear 
with the average revenue curve, so that he will seek to equate his mar-
ginal cost to price (or average revenue). \Vhen there is perfect compe-
tition on the buyers' side of the market, each buyer will be faced by 
1Joan Robinson Economics !2f Imperfect Competition (London, Macmillan 
and Co., Ltd., 1933) Chapter II. 
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many sellers so that he will regard the marginal cost curve as colinear 
with the average cost curve, and will seek to equate marginal utility to 
average cost. The neoclassical supply and demand diagram that appears 
as standard equipment in every economics text assumes perfect competition 
on both sides of the market. Thus, the demand curve is a marginal utility 
curve and the supply curve is a marginal cost curve. The equality of 
marginal utility and marginal cost (which is the same as the equality of 
average utility and average cost) determines the equilibrium purchase 
and the equilibrium price. 
The service of the monopolistic competition school has been to 
point up the special nature of this equilibrium adjustment. It is now 
common knowledge that the equality of marginal utility, marginal cost, 
average utility, and average cost is the property of a particular (and 
perhaps rare) set of circumstances. On the much overemphasized seller's 
side of the market, equilibrium will be obtained where marginal revenue 
(to the seller) equals marginal cos t (to the seller) while the price is 
read off the average revenue curve (which is often assumed to be the 
1 
same as the average utility curve of the buyer), while on the buyer's 
side of the market, the equilibrium price is determined by the equality 
~specially is this so, if some account is taken of the power of 
the monopolist to discriminate between consumers. Thus rs. Robinson 
says, "the average revenue of the perfectly discriminating monopolist 
can be derived directly from the demand curve and will coincide with 
the curve of average utility to the consumers. 11 J. Robinson, ~· cit., 
note to p. 188. -
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of marginal utility (to the buyer) and the marginal cost (to the buyer) 
while the price is read off the average cost {to the buyer) curve (which 
is often assumed to be the same as the average disutility curve of the 
seller). Only when perfect competition obtains in either side of the 
market will the marginal and average curves be co linear. This is in 
essence what Professor Chamberlin and Mrs. Robinson feel to be most impor-
tant about their presentation.1 It cannot be overemphasized that this 
conclusion is not new, 2 but the clear light shed upon the nature of ex-
change equilibrium adjustment by the careful delineation of the marginal 
principle has aided in the application of partial equilibrium analysis 
to the 11real world. 11 3 
It is rather surprising that measures of gains or losses other than 
those implied by the revenue curves and cost curves have not played a 
more important part in the matters so frequently under discussion by the 
monopolistic competition school. The very implications of the aberration 
from the perfect competition equilibrium are couched in welfare terms. 
Monopolistic competition output is "worse" than competitive output in 
production terms. It involves 11waste 11 of resources. There are "too 
1
cf. the setting out of the equilibrium conditions for monopolistic 
and imperfect competition in R. Triffin, Monopolistic Competition and 
General Eguilibrium Theory (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 194!) 
PP• 23, 4 • 
2For example, it appears without its distinctive dress in Pigou, 
Economics of Welfare (London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1932) Appendix III. 
3This particular statement runs counter to the conclusions of 
Triffin, .£E• cit. 
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many firms in the monopolistic industry. 11 Price is tttoo high." These 
are objective comparisons and welfare economists have shoYrn that measure-
ments do exist on the production plane for determining the degree of 
11waste 11 or 11worseness" involved in prodm tion under conditions of monop-
1 
oly. Such comparisons are rather recently coming to be made in terms 
of a calculus which has policy applications. The question of monopo~ 
profit or 11 producer1 s surplus112 has an analogue in 11 consumer' s surplus. 11 
Perhaps the rejection of the notion of a "consumer's surplus" by 
Chamberlin derives from his concept of the demand curve. In very simple 
terms, a subjective demand curve is either a marginal utility curve show-
ing the slope of the total utility curve (and therefore we must accept 
Marshall's strictures about it) or it is an average utility curve) (where 
each utility-quantity combination is independent of every other). Objec-
tively, the seller will be concerned with the average revenue curve in an 
imperfect market for his goods, and he will regard this as his demand (or 
sales) curve. To Chamberlin the preferred way of expressing the relation-
ship between demand and price is the average revenue curve which relates 
1
cf. s. Enke, "Resource Malallocation Within Farms," Quarter1y 
Journal~ Economics, Xllii:572-576 (1949). 
2It may be objected that it is an error to confuse "producer's sur-
plus" and profit. While it may be admitted that these concepts can be 
shown to be distinct and on occasion to refer to different income con-
cepts, it is not uncommon to regard monopoly profits as a type of pro-
ducer's surplus. Cf. Marshall, Principles of Economics, pp. 830-832. 
3
or some form of the average utility curve. Prof. Bishop has pointed 
out to me that insofar as the monopolist is not able to discriminate per-
fectly and exact a price which will eat up consumer's surplus, the objec-
tive demand curve will be less an average utility curve. 
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the ~rious possible amounts, consistent with the present state of pref-
erence of the consumer, which a consumer will purchase at alternative 
prices when each price-quantity combination is assumed to be independent 
of every other. 1 Thus, for Chamberlin, the objective average revenue 
sales-demand curve is a subjective average utility curve, (or the summa-
tion of the subjective average utility curves of the various consumer-
components of the market), 2 so that he insists that if the consumer were 
willing to purchase at a given price a certain quantity of a commodity, 
he should be willing to take somewhat less than that quantity if he had 
paid a higher price for a part of it. He summarily rejects :Marshall' s 
argument that each successive potential purchase is dependent upon the 
immediately previous possibilities. It can be shown that the triangular 
area under the demand curve and above the rectangle representing total 
cost to the consumer cannot be consumer's surplus if we regard the demand 
curve as an average utility curve.3 For that reason, the most obvious 
measure of consumer's surplus is not applicable in the realm of 
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. 
Mrs. Robinson is somewhat clearer in her presentation of the demand 
curve. She points out that when she discusses monopozy-, she is treating 
1In his diagrammatic presentation, Chamberlin always darkens the 
average revenue curve and uses it as his demand curve. 
2chamberlin nonetheless insists he has assumed "absence of condi-
tions favorable to monopolistic discrimination." Chamberlin, op. cit., 
p. 13. - -
3
cf. Chamberlin, .£e• ~·, note to page 27. 
"the principles of selling.111 From the seller's viewpoint, a 11demand 
curve represents a list of prices at which various amounts of a certain 
commodity will be bought in a market during a given period of time. 112 
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The conditions of demand lie entirely outside the control of the seller in 
pure competition so that the demand curve in that instance is perfectly 
elastic. In an industry which is conducted under conditions of imperfect 
competition, "the demand curve for the individual firm may be conceived 
to show the full effect upon the sales of that firm which result from any 
change in the price which it charges.") Thus, when she uses the phrase 
individual demand curve she means "the demand curve for the product of 
the individual firm."4 The very fact that she draws her demand curves 
typically concave to the axis indicates that she is concerned with a 
curve in which "a given absolute fall in price induces a larger and larger 
absolute increase in the amount sold as the price falls."S This is true 
because "the market is composed of individuals of differing wealth, so 
that a fall in price not only induces those, who, at a higher price, con-
sume some of the commodity to buy more, but also induces new buyers to 
come into the field. 116 
1 
J. Robinson, ~· cit., pp. 7,8. 
2 
.QE. cit • , p. 20. 
3QE. cit., P• 21. 
4 Loc. cit. 
--
50p. ~., p. 23. 
6 Op. cit., p. 24. 
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There is no doubt that her demand curves are average revenue curves, 
for she suggests that 11 it is frequently convenient to refer to a demand 
curve as the average revenue curve of a seller. 111 Utility is not an im-
portant consideration for the producer in either perfect or imperfect 
competition, for he looks at the demand curve objectively. When Mrs. 
Robinson outlines the nature of the utility analysis upon which she bases 
her treatment of monopsony, she reveals that she regards the marginal 
utility curve as a demand curve only when "the supply of the commodity is 
2 perfectly elastic to the buyer." So long as we assume that competition 
among buyers is perfect, it will be formally correct to assume that the 
demand curve is a marginal utility curve, but it must be remembered that 
this is true only because marginal cost to the buyer equals average cost 
to the buyer in perfect competition. The marginal utility curve "does 
not represent a list of the amounts of a commodity which will be bought 
at various prices; it represents the amounts which will be bought at 
various marginal costs to the buyer.•.3 Apparently, because she does not 
feel that she can assume that competition among buyers is usually perfect, 
in the first part of her book (that devoted to problems of monopoly) she 
1 ~., 21. Op. p. 
20p. ~-, P• 216. 
3 
Loc. cit. 
- -
always treats the demand curve as an average utility curve.1 Thus, her 
monopoly demand curve is likewise an average revenue curve objectively 
and an average utility curve subjectively. She also could find no use 
in her analysis of monopoly (or monopolistic competition) for the 
Marshallian measure of conswner' s surplus. 
It will be instructive to examine what an average utility demand 
curve means. Just as there have been shown to be four limiting cases of 
2 cost-supply curve, four limiting cases of the demand curve can be shown 
to exist as tools for analysis of demand conditions. It will be well not 
to confuse this fourfold analysis with the variety of interpretations of 
the demand discussed elsewhere in this paper.3 
The marginal utility demand curve is the usual subjective demand 
conception found in Marshallian economics and often implied in many dis-
cussions of demand. It is drawn so as to subtend consumer's surplus. 
1 
This conclusion is based upon two considerations. First, that 
Mrs. Robinson regards the typical monopolist as being able to some degree 
to use price discrimination. Second, that she regards the marginal util-
ity curve as a demand curve only when it can be assumed that the supply 
of the commodity is perfectly elastic in the market to the buyer. Since 
it is usual to assume that neither a lack of monopolistic price discrim-
ination nor perfect elasticity to buyers characterize markets in imper-
fect competition, it then seems correct to imply her use of the average 
utility curve or some form of it as the demand curve in the more usual 
circumstances. But see following discussion. 
2 J. Robinson, op. ~., pp. 133-142. 
3see Chapter III. 
1 This demand curve we may call I. 
Z/7 
Mrs. Robinson distinguishes another demand curve the average utility 
curve which subtends the total utility rectangle and which "represents a 
list of the amounts of a commodity which will be bought at various prices" 
2 if we assume perfectly discriminating monopoly. Every price in the 
demand schedule is an all or none price. Such a demand curve rules out 
the possibility of Marshall's measure of consumer's surplus. We may call 
this demand curve II. 
While demand curve I is drawn up under the assumption that the price 
consumers pay equals their marginal utility and demand curve II is drawn 
up under the assumption that the consumers receive no consumer's surplus, 
the third demand curve may be regarded as intermediate between these 
limits. Thus, we may draw demand curve Ill up under the assumption that 
the seller regards it to his advantage not to exact an all or none price 
but some fixed proportion of the consumer's surplus.3 Thus, we have a 
demand curve which in some sense is an average utility curve and which 
1 A complete discussion of this demand curve appears in Chapter III. 
2 J. Robinson, ~· cit., note to p. 187, note to p. 188, pp. 203, 
216, note 2 to p. 223. 204, 
3This curve may be looked at in two ways. It may be regarded as 
typical of some policy of deliberate imperfect discrimination or it may 
be regarded as evidence of a failure on part of monopolist to maximize 
his profit because he regards as 11 a gain to consumers as of equal impor-
tance with a gain to himself, u (Marshall's total benefit concept) or 
because he regards a fixed proportion of consumer gain to his profit as 
desirable (Marshall's compromise benefit concept). Cf. Marshall, 
Principles, pp. 487ff. 
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has an analogy to the total and compromise benefit concepts of Marshall . 
Demand Curve IV is suggested by considerations of monopsonistic exploi-
tation1 and is drawn up under the assumption that the buyer is able to 
exact a series of alternative Jrices only one of which is equal to mar-
ginal utility. Every other price will involve some exploitation and yields 
the buyer more than his marginal utility from the commodity. It will be 
easiest to assume that the monopsonist is able to exact all of the produc-
er•s surplus so that he obtains by perfect monopsonistic price discrimin-
ation the whole of the social surplus. Demand curve I may be regarded as 
marginal to deilB!ld curve IV, just as demand curve I is marginal to de-
ma.nd curve II. 
Demand curve III closely approximates the sort of demand curve 
Robinson and Chamberlin use and is the one designated in this paper as 
the average utility curve. 2 
1 
Cf. Robinson, op. ~., PP• 301-304. 
2 
The concept of a differentiated product means that the individual 
producer is enabled to use a kind of implicit price discrimination. As 
Nichols has pointed out, "the theory of monopolistic competition holds 
that when consumers distinguish between products of different sellers of 
the same type of product, advantages accrue 'which,if not in extent, at 
least in their nature, are equal to those enjoyed by the ordinary monop-
oly.' Each seller is thereby enabled to raise his price without the loss 
of all his sales." A. Nichols, "The Development of Monopolistic Competi-
tioii"'"il d the Monopoly Problem, rr Review of Economic and Statistics (May, 
1949) p. 118. Cf. also A. Nichols, "TheRehabilitation of Pure Competi-
tion," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. LXII, pp. 3lff. Thus each sel-
ler has a nucleus of customers for his product who will regard their con-
sumer's surplus as in some way related to the J:r oduct and who thus in mon-
ey terms may be induced to give up a portion of it rather than the product. 
The extent to which such a coterie exists will determine the nature of de-
mand curve III. 
When Marshall treated the problem of monopolistic output, he had 
reference to what has since come to be called "pure monopoly • 11 He was 
especially concerned in his Principles with considerations of monopoly 
net revenue and has apparently left the impression with some of his stu-
dents and followers that he regarded the determination of monopoly net 
revenue and monopoly output as a problem requiring tools of a different 
character than those used in the determination of the competitive out-
put. Mrs. Robinson has rightly averred that the marginal analysis used 
by Marshall in his examination of monopoly is not distinct from that 
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supply-price demand price analysis which enabled him to set out the condi-
tions of competitive equilibrium.1 As pointed out above, the service of 
the monopolistic competition school has been to distinguish the fact that 
marginal tools are necessary to every detennination of equilibrium in the 
neo-classical equilibrium analysis. 
Overlooked in Marshall's disquisition on monopoly has been the use 
of the "consumer 1 s surplus curve 11 to set out the notion of 11 total benefit" 
1 
A careful reading of Chapters 15, 16, and 17 of Economics of 
Imperfect Competition seemsto lead to no other conclusion. "It IS clear 
that the marginal method of analysis will produce exactly the same re-
sults as the method, used by Marshall, of finding the price at which 
the area representing 'monopoly net revenue' is at a maximum, since net 
revenue is at a maximum when marginal revenue and marginal costs are 
equal. Both methods can be applied to problems of competition and of 
monopoly. Marshall introduced into his system of analysis an artificial 
cleavage between monopoly and competition, by treating competitive prob-
lems only by the 'marginal' method, and monopoly problems only by the 
•areas' method." Note to Page 54, Robinson, op. ~· 
arising from the existence of a monopoly.1 Total benefit is the sum of 
the monopoly net revenue obtained by the monopolist from the sale at the 
equilibrium price of the equilibrium units of the service or commodity 
produced by the monopolist under condition of decreasing cost and the 
consumer's surplus arising from the sale of the commodity at that price. 
11 If the monopolist regards a gain to consumers as of equal importance 
with an equal gain to himself, his aim will be to produce just that 
amount of the commodity which will make this total benefit a maximum. 112 
This reasoning is especially applicable to the case of a government 
monopoly where it cannot be assumed that the maximization of profit is 
the sole determinant (or principal one) of productive effort. 
It is our purpose to apply this consumer's surplus curve in monop-
olistic competition analysis in order to show the possible use in this 
realm of this measure of consumer gains from exchange. It is perfectly 
logical that there should be a consumer' s surplus curve, for if con-
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sumer's surpl s can be shown as a geometrical area under a curve which is 
dependent upon the limit of the integral, there will be some line (or 
curve) which will indicate the growth of the area as we select limits 
successively farther apart. In terms of the symbolic language of the 
calculus, the consumer's surplus curve is the first derivative of the 
1 
Marshall, op. cit., pp. 477ff. 
2 
Marshall, op. cit., p. 487. 
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integral of the equation which yielded the measure of the geometrical 
area. We shall use the Marshallian measure--the area under the marginal 
utility demand curve from the all or none price to the equilibrium price 
and above the rectangle which measures the total cost to the consumer of 
the units of the good acquired--because we suspect with Morgan that it is 
the measure most susceptible of empirical verification. Schumpeter has 
asked why "unless (consumer's surplus) was meant to lead up to the statis-
tical evaluation of a quantified welfare, ••• should not Marshall have been 
content with mentioning the existence of such a surplus, a function of 
many variables, instead of courting the danger of misunderstanding and 
opposition, by insisting as Dupuit had done before him, on this kind of 
simplification that would reduce the number of independent variables to 
two?111 
Even in his setting out of the problem of determination of monopoly 
output, the demand curve of Marshall remained a marginal utility curve. 
Thus, the triangular area under the demand curve is identified by him 
as consumer's surplus throughout his Principles. In a note to Page 487, 
he describes the derivation of the consumer's surplus curve in the follow-
ing manner. In Diagram 33 below DD 1 is a marginal utility demand curve 
and SS' is an average cost supply curve which declines throughout its 
length because of increasing returns. QQ ' is a monopoly revenue curve 
1 
J. A. Schumpeter, "Alfred Marshall's Principles; A Semi-centennial 
Appraisal, 11American Economic Review, XXI :248. 
Diagram 33 
\ 
' 
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drawn on the principle of subtracting from total revenue the total costs 
at each point along the supply-cost curve. Monopoly net revenue is at a 
maximum when the distance from the quantity axis to the monopoly revenue 
curve equals the distance from the average cost-supply curve up to the 
demand curve (i.e. when Lq3 is equal to .9,J.S2). Therefore, the equilibrium 
output under conditions of monopoly would be OL whereas under conditions 
of free competition output would be ~· 
Marshall presumes that the monopolized industry is now producing 
OM units of the service or product at the price MP1 and obtaining a total 
revenue of OM times MP1 • At price ~l the consumer's surplus is equal to 
the triangular area ~1. He would mark off along ~l section~ such 
that ~4 times ~ would equal the area DFP 1 • Then, as the level of out-
put moved from zero level upward, a curve beginning in the origin and 
passing through~ would trace the consumer's surplus curve. 
At OM units of output the monopoly net revenue is at a level equal 
If we to ~ times MP3• 
to~' we would obtain 
cut off from MP a section beginning at P3 equal 
-1_ -
section ~3'~5 . N em ~5 is of such length that 
when multiplied by~ the result is the sum of the consumer's surplus 
and the monopoly net revenue and this sum is "The (money measure) of the 
total benefit which the community will derive from the commodity when 
the amount OM is procured." 
Superimposed upon this diagram are a series of constant revenue 
curves (rectangular hyperbolic curves) which trace out, as it were, levels 
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of revenue. Where the curve traced from ~ through ~.5 is just tangent 
to the highest constant revenue curve, there is determined a level of 
output whose demand price will yield a total revenue of sufficient pro-
portions to cover the losses of the monopolist and leave a maximized net 
social gain. In Marshall's terms, total benefit will be at a maximum 
when the amount offered for sale is OW, or to put it in another way, 
when RW is fixed as the sales price under the given conditions and 
supply and demand. 
It will be instructive to compare this conclusion with those usually 
obtained by the tools which the monopolistic competition economists 
have taught us to use. In order to preserve the similarity to the 
Marshallian analysis, we shall have to make the heroic assumption that 
the demand curve in monopoly is the marginal utility curve.l We shall 
use Figure 34 as it appears on Page 9.5 in Joan Robinson, Economics of 
Imperfect Competition and make such changes in it as are necessary to 
illustrate full impost of the Marshallian presentation. The output 
determined by the intersection of the marginal revenue and the marginal 
cost curves is OM at which the rectangular area ~ is the total amount 
of excess profit and DFP is the concumer's surplus resulting from the 
sale of ~ units at the price PM. If perfect competition reigned, the 
output would be ~ at which price QN would obtain and the consumer's 
surplus would be D'NQ while excess profits would have disappeared. 
1Tha t is Demand Curve I. 
Diagram 34 
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Now we are ready to introduce the consumer's surplus curve. If 
we mark off along ~ !3! which when multiplied by OM will yield an area 
equal in size to DFP, we have a point on the consumer's surplus curve. 
Likewise, if we mark off along QM ~which when multiplied by ON will 
yield an area equal to DWQ in size, we have still another point an the 
consumer's surplus curve. We have in fact three points on such a 
curve, for we know that at zero sales and output, no consumer's surplus 
is obtained. Therefore, the consumer's surplus curve must begin in the 
origin. Thus, curve ORS is the consumer• s surplus curve. 
To continue our process of assimilation, we shall mark off along 
PM a section beginning at~ equal to~' the unit excess profit at the 
output _9!, or RJ. RJ is a point on a total benefit curve of the 
Marshallian variety. ~ must be another point of this total benefit 
curve, because at the output ~ ~ere is no excess profit and the 
total benefit to the community to be obtained from the sale of the 
ON units of the commodity (above the cost) will be the consumer 1 s 
surplus. The total benefit curve must rise to the point ,!! and then 
decline. Li kewise, a monopoly revenue curve can be traced passing 
through the price line PM at the point y and reaching zero at the point 
,!! along 2!• 
An examination of this diagram which we have thus developed will 
show one of the very significant disadvantages of the monopoly output 
OM. Consumer's surplus is not at a maximum nor does it bear an equili-
brating relationship to amount of profit which the monopolist has 
obtained. Monopolistic competition theory has placed profit maximization 
upon a pedestal and has made all economic theory bow before it. The 
use of the consumer's surplus curve may help to remove the aura of 
sancti:ty that surrounds this deity. 
We are now enabled to apply ,to monopolistic competition some of 
Marshall• s strictures. The pioneer neo-classicist pointed out that the 
monopolist "even if he does not concern himself with the interests of 
the consumers, he is likely to reflect that the demand for a thing 
depends in a great measure on people• s familiarity with it. 11 Such a 
monopolist will find it to his long-run advantage to sacrifice some 
of his profits to encourage a fuller use or fuller sale of his com-
modity. It is interesting to speculate upon the role of selling costs 
1 
when the consumer• s surplus curve technique is used. 
It will be well to remember as we have insisted earler that the 
consumer• s surplus is the key to welfare economics. In the realm of 
welfare economics, monopolies have always been a special instance of the 
discrepancy between social and private product. As we pointed out at 
~he concept of selling costs involves an implicit consideration 
of matters germane to consumer's surplus. The effect of such selling 
costs is to increase demand not in proportion to the cost but in some 
lesser proportion, for a part of the cost is devoted to building up a 
coterie of buyers who will regard their consumer• s surplus as in some 
way related to the product. The demand curve in the usual sense is to 
Chamberlin "not the actual one, which plays a part in determining the 
price; it is a fictitious and irrelevant one Which includes only a 
fraction of the demand - that part which would exist if no selling 
expenditures were made•" Cbamberl:Ln, op. cit., p. 174. 
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the beginning of this present analysis, it is held that monopolies invest 
too few resources in their production as compared with firms producing 
for purely competitive markets and that they produce at too high a cost 
an output which is less than the competitive output. In welfare terms, 
looked at from the physical production level alone, it can be concluded 
that a net social gain results from the elimination of monopoly. Let us 
subject this conclusion to further analysis with the tools which have been 
forged. Mrs. Robinson uses all the classical and neo-classical apparatus. 
If we may assume that she uses them in the same way to mean the same things 
as did her predecessors, then we shall be entitled to draw the conclusions 
they did from the use of this apparatus. Especially do we want to consider 
her use of these tools in the case of those articles which are slightly 
different, which is of course the basis of her monopoly analysis. Equi-
librium is attained, as we have noted, where marginal cost equals mar-
ginal revenue. Free entry is assumed and entry will occur up to the 
point at which average cost is at a minimum. The condition for optimum 
production for any firm is that it produce at minimum average cost. 
In the following diagram, let AC be the average cost curve of the 
industry producing goods which are alike enough for the elasticities of 
substitution of the goods to be finite and relatively large and whose 
1 
cross elasticities of demand are finite. The intersection of the in-
1 
Cf. Sidney Weintraub, Price Theory (New York, Pitman Publishing 
Corporation, 1949) pp. 97-102. 
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dustry marginal. cost curve with the industry marginal revenue curve deter-
mines an equilibrium output ON whose unit cost is NS and which sells at 
the price ~ yielding excess profits equal to PQRS. Because NS is greater 
than M'M (the minimum average cost), Mrs. Robinson would conc~1de that 
there are too many firms in the industry. Her prescription for such a 
social malady would be a reduction in the number of firms by the elimina-
tion of the marginal ones (or one). 
Our analysis suggests that it would be better to fix attention on 
the marginal firm or firms and to inquire whether, from the data regard-
ing its position, both with respect to cost and with respect to consumer's 
surplus yielded, it should be in production.1 Is this firm an efficient 
producer? If we can further suppose that this firm has a marginal cost 
curve which in every point lies above the effective social marginal cost, 
we might be entitl9d to conclude that the cessation of production by this 
firm would yield a net social gain. The resources thus released might be 
put to a more profitable use elsewhere. The temporary loss from the un-
employment of the factors would soon be more than offset by the profit 
obtained in the new use. In the old use, the firm's profit could be re-
garded as illusory, for there was in reality a social loss. 
1 
I owe most of this analysis to John R. Hicks in whose seminar in 
Economic Analysis, I began to gain an insight into the welfare implica-
tions of monopolistic competition. 
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There are, however, other considerations to be made. The consumer's 
surplus obtained from the production and sale of the commodity must be 
taken into consideration in order to see the full issue at stake. We 
should have to consider whether the gain in the new use after the transfer 
of the productive factors was greater than the profit previously gained 
with the addition of the consumer' s surplus. In other words, we should 
have· to consider the total benefit. In fact, even when the firm under 
consideration is not making a profit, or perhaps is sustaining a loss, it 
may be yielding a very considerable consumer's surplus. Thus, if the out-
put were at some such level as 2.!f in Diagram 34, total benefit might be 
maximized even though there might be a very large loss. 
What has been said about the comparison between competitive output 
and monopolistic competition output has involved the assumption that Mrs. 
Robinson and Prof. Chamberlin used the demand curve we have designated as 
I. We have shown that in fact they used an average utility curve of the 
type we have called Ill. It should be obvious that if they are to be 
assumed to use Demand Curve II, the consumer's surplus curve technique 
loses it validity, for consumer's surplus is all "eaten up" by the per-
fectly discriminating monopolist. 
The setting out of a comparison between pure competition output 
(with demand curve I) and monopolistic competition output (with demand 
curve III) involves a number of technical difficulties. First, we shall 
have to recognize that the two outputs are not in a certain sense com-
Diagram 36 
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parable. Secondly, we have to draw a specialized demand curve to fit the 
demand conception which we have set out. The first difficulty is one 
which besets all comparisons between monopoly output and competitive out-
put and we shall simply assume that in the main there are elements of 
comparability.1 
The second difficulty involves a little geometry. In the diagram 
f ollowing, Demand Curve I is a marginal utility curve, Demand Curve II is 
an average utility curve such that the area OLP~1 represents total util-
ity and FQP1~1 consumer's surplus. If the monopolist should decide to 
take some fixed proportion (say PP2/ PP1) of the consumer's surplus by a 
discriminatory pricing technique, demand curve III would be determined. 
Demand curve III is not isoelastic with demand curve I but would bear a 
definite mathematical relationship to it. 
Now, if we draw Ilia marginal to III, it Will intersect MC at R' and 
determine a new higher level of output ~' than that determined under the 
1 
11 In order to make a valid theoretical comparison between competi-
tive output and monopoly output in a particular industry, it is necessary 
to make very severe assumptions. First, we must have a definite idea of 
what we mean by the commodity that we are considering. Secondly, if we 
wish to discuss what will happen to output and prices if a certain com-
modity, hitherto produced by competing firms, is monopolized, we must 
assume that neither the demand curve for the commodity nor the costs of 
production of any given output are altered by the change. These assump-
tions are unlikely to be fulfilled in any actual situation, and in study-
ing an actual case changes in demand and in the efficiency of production 
must be allowed for. On the assumption, that they are unchanged, the 
relationship between monopoly and competitive output can easily be dis-
covered." Robinson, op. ~·, pp. 113, 144. 
assumption of a marginal utility demand curve. At price ~2 profits 
will be larger while consumer's surplus will be a little less than at 
price LP. Thus, output under the concept of demand TII will be closer 
to the competitive output than under demand concept I.. As has been 
pointed out by Mrs. Robinson, output under demand concept II would be 
exactly equal to the competitive output, if average costs are constant 
(or if the average cost curve intersects the marginal utility curve at 
the minimum average cost). Otherwise, output under demand concept II 
will tend to be slightly more or slightly less than competitive output, 
depending on whether average costs are rising or falling. 
It is now apparent that most presentations of monopolistic competi-
tion output have understated monopoly output because of implicit assump-
tions with regard to consumer's surplus. Our examination of the average 
utility curve has pointed up the extent to which care must be taken in 
comparing monopoly and pure competition and helps to bring out what 
Chamberlin means by his insistence that the competitive "demand curve is 
1 
not the actual one which plays a part in determining the price • 11 
1 
Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 174. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
EVALUATION 
I 
The general conclusion o.f this dissertation mst now be clear. 
It is that the consumer's surplus is a tool of great utility in the 
determination of economic demand e~ilibrium. The review of the de-
velopment and application of the consumer's surplus Which has just 
been completed sought to show the natural evolution of this measure 
of the gains to members of society whieh result from the exchange pro-
cess. It was argued that Adam Smith's postulation of exchange e~Ui­
brium involved implicitly such a measure and that his paradox of value 
suggested its nature. It was shom that this relative surplus concept 
began ~th Ricardo's differential rent but was definitively presented 
in geometrical form by Dupuit llho dealt with the ~estion of the 
utility of social goods, states of demand for them, and mathematical 
exposition of these ideas. 
Though Mill's subtle reformulation of political economy in sub-
jective terms was slow to bring the indicated increased anphasis on 
utility, when once the marginal revolution had begun, both Jenkin and 
Marshall built upon a mathematical reinterpretation of Mill's subjec-
tivism, a measure of the gains to parties to the exchange process. 
Though, perhaps, Jenkin deserves pride of place, Marshall's treatment 
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is far more complete, wt hardly any more accurate. At llarshali's 
hands this relative subjective surplus became, as Hicks has later shown, 
the cornerstone of a system of welfare economics lhich S>ught to meas-
ure the results of f:inite changes in the static organization of economic 
society. 
The reconsideration of the meaning of the welfare economic propo-
sitions of the English classical economists with their marginal rein-
forcements as supplied by Marshall has naturally led to a renascence of 
the consumer's surplus. Its disuse over the period of the first four 
decades of the twentieth century is perhaps traceable to the preoccupa-
tion by economists with price economics, 1 following the suggestions of 
men like Davenport2 in the United States, Pigou3 in England, and Cassel4 
in Sweden. When once it began to be remembered that equilibrium condi-
tions and theories of marginal rewards were postulated in subjective 
terms and that they had validity only as they accorded with basic prin-
ciples of social interaction, it became again apparent that one needed 
1Another possible explanation is examined in mat follows. 
2 Cf. H. J. Davenport, The Economics of Enterprise (New York, 
The Macmillan Company, 1913). 
3 Cf. A. C. Pigou, Economics of Welfare (London, Macmillan Co.J 
Ltd., 1920). 
4 
Cf. G. Cassel, Theory~ Social Economy, translated by S. L. 
Barron (London, Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1932). 
to consider carefully the motivation that underlay tha process of' ex-
change. If' one rejected Smith 1s postulated instinct "to truck and bar-
ter, 11 one needed to show that gain proceeded from. the act of' exchange 
of' sufficient character to induce continuation of the process. 
II 
It can be argued that consumer's surplus cannot fulfill the role 
we have set out for it. Knight, for example, has insisted that as a 
measure of gain it is tainted at the source because of philosophical 
preconceptions. Thus he points out: 
It is not the province of' economics to determine 
the value o£ life, in "hedonic units 11 or any other 
units, but to work out, on the basis of the general 
principles of' conduct and tiE fundamental fact of the 
social situation, the laws lhich detennine the prices 
of' comm.orties and the direction of the s:>ci.a.l economic 
process. 
The consumer's surplus is an erroneous oonception not only because it 
seeks a measure in terms of very suspect philosophical quantities, but 
also because as it concerns "scope and method" there simply is not any 
use for it. Even if one were to admit that psychic variables of this 
character did exist, it 1Duld not follow that they were more than in-
definitely quantitative. Such a surplu~ is "very shadowy and elusive 
1 
Frank H. Knight, ~, Uncertainty ~ Profit (University of 
London Reprint, 1933), p. 71. 
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1 
••• if not altogether unreal." 
The mathematical equipment used to show the existence of this 
surplus is extraordinary, Knight went on, in that the ordinates of the 
utility curve 1man nothing definite. It would seem as a consequence 
that the area under the curve meant little more. It is obvious, then, 
that "the fallacious notion of the surplus follows • • • from the confu-
sion between momentary satiety and the correct standpoint, the estima-
2 
tion of relative importance of things in planning ahead ••• " 
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This sort of criticism is methodologically severe. It cannot be 
our part to examine fully the premise upon Yilich it is based. 3 That it 
was made was of itself of great importance in the history of this doc-
1 QE. cit., p. 69. 
3 
It must be noticed also that Knight has shifted ground. He now 
admits that "there can be no question of the 'theoretical reality• of 
consumer's surplus as defined (by Marshall)" though it "has extremely 
little practical significance." (F. H. Knight, "Realism & Relevance 
in the Theorr of Demand, 11 Journal 2.f Political Economy, Vol. LII, 
pp. 311, 312). Explaining how he came to change his mind, he says, 
"... especially important for my later thinking is my coming to real-
ize that because a 'variable' is not measured, or measurable, it does 
not follow that it is not quantitative in form; we are not necessarily 
thrown back on mere ranking as the only alternative.... It was my 
failure to see this fact ••• which led me to fall in with supposedly 'ad-
vanced' views in my doctoral dissertation ••• " (F. H. Knight, "Comment 
on llr. Bishop's Article," Journal of Political Econo.my, Vol. LIV, 
p. 176). This changed opinion, the result of a mature reconsideration 
of value problems, would seem to indicate that further oonsideration of 
this issue from Knight's analysis is fruitless. This, apparently Bishop 
did not recognize, 'When he s:>~ht to quote Knight's earlier w::>rk against 
him to convict him of error. {Cf. R. L. Bishop, "Professor Knight and 
the Theory of Demand, 11 Journal of Political Econo.my, Vol. LIV, pp.l4l.ff). 
trine and helps to explain why it has been necessary to rehabilitate 
the concept. The effectiveness of criticism nmst be sought not in the 
cogency of the reasoning involved but in the ultimate effect. In this 
instance, the ultimate effect has not been to destroy consumer's sur-
plus rut to cause it to be reclothed in a new dress less permeable to 
such attacks. 
Knight's criticism did not direct itself against the idea of su~ 
plus in any fonn whatsoever, for in his outline for the understanding 
of: 
the psychology of valuation, two points are equally 
important: (1) that, logically, choice is a matter of 
comparing alternatives and combining them according to 
the law of rational procedure ••• and (2) that there is 
none the less a practical difference beiween two kinds 
of alternatives in ordinary situations. 
Thus, though one might dispose of consumer's surplus in welfare prob-
lema, one had to seek out some other measure of gain. That no one 
other measure has appeared quite as :useful as consumer's surplus has 
led to its renascence, has been shown in the preceding chapters. 
A more telling criticism, that of Hobson, insists that mether 
methodologically correct or not, consumer's surplus is largely irrele-
vant. The division of society into two amorphous interest groups--
consumers and producers--is unreal and serves but little purpose in 
social analysis. As we have shown, Hobson w:>uld have us look at the 
1 
Risk, Uncertainty~ Profit, p. 72. 
I 
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individual member of society as a producer and inquire llhether he is 
obtaining a sufficient amount (in real terms) of what he procbces to 
give him incentive to continue and e:xpand his procbction. That some 
classes of producers wi.ll receive an unproc:IJ.ctive surplus (in this 
"incentive" sense) is characteristic of modem society. If, then, one 
sought a measure of welfare, one should look to the Smithian level of 
physical proc:IJ.etion and to the absolute surplus corr::ept. 
This Hobsonian criticism implies a viewpoint modern economies has 
not wanted to take, for it seemed to say that there was some necessary 
cost which was ascertainable in physical terms. It has proved just as 
difficult to find an objective measure of this cost (through a labor 
theory of value) as it is to find a subjective measure. Less meaning-
ful in relative terms, an objective measl.U"e can be found to involve as 
many philosophical and social preconceptions as a subjective measure. 
Welfare economics had then to turn back from the challenging suggestion 
of Hobson to the lla.rshallian formulation. 
1 2 .3 Samuelson, Allen, and Schultz, among others, have shom how it 
1 
Cf. P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1948). -
2 
Cf. R. G. D. Allen, 11The Economic Theory of Index Numbers 1 " 
Economica (New Series), Vol. XVI, pp. 197ff • 
.3 
Cf. H. Schultz, The Theory and Measurement of Demand (Chicago, 
University at Chicago Press, 19.38). 
.300 
is possibite to work on an objective level above that of utility which 
bears a relation to utility much as utility bears to the labor theory. 
Because only the barest beginnings have been n:a.de of the possibilities 
of analysis at this level, it is not possible to examine fully the con-
sequences of this reasoning for consumer's ~:nrplus. Knight, writing in 
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1944, finds this new level to be above "the vague idea of a teleological-
metaphysical necessity," to involve "an objective statement of Wl.at hap-
pens under explicitly given conditions," and to avoid 11the invalid prop-
1 
osition that •men have to live' • 11 This latter, he insists, is not a 
. 2 
"usable premise for objective economic anal.ys1s. 11 We have tried to 
examine, provisionally, the role. of oonsumer 1s surplus on this new 
level in Chapter Ill. It was concluded that it was perhaps best to pre-
serve the consumer's surplus in the present state of our knowledge and 
equipnent. 
As compared with the crude and inexact results obtained wi. th the 
consum!'r's surplus on what we have called the MarshalJian level, Samuel-
son argues that it is now possible to obtain results as easily (and more 
lucidly) with a consumer's preference field at two distinct situations~ 
All.en has applied to this s:>rt of reasoning an index number theory and 
thinks he has obtained a meaningful measure of gains and losses without 
1 
F. H. Knight, "Review of 'The Conception of Surplus in Theoreti-
cal Economics 1 by Amiyakumar Dasgupta (Calcutta, Dasgupta & Co., 1942)" 
Journal .2£ Political Economy, Vol. LII, p. 176. 
2 
Ibid. 
1 
reference to utility considerations of any kind. 
It should be noted, however, that these criticisms all lead to a 
conclusion that though the technique now in use is possibly faulty, 
all are seeking the same sort of criterion of the successful operation 
of the economy. It only serves to reinforce the basic conclusion of 
this paper when we record a recent admission that "arguments based 
upon the consumer's surplus are valid and important (though by no means 
2 . 
final). n Both Samuelson and Knight now agree that on this Uarshal-
lian level no better measure of welfare exists. 3 
III 
It will now be instructive to examine four possible stages of wel-
fare analysis.4 This methodological device seeks . to provide a means 
Vihereby certain aspects of the issues involved may be ccnsidered in 
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their proper turn and helps to present clearly the utility of consumer •s 
surplus in equilibrium analysis. 
1 
It is possible that the macroeconomics of Keynes and its welfare 
connotations can be better integrated to the body of neo-classical eco-
nomic principles at this new level. Cf. H. S. Ellis, "Competition and 
Welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics ~ Politica:L Science, Vol. XI, 
pp. 554!f. 
2with the qualification that problems of e'/ualit;y of income be ab-
stracted. Cf. D. H. Roberts_?!!.t.."A Revolutionist s Hanabook, 11 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol • .l....lUV, p. 7. 
3"As to 'consumer's surplus' there does not seem to be any impor-
tant issue. The concept is theoretically meaningful ••• 11 F. H. Knight, 
"Comment on Mr. Bishop's Article," p. 176. Cf. footnote to Page 98 
above for SBIIIUelson' s comment. 
4 
Cf. Samuelson, Foundations, Chapter VIII. 
303 
1 
On level one, we look at the Jenkin problem. Does one party not 
gain what the other loses? It has been shown that exchange equilibrium 
as postulated by tba classical economists, by Dupuit and Jenkin, by 
Marshall ani by Hicks involved at least tm marginal condition that ex-
change was in some wa:y mutually beneficial. This does not mean that we 
have shown that pure competition is the best position. It is entirely 
conceivable that Marxian exploitation may exist on this level. We re-
quire only that supply and danand curves intersect or what is the same 
thing, that indifference curves be tangent to procuction frontiers (or 
production indifference curves). It is obvious that at this level, 
consumer's surplus (and producer's surplus as well) does help to de-
scribe the equilibrium and to tell why the exchange is mutually bene-
ficial. It is perhaps on this level that most analysis proceeds. 
On level two, we consider the argument that the pure competition 
equilibrium position involves an optimum for each individual, consist-
ent with his initial supply of economic goods (including labor power) 
and the given mrket situation that oonfronts him. This, however, need 
not imply very much. The best of a given situation may be a relatively 
low optimum. It is obvious that this could describe monopoly and 
monopsony equilibrium as well. Hicks and his followers have sought to 
give technical exactness to the conditions of equilibrium on level 
1 
c. H. Fleeming Jenkin, 11 Is One Man's Gain Another Man •s Loss?" 
in s. Colvin and J. A. Ewing, editors Papere2 Literary, Scientific, 
lli•' & the late Fleeming Jenkin, Vol. II (Loncbn; Longmans, Green, 
and Co., 1887;.-
1 
tlVO. Their stability conditions W>uld require that indi!ference 
curves be convex to the origin and that all procilction frontiers be 
concave to it. In other words, it is r~ired that danand curves be 
monotonic falling and that supply curves be monotonic rising curves, 
and that they intersect at only one point where consumer's surplus is 
ma.x.i.mized. Hicks has sho'Wn that the stability conditions ean be very 
clearly stated if we take consumer's surplus (or some such measure) 
explicitly into consideration. 2 
On level three, we do not attempt to show that each individual 
is at some optimum position, but that in so.ae sense tba sum total of 
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satisfactions of society as a vbole is maximized. In other words, we 
postulate that an ideal compromise has been effected so that (real or 
money) income of all individuals is tre largest possible under existing 
conditions. On this level, Marshall's consumers' surplus (and that of 
Jenkin and Dupuit), depending as they do in some way upon interpersonal 
comparisons of utility, have been used to show what the ideal out. put of 
social goods, for example, maans. It has been sho11l that this equili-
brium. was rejected by Marshall as one of ultimate maximization of wel-
fare, for we have not as yet inq.1ired about the distribution of income. 
It is quite possible that sone other position than the equilibrium one 
1 
Reder's little book summarizes most of the Hicksian welfare anal-
ysis. Cf. M. W. Reder, Studies in the Theory of Welfare Economics (New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1947) Esp. Chapters I to IV. 
2 
Hicks, in his "Foundations of Welfare Economics, 11 Economic Journal, 
Vol. XLIIX, pp. 696ff, outlines these conditions. 
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may yield more satisfactions. It is obvious that if consu~r•s sur-
pluses of some individuals can be increased by more they are decreased 
for other individuals by a given change in the market situation, the 
equilibrium is not one of optimum. 
On this third level, Hicks has introduced the use of the Edge-
worth (and Paretian) contract curve. It is possible to shoi'l 'What finite 
changes in welfare (consumer's a1rplus) yield positions on the contract 
curve and lhich involve move~nts awa:y from it. It should be noticed 
that the range of possible equilibria along the contract cUJ:"ve is from 
the lowest possible indifference curve of one trader (the "zero satis-
1 faction curve 11 ) to the lowest possible indifference curve of the other 
trader. In effect, the analysis on the third level of welfare economics 
adds an income dimension to the supply and demand diagram and shows that 
the intersection of the supply and demand curves yields not one point 
but a series of points along a cmtract curve, every om of lhich maxi-
mizes consumer's surplus. 
It becones obvious that level four concerns the distribution of 
income. It might be postulated that exchange under perfect competition 
is optimal when incone is distributed optimally. For so~ 1 this has 
meant equality of distribution. We have examined ltlat equality of dis-
tribution might entail. To others, an optimal distribution of income 
1 
cr. A. G. Hart, 11Peculiarities of Indifference Maps Involving 
Money," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. Vlli, pp. 126ff. 
involves capacity to enjoy (and implicitly tba societal structure). 
Insofar as the right goods are chosen with the optimally distributed 
incomes, consumer's surplus can be used on this level to measure the 
gain. It must be admitted that little of value can be said in these 
terms. Though this may be regarded as a matter of sone importance to 
3o6 
modern states, economists do not as yet have tools Which can offer pre-
cise and meaningful answers in this realm. 
Hicks' total conditions, like those of Wicksell, 1 are stated not 
in tenns of income distribution rut in te:rms of "maximized production." 
Because maximized production under perfect competition means in some 
wa.y maximized satisfactions, and since an inappropriate distribution 
of income paves the way for imperfect competition, this becones an in-
direct way of putting the matter. It is, then, impossible to increase 
welfare by changing the current rate of output of any good by any firm 
or individual (including variations from zero), by changing the current 
rate of consumption of any good by any consumer (including variations 
from zero), or by changing the currEnt rate of use of any factor of pro-
duction (including variations from zero). Reder has shovn that all con-
ditions of welfare are included in these total eODditions. 
If it could be shown that a new product, not previously made or 
wanted, could be introduced into the current market and yield a con-
1 
K. Wicksell, Lectures ~ Political Economy {English translated, 
New York, The Macmillan Company, 1934) Cited in Samuelson, Foundations. 
sumer 's surplus greater than any loss of production sustained in its 
cost of production, it would follow that. the total conditions were not 
fulfilled. 
IV 
It is believed that a careful consideration of the arguments 
against the eo nsumer' s surplus (or, if you will, eo nsumer s • sln"plus) 
will show that they are for the most part directed against unessential 
features of the doctrine. The _most telling argument against it, we 
have elsewhere pointed out, is not that it is in error, but. that it is 
irrelevant. Samuelson's arguments against it revolve around a reluc-
tance to accept Hicks' widened interpretation and do not weigh against 
some such measure but against this particular formulation. 
It must be insisted finally that economics both as a science of 
static equilibrium tendencies and of dynamic trends needs a basic law 
of interaction. Though we do not intend to say that the consumer •s 
surplus indicates the full nature of such a basic law, it is in the 
direction of a causative principle and as such helps to give meaning 
to the results of analyses. 
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In this dissertation I review the history and the developmant. of 
the concept of tre consumer's rurplus. My purpose is to give focus to 
the role of this ooncept in equilibrium determination for consumer 
demand and procb.ction theory and thus to point up the wel.fare signifi-
cance a! certain consumer and producer decisions. My method is basical-
ly illustrative. I draw my principal conclusion-that ccnsumer • s sur-
plus is an analytical tool a! great utility and therefore merits its 
recent rehabilitation--from an examination of the meaning of consumer 
equilibrium. This I do by, first, defining surplus, and attempting a 
classification of it. Then I proceed to a consideration of the connec-
tion between major surplus concepts and of the unique role of the con-
sumer 1 s surplus. Having done this, I look into the develo~nt a! 
consumer demand theory to see how conswner•s surplus plays its role 
there. My next step is the outlining a! the welfare systems of major 
economists as these systems involve a consumer's surplus. Lastly, 
after a consideration of two probleu of ideal out put in procllction 
theory, I give attention to the criticisms of tre oonswner •s surplus 
and sunmarize my conclusions regarding the use of the concept. 
Though this is not explicitly a history or welfare economics, it 
does, in fact, shed some light on the meaning of welfare economic prin-
ciples. Accordingly, after having set out tre method and limitations 
of this paper, I devote the remainder of Chapter One to a non-technical 
description of the welfare postulates of classical and neo-classical 
economists and their recent amendments so that the place of consumer's 
surplus in welfare analysis ~ be clearly seen. 
In Chapter Tf«) I define the relationship of consumer's surplus 
theory to other theories of surplus. Because this is still a confused 
question, I distinguish carefully between rent, surplus value, and the 
consumer's surplus insofar as possible. At the same time, however, I 
do point up the ambiguous similarities. This chapter begins with a 
short definition of surplus (Section I). In Section II, I outline the 
ultimate nature of surplus in society and in Section ill, suggest a 
method of classification of surplus concepts in llhich I emphasize the 
absolute-relative distinction. I place consumer's surplus in the rela-
tive category though I also undertake to examine mat an absolute con-
sumer's surplus might entail. Sections IV, V, and VI are those in 
l'b.ich I show how consumer's surplus, rent, and surplus value may be 
set apart. 
The purpose of Chapter Three is to show how the theory of con-
sumer's surplus has changed in accordance ld.th changes in the theory 
of consumer demand. It is, therefore, an outline of those phases of 
consumer demand theory that relate directly to oonsu.oer' s surplus. 
The order of presentation is chronological and the material presented 
is divided according as it preceded Marshall, as it was developed at 
the hands of Marshall, and as it has grol'll up after .Marshall. In order 
that the treatment in this chapter might be complete, some portions of 
its analysis tend to overlap and perhaps may seem repetitious of pas-
sages of the last and following chapters. It will be found, however, 
that this outline of consumer demand theory will help to make the parts 
fall into their proper places in the mole of tre dissertation. In 
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this chapter, I do not seek to show that consumer's Slrplus is a neces-
sary tool but that it is indeed a useful one and that it naturally 
follows from the specific concept of consumer demand. 
The core of my dissertation is the outline in Chapters Four, Five, 
and Six of the welfare economic principles of seven economists as these 
principles involved the laying of a foundation for and tre development 
and use of the consumer• s surplus. These seven--Adam Smith, A. J. E. J. 
Dupuit, H. C. Fleeming Jenkin, Alfred Marshall, S. N. Patten, J. A. 
Hobson, and J. R. Hicks-are not alone in having treated wi. th the notion 
of a consumer's surplus, but they are the ones "Nlo have shaped the doc-
trine into its present form. Insofar as others l'ave made significant 
contributions either toward emendation or clarification, their YPrks 
are alluded to or considered in tbase chapters. The central theme of 
these three chapters is the development and use of tre collBU.ID9r •s sur-
plus as a welfare tool; the method-a separate study of each economist •s 
dicta. 
Chapter Four, then, gives a study of Adam Smith's pioneer analysis 
of equilibrium and its meaning. This study attempts to show how a labor 
theory of value involves an absolute surplus concept of progress. It 
also seeks to demonstrate how Smith's paradox of value, 1\bich was for 
him an aside, set the stage for tba development of a doctrine of a 
relative consumer's surplus which had to await the introduction of a 
relativistic or marginalistic approach to economics. 
Chapter Five traces this developnent of an explicit consumer 'a 
surplus at the hands of A. J. E. J. Dupuit, H. c. Fleeming Jenkin, and 
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Alfred Marshall-each a pioneer in his own right. Their ideas regard-
ing the role and significance of this' measure of benefit accruing to 
the consumer from the act of exchange are set forth in Sections I, II, 
and III. Although the accomplishments of Dupuit and Fleeming Jenkin 
are no less worthy of notice than those of Alfred Marshall, yet because 
the neo-classical economics of Marshall has had tre greater influence, 
the analysis of his ideas is tre more complete. An attanpt is nade, in 
Section ill, to clear up a co.!IliiDn contusion about Marshall's measure of 
consumer • s surplus and to show that even it one does not agree as to 
which of three neasures he will accept, it any, the ideas Ybich the con-
cept, expresses are still useful. Most careful treatnent, in this sec-
tion, is given to a methodological prop of Ma.rshallian analysis-the 
assumption of the constant marginal utility of money. Sections IV and 
V present the attempts at incorporation of the consumer's surplus into 
systems of welfare principles.. s. N. Patten and J. A. Hobson, although 
I 
by no means pioneers in tre development of the concept, nevertheless 
were the first who sought to show how it could be used as an explicit 
measure of the justice of the distributive system. Building on the 
suggestions of Marshall am his predecessors, Patten and Hobson fit the 
concept into an analysis of the benefits of capitalism. The thirty 
years or more from Jenkin's and Marshall's first V«>rks to Hobson's 
Economics of Distribution saw a rapid and widening use of the concept. 
These years were followed by a period of disuse. 
Chapter Six is one in vbich I undertake to examine why consumer • s 
. 
surplus should have fallen into disuse and how it has been rehabilitated 
at the hands of John R. Hicks. Sections I and II re-outline the prob-
lem of oonsumer eq.lilibrium, tn:, contribution of the marginal utility 
doctrine in the statement of tre issues involved, and the nature of 
the difficulties John R. Hicks sought to overcome as he began his 
rehabilitation of tl:e consumer's surplus. Section III is expository 
in character, being a summary of the recent work of Hicks in this 
field. It also seeks to show why Hicks should have regarded the con-
sumer's surplus as necessary to his newer system of welfare economics. 
It ends with an evaluation of the accomplishments of Hicks. 
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Chapter Seven reviews the wccy-s in Ybich consumer •s surplus can be 
applied to problems in production theory. Two problems are considered-
those of the ideal output of goods \thich are not divisible and lilose 
production does not usually involve profit maximization (i.e. 11social 
goods"), and those of ideal. output under monopolistic competition. 
These treatments are necessarily only suggestive but, they do ou.tline 
possible further lines of analysis. 
My purpose in Chapter Eight, Yhich is the last one of the disse!'-
tation, is to determine whether the criticisms directed against the 
consumer's surplus will affect tre general conclusions of the paper. 
I do not seek so much to evaluate the criticisms for themselves as to 
discover the effect of those criticisms on those phases of consumer's 
surplus theory at vbich the criticisms are aimed. In this way, I at-
tempt to show both why these criticisms were for so long a time effec-
tive and how they have recently been overcome. I conclude the chapter 
with a setting out of four possible levels of welfare analysis in order 
to determine what part col1Sl.UI8r 1s surplus can play at. each level. This 
methodological device enables me to consider in their tum certain of 
the issues involved and to summarize lbat I have said in this paper 
about the utility of the consumer's surplus. 
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